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Abstract 
 
What makes a person take up a cause? This ethnographic study of environmental and 
social activists in Kerala, India examines how they commit themselves to normative visions for 
social transformation and how they attempt to persuade others to take up these causes as 
well. Through thick description of the causal forces at play in these processes, I attempt to push 
beyond the binary between freedom and determinism in ethical life. 
  This study is based on thirty-two months of fieldwork conducted between 2005 and 2014 
with activists in Kerala’s “people's struggles,” a mode of grassroots community organizing 
primarily concerned with the impacts of industrial pollution, land rights, and other environmental 
conflicts. Fieldwork focused on two groups of activists as they collaborated on a campaign to 
stop pollution from a suburban gelatin factory. The first group was a local action council formed 
by nearby residents to protest the health effects of the factory’s emissions. The second group was 
a network of environmentalists who supported such campaigns as part of a broader effort at 
radically transforming environmental values. Making use of archival data, recordings of face-to-
face interaction, participant observation, and interviews, the study follows activists as they 
transformed their own ethical lives—learning protest songs, going to marches instead of going to 
work, or giving up tea and Western medicine—and also as they attempted to persuade others 
with magazine articles, roadside speeches, and guided tours of pollution.  
  xi 
 
This dissertation challenges dominant accounts of purpose and agency in literatures on 
social movements, community organizing, and the anthropology of ethics. Drawing on moral 
philosophy and the linguistic anthropology of stance, I trace relations of influence from 
evaluating subject to evaluated object, object to subject, and between subjects. I show that the 
causes of people’s struggle activists are best understood not as functions of predetermined 
interests, nor as the creations of radically free subjects, but as products of activists’ interactions 
with social others and a value-laden world. Describing the entanglements of changing oneself 
and changing others in people’s struggle activism, I argue for the importance of various 
“unfreedoms” in even the most strategic, norm-contesting ethical projects. 
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Chapter 1: Changing Oneself, Changing Others 
1.1 Ordinary Anxieties 
Dinner went late that night. We were celebrating the departure of Sunil, my research 
assistant, and I had brought home a feast of takeout: chicken, fish, mussels, fried rice, and 
various sweet treats. Long after we had all eaten our fill, we sat together on the tile floor, cross-
legged or propped on our wrists among the greasy plates and half-empty cartons, talking.  
Sunil and I had been living with Adarsh, Faiza, and their daughter for almost a year, he 
playing the adopted anthropologist as much as I.1 Indeed, Sunil arguably played the role better 
because he played it more quietly, being less quick than I to stake out his own positions in this 
activist household's many debates. Adarsh and Faiza were part of a network of environmental 
and social activists involved in Kerala's "people's struggles," janakīya samaraṅṅaḷ, a mode of 
grassroots community organizing primarily concerned with the impacts of industrial pollution, 
land rights, and other environmental conflicts. We regularly received visitors with strong 
opinions, and a couple of our most frequent guests were with us that night, as well as Faiza's 
father and sister, who were never shy of speaking their minds. Over time, we had come to 
recognize that Sunil, a devout Muslim, had some strong opinions of his own. But whether 
because of his dedication to his role as researcher or because of his relative youth, he tended to 
                                                 
1 In order to protect confidentiality, pseudonyms are used for people and some place names and 
geographic markers. For people, pseudonyms are selected to approximate the caste and religious 
associations of the actual name. Exceptions are made for those who expressly requested to have 
their real names used. 
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keep his views to himself. Perhaps for this reason, now that he was on the verge of saying 
goodbye, everyone had questions for him. 
What was Sunil's first impression of me? Of Adarsh and Faiza? In his opinion, what were 
our bad traits? The more he hedged and demurred, the more provocative our questions became.  
"And what about that night during Ramadan when John ate the food we put out for you?" 
Adarsh quipped, "How did that feel?2" 
"If that food helped to end John's hunger, then I am content," said Sunil with a 
mischievous smile. Adarsh howled and laughter erupted all around. 
Finally, after much thought, I asked Sunil a more serious question: When, during all of 
our experiences together, had he been most afraid? He took a long pause before answering, 
casting a meaningful look in my direction, as if he knew what I expected he would say. But the 
story he told was not what I would have guessed at all. 
Sunil told about a day when he had purchased some vegetables on his way home. Faiza 
did nearly all of the cooking for our house, with occasional help from Adarsh, so Sunil and I 
considered it our part to contribute to the raw materials, so to speak. That day he carried three 
plastic bags of produce across the soccer ground that lay between the vegetable shop and our 
house. But as he got closer, he began to get anxious about how Faiza might react if he returned 
with these three big plastic bags. Not just anxious, he said, but afraid. He put everything down 
and carefully packed all of the vegetables into just two bags. Then he threw the other bag into a 
small water reservoir next to the soccer field, a place used by many of our neighbors as a 
makeshift landfill. 
                                                 
2 This unfortunate incident was the result of a misunderstanding of the meaning of a plate of 
food left on the kitchen counter at night. For discussion of the capacity of gifts to “become lost to 
those whom they would serve,” see Keane, 1997, p. 91-93. 
  3 
 
When Faiza heard this story, she laughed. She teased Sunil for worrying so much about 
such a little thing. What, she asked, could he have possibly thought she would do to him? Her 
sister needled Sunil for finding Faiza so terrifying. Everyone laughed, and I laughed too, but not 
in quite the same way as the others. I laughed because, over the course of five years studying 
people's struggle activists in Kerala, I had been in that kind of situation so many times before—
slipping into the bathroom to take my allergy medicine or looking over my shoulder as I ducked 
into an ice cream store. I laughed because I knew the "fear" Sunil was talking about. I laughed at 
the ridiculous things living alongside environmental activists had made me do. 
The reader may well find it puzzling how such ordinary things (e.g., one among the 
millions of polyethylene bags that daily convey purchased goods to Kerala homes) could be the 
source of so much anxiety. One part of this puzzle is the question of how ethical value can be 
rescaled such that ordinary, usually unremarkable acts become subject to intense evaluation and 
reform. To be clear, this was not a puzzling matter for Faiza, Adarsh, or the other activists with 
us that night; the smallness of plastic bags did not come into their jokes. To varying degrees, 
these activists took changes in the everyday habits of one's own life to be crucial levers for 
transforming the "broader" social world. Thus, they were often engaged in contesting the 
boundaries between the ethical and the nonethical, making seemingly unimportant aspects of 
life—like milk, soap, tea, or the alignment of one's stride—part of a larger normative project of 
social change. Within this scalar paradigm, bringing a few plastic bags from the vegetable 
market was seen as perpetuating, rather than challenging, an accumulation of plastic waste that 
was overflowing Kerala’s landfills and sickening those who lived nearby. Indeed, several of 
Kerala’s most prominent people’s struggles were pitted against such landfills. Thus, Adarsh was 
careful to pack an empty fabric bag in his knapsack every morning just in case he needed to buy 
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anything on the way home. Plastic bags  might be so pervasive as to seem ordinary, but this was 
the very reason they were so important. 
But there is a second part to this puzzle, a part that Faiza, Adarsh, and their guests 
seemed to find puzzling as well. How could Faiza's concern with plastic bags have stirred such 
powerful emotion in Sunil? To be sure, she and Adarsh avoided using plastic themselves, and 
they were in support of a ban on plastic bags. But, like other environmentalists and people's 
struggle activists I studied, Faiza and Adarsh did not see themselves as forcing their views or 
their chosen way of life on others. Indeed, they considered the expansion of individual freedom 
to be a central aim of their efforts for social change. This was particularly true with regard to 
their efforts to reform their everyday lives; in working to change themselves, they were actively 
challenging widespread social norms that they saw as perpetuating social inequality and 
environmental degradation. These were practices of freedom. The notion that such practices 
could instill fear was incongruous, even ridiculous. 
And yet, the anxiety Sunil felt about the plastic bag reflects a persistent aspect of our 
shared experience conducting participant observation among activists in people's struggles. We 
used to sneak off together sometimes, for a club soda or for lunch in an AC restaurant, and we 
would talk about our feelings of vigilance, apprehension, sometimes even fear. We knew that 
those we studied would have found our anxieties silly, and it was not that we were really worried 
that they would do anything to us. It was simply that we were aware that moral judgment was in 
play. We were not like these activists—we used plastic bags, took allergy medicine, and drank 
club soda—and we knew we would be found out. The supposed "smallness" of all these things 
only made this experience more oppressive. With so many ordinary things under moral scrutiny, 
how were we to know when we might stumble into ethical trouble? We were constantly on high 
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alert. Thus, the pervasive work of self-reform in which we were immersed felt anything but 
freeing. It made us worry about what would otherwise have been of no concern. It made us do 
what we would not otherwise have done. As for Faiza and Adarsh, the question of why these 
activists' work upon themselves had such effects on us was puzzling. But it was no joke. 
1.2 Practices of Freedom Among Other Forces 
How can living out one's vision of the good life bring about unfreedom in the lives of 
others? Many recent anthropological treatments of ethics have focused largely on the exercise of 
freedom (2012, pp. 91-93; Faubion, 2001; Heywood, 2015; Laidlaw, 2002, 2014b; Mahmood, 
2005; Pandian, 2009). In an attempt to counter what some argue was an earlier over-emphasis on 
rules and obligations as the building blocks of moral order, anthropologists have described 
people who actively order their own lives in accordance with their values. These accounts of 
ethical freedom, like accounts of norms, tell a story about the social forces that drive the 
evaluative dimension of human life. But by framing ethics as either the work of society upon 
individuals or the work of the self upon itself, anthropologists give prominence to some forces 
over others, while failing to adequately attend to the interactions among them. Both stories make 
it difficult to understand how freedom and unfreedom can coincide. 
What Sunil's predicament shows is that other stories could be told. Living out one's 
values may at times be largely a matter of following rules (Durkheim, 1961; Mahmood, 2005; 
Robbins, 2004), pursuing one's chosen vision of the good (Dave, 2012; Laidlaw, 2002), or both 
(Keane, 2010; Robbins, 2007). But it is also often about imposing one's own visions of the good 
upon others. This latter aspect of ethics is particularly evident among activists. Faiza and Adarsh, 
like the other activists I studied, engaged in a politics of moral transformation, seeking to change 
widely-held ethical values in order to bring about their vision for a better social world. They 
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were pursuing their chosen way of life, but changing others was integral to that way of life. 
Those who lived alongside them, like myself, Sunil, and our neighbors, felt the pressure of Faiza 
and Adarsh's social change efforts even when those efforts were not directed at us. 
The recent anthropology of ethics has not only described the exercise of freedom; it has 
also been a forum for the critique of freedom. In particular, anthropologists have been concerned 
to distinguish their conceptualizations of ethical freedom from liberal notions of individual 
autonomy as an ethical ideal. For example, James Laidlaw's proposal for an anthropology of 
ethics as the study of practices of freedom begins from an analysis of Jain ascetic practices, in 
which all desires are "enumerated, identified, repudiated, and extinguished" so as to achieve self-
renunciation and, ultimately, the destruction of the self (Laidlaw, 2002). Laidlaw acknowledges 
that, insofar as such practices aim at destroying both desires and the desiring self, they may seem 
to run counter to prevalent notions of freedom. But he argues that because Jains' pursuit of self-
destruction is generally undertaken as a "voluntary ethical project," it should be understood as a 
form of free self-cultivation (Laidlaw, 2002, p. 326). The criterion for whether a social practice 
is an ethical "practice of freedom," he argues, should not be made with reference to its endpoint, 
but rather with reference to the process through which it is pursued. 
Like Laidlaw, Saba Mahmood develops a critique of ethical freedom from an account of 
practices that appear unfree from the perspective of liberal norms, but her argument against these 
norms is more radical. In an ethnography of a piety movement among Muslim women in Cairo, 
she challenges the applicability of any preconceived "procedural" notion of freedom to the work 
these women undertake in cultivating virtues such as fear of divine retribution, submission to 
religious authority, and obedience to one's husband (Mahmood, 2005). Mahmood finds resources 
for her analysis in Foucault's treatments of subjectivity as both "subjection" (French, 
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assujettissement), or the ways in which relations of power constitute subjects (Butler, 1997, p. 2; 
Foucault, 1978), and as "moral subjectivation," or the ways in which people take themselves to 
be ethical subjects accountable to moral codes (Foucault, 1990, pp. 27-29).3 She argues that these 
ideas pose a paradox in that the formation of the subject and its ability to act are "enabled and 
created by specific relations of subordination" (Mahmood, 2005). Viewed through this lens, the 
pursuit of obedience and submission by participants in piety movements is neither mere coercion 
nor "voluntary slavery" (Mahmood, 2005, p. 149). Rather, it is the basis for their ethical freedom 
as Muslim women. 
Thus, Mahmood's argument leaves aside the fundamental voluntarism that Laidlaw 
retains. Nonetheless, both critiques of freedom share a common form; they both seek to 
recuperate some story of freedom from ethical lives that might, they acknowledge, seem 
profoundly unfree to the naive Western liberal observer. Importantly, in neither case does the 
author claim that the idea of freedom was important to those they studied. Indeed, in both cases, 
it would seem that the respective parties are mainly concerned with other ideas, other aims, the 
value of which justified subordination or even elimination of their desires and freedoms. And 
yet, stories about the free work of the self upon the self can be told even here. 
Efforts by Faiza, Adarsh, and other Malayali4 activists to change the world by changing 
their own ethical orientations and everyday habits—to "be the change they wish to see in the 
                                                 
3 The continuity that Mahmood assumes across Foucault’s work is a matter of some debate. 
While she calls both concepts “subjectivation,” the prior concept, which appears to be Foucault’s 
main concern in work prior to the second volume of The History of Sexuality is generally glossed 
as “subjection.” While Foucault retrospectively described an overarching concern with 
subjectivity across his work (e.g., Foucault, 1983), it is not clear that his various treatments of 
the topic cohere in one theory of subjectivation (Flynn, 1985; Kelly, 2013). 
4 The people of the state of Kerala, India, in which this research was conducted, are usually 
referred to as Malayalis, after the state’s dominant language of Malayalam. 
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world"5—make for a far more straightforward account of ethical freedom. Indeed, although the 
scalar perspectives that underpin these efforts have a clear South Asian pedigree (see Chapters 2 
and 6), these activists quite often invoked liberal arguments for individual freedom in describing 
their own aims. And yet, as Sunil's anxieties about plastic bags illustrate, efforts to transform 
oneself can overflow the self, such that an exercise of freedom becomes also an imposition of 
pressure upon others. Indeed, even work upon oneself regarding apparently "small" matters can, 
at least in some cases, occasion heavy and unwanted pressure. Thus, rather than an account of 
how freedom can be recuperated from apparent unfreedom, here we see how even the explicit 
pursuit of freedom can engender unfreedom. 
But my aim is not simply to recuperate unfreedom from freedom. Rather, insofar as the 
complexity of evaluative practices (whether intuitively liberating or not) consistently confounds 
the dichotomy between freedom and unfreedom, understanding the dynamics of causal influence 
in human ethics may require more subtle terms. Temporarily bracketing some of the contrasts 
that have dominated the anthropology of ethics—such as freedom/unfreedom, good/obligation, 
reflexivity/habit, choice/norm, and self/society—may be the best way of getting a handle on 
when and how these various factors make a difference in ethical lives. And this is particularly 
true, I would argue, for an adequate account the ethical projects of the activists described here, 
who pursue change of self and others in tandem. What is required is a survey of the forces, 
understood as broadly as possible, at play in efforts to bring about moral change.  
                                                 
5 Although it is not clear that Mohandas K. Gandhi ever said or wrote precisely these words, this 
aphorism is attributed to him on the T-shirts and coffee mugs of countless social work schools 
and service organizations around the world (Morton, 2011). The activists studied here were also 
familiar with this Gandhian “meme.” Although consideration of such notions in Gandhi’s own 
thought is beyond the scope of this study, the centrality of self-oriented change among these 
activists was clearly influenced by Gandhian organizing traditions. 
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Such a survey of forces offers a reframing for the study of ethical freedom. Freedom is a 
complex, multifarious, and highly normative notion that has been central not only to recent 
anthropological debates, but to Western social theory in the broadest possible sense. It is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to propose any new theory of freedom. What a survey of forces 
helps to highlight, however, is that freedom is fundamentally a causal concept. In Laidlaw’s 
words, the question of ethical freedom has been understood as the question, “of whether or in 
what sense peoples’ actions are unconstrained and really their actions” (Laidlaw, 2014b, p. 6). In 
other words, freedom can be understood as a relation between trajectores of force—between 
forces from the self and forces upon the self. Thus, to trace the multiple trajectories of causal 
influence that contribute to the ethical lives of activists is also to explore forms and degrees of 
freedom and unfreedom, but without presupposing that ethics itself is fundamentally free or 
unfree. 
Relatedly, in both sociology and anthropology, the study of social movements and 
activism has received increased interest with a shift in emphasis (speaking here in the broadest 
terms) from social stability and reproduction to social change and, relatedly, from society and 
social norms to the discrete projects of particular social actors—what has been called a turn to 
“practice” (Ortner, 1984). In this context, the lives of those who transgress or work to change 
social norms became more than aberrations in the social order; they became, in effect, a site for 
exploring how social orders are disassembled and remade. To some extent, the activists I studied 
also understood themselves in the same way. However, particularly with regard to the shaping of 
ethical orientations, the agency of activists was often limited. With regard to work upon 
themselves, activists did cultivate their own ethical orientations, but they also described how 
they were affected by others (including other activists) or by the valences apparent to them in 
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their socio-material world. Likewise, in their efforts to persuade others, activists often sought to 
enroll material things—such as evidence of pollution—that could bolster their own efforts, but 
had difficulty controlling these things.  
The emphasis on human freedom—and especially Foucauldian “autopoesis,” or the work 
of the self upon the self (Faubion, 2001)—in the anthropology of ethics tracks closely with the 
broader “turn to practice” narrative described above and could even be thought of as late to the 
party in this respect. My chief contribution to this literature is to direct attention to how people 
exert influence or pressure on the ethical lives of others—arguably the quintessential activity of 
an activist ethics. On the one hand, I show that the problem with Durkheimian moral theory is 
not in his emphasis on social control, but in the way Durkheim imagined society. Seen through 
the lens of activist ethics, normative forces of social control are not from society above, but from 
“the people standing next to you.”6 On the other hand, I also show how ethical self-cultivation is 
not only influenced by moral pressure from others, but also exerts pressure upon others, even 
when those concerned claim to only be interested in changing themselves. Thus, the looping 
influence of selves upon themselves is just one stitch in a tightly woven web of agonistic and 
reinforcing forces. 
In their efforts for social change, activists in Kerala's people's struggles engaged in 
contention  over ethical judgements about right and wrong, good and bad, justice and injustice. 
They sought to creatively elaborate new values for themselves and persuade others to adopt new 
values and judgments as well. Both in changing themselves and in changing others, they 
exercised considerable agency, but they were not the only agents. People's struggle was an 
                                                 
6 I am grateful to Charles Zuckermann for suggesting this point. 
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interactive pursuit, in which activists sought to employ forces that they could not entirely 
control—for example, the  forces of arguments and ideas, material evidence, TV newscasts, and 
bodily conflict in addition to the forces of kinship ties or self-discipline.  
To be clear, my aim is not to describe the workings of a "force" manifest in various forms 
but ultimately unified, as in a certain galaxy far far away. I have selected the term "forces" only 
for its vagueness, seeking to begin the search for what matters to ethical life agnostically, 
without presuming any general picture. Chiefly, I do not wish to give privilege to any of the 
possible trajectories of influence between selves and their others. Thus, I take up the term 
"forces" here, at the outset, only in order to emphasize that the relevant trajectories may not only 
be those of freedom (self → self or self → other), nor unfreedom (others → self), nor the work 
of some upon others that is commonly called "activism." In what follows, I leave this general 
term aside in favor of the verbs that best describe any particular trajectory of influence, 
motivation, or compulsion. 
 In addition, I wish to leave open the relation between evaluating subject and evaluated 
object, allowing for the possibility that the work of evaluation is not all on either side. Activists 
took on new ethical orientations not merely by force of will, but because they felt inspired by 
examplars and compelled by injustices in their social worlds. Their moral creativity was a 
practice of attunement, even obedience, to the ethical demands of a non-neutral reality. 
Moreover, insofar as to adopt new ethical orientations for oneself was also often to exert force 
upon the lives of others, persuasive force was already stirring in the creative process. The 
language of forces makes room for uncertainty about subject-object relations as well. However, 
as with self-other relations, the description of these relations will require more specific terms. 
This dissertation explores the interplay of forces in the ethical lives of activists working 
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on Kerala's people's struggles. Efforts at avoiding plastic and other objectionable ordinary things 
form only one aspect of this activism—an aspect which some activists made central and others 
considered a distraction. But across all aspects of people's struggles, such as the campaign to shut 
down a polluting gelatin factory that forms a major site for this study, one can find the work of 
changing oneself and changing others in complex and mutually-supportive relation. By breaking 
with the concepts of freedom and unfreedom, we can better understand how multiple causal 
mechanisms converge and interact in the tandem projects of changing oneself and changing 
others and more fully appreciate how various trajectories of influence may be operant at once. 
We can also more effectively analyze how such projects mix ethics and politics. 
1.3 Ethics and Politics in Kerala's People's Struggles 
As Lambek points out, the recent turn to ethics in anthropology has been, in part, a turn 
away from "analyses that emphasize structure, power, and interest" (Lambek 2010, 1). One can 
see this same shift in the emphasis given to freedom and reflexivity in this literature; questions 
about what people live for only make sense insofar as their lives are not entirely determined by 
structures, powers, or interests. In analyzing activism as an ethical7 practice, I tread this same 
path. However, like others calling for attention to ethics, my aim is not to leave behind the 
analysis of structures, powers and interests, but to integrate the analysis of ethics and politics. 
Activist contention over ethical values offers an ideal site to take up this integrative work. 
At first glance, it might seem that Kerala's people's struggles are better understood as an 
arena of political contention than of ethical contention. The local Action Council formed by 
                                                 
7 One source of confusion in scholarship on ethics is that the English adjectives “ethical” and 
“moral” share two common uses—to indicate what “has to do with” ethics or morality and to 
indicate what is of positive ethical or moral value. Throughout this manuscript, I will use these 
terms with exclusively with the prior meaning. To indicate what is positively valued by someone, 
I will use “good,” “right,” “just,” or other such less ambiguously normative terms. 
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residents to oppose the gelatin factory in the village of Gandhamur, for example, was not so 
much concerned with changing people's values as with simply shutting the factory down. To do 
so, they needed to persuade others that their cause was just, but even this process required the 
use of physical force, including violence (see Chapter 4). Likewise, Sunil's experience of fear 
could be read as a story about power more than a story about values insofar as he was younger 
than Faiza, from a relatively lower class and caste, and a guest in her home. Without this 
imbalance of social position, perhaps he would not have been so anxious about such a seemingly 
minor ethical misstep. Many studies of activists, community organizers, and social movement 
organizations have focused primarily on how these actors accumulate and employ power to 
further the interests of some at the expense of others; they have been studies of "contentious 
politics" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) more than contentious ethics. 
Recently, however, some anthropologists have argued that the politics of social change 
cannot be separated from the ethics of social change. For example, Dave treats the activism of 
lesbians in Delhi as an ethical endeavor, aimed primarily at "the undoing of social moralities" 
(Dave, 2012, p. 6). Dave finds a focus on ethics especially relevant to understanding why some 
lesbians become activists and what motivates their work (Dave, 2012, p. 5). More broadly, 
Keane makes the analysis of social movements central to his far-reaching, synthetic study of the 
ethical dimensions of human life, arguing that, on the one hand, activists' commitments to a 
cause often cannot be explained by self-interest, and that, on the other hand, political movements 
often result in ethical transformation (Keane, 2016, pp. 187, 188). Keane is careful to point out 
that this does not mean that the politics of such movements can be reduced to ethics, but it does 
mean that their ethical dimensions are not reducible to politics (Keane, 2016, pp. 188, 218). 
How, without reducing one to the other, can we describe the multiple and seemingly tight 
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conjunctions of ethics and politics in people's struggle activism? To answer this question, it will 
help to first explain that the concepts of ethics and politics I employ here, though distinct, are 
entangled with one another at their very roots. The philosopher Bernard Williams has suggested 
that the fundamental question of ethics is "How should one live?" (Williams, 1985, p. 4). In 
anthropology, we have long recognized that humans do not pursue their lives in isolation; we are 
social animals, and our actions are always also interactions. As such, ethical questions about how 
we should act or live presuppose political questions such as, "Who gets to determine how we act 
or live?8" But if ethical questions lead to political questions, the reverse is also true. The political 
question of who should decide how to live is, itself, one among many ethical questions about 
how people ought to live. Thus, ethics and politics are intimately tied up with one another even 
at this abstract level. 
People's struggles are clearly contentious politics; they are efforts at asserting the 
interested claims of some over the claims of others (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 4). But the claims 
of people's struggles are claims about justice; they are claims about what ought, or ought not, to 
be. Thus, people's struggles are contentious ethics. Moreover, as I describe in greater detail 
below, this ethical dimension is particularly prominent in people's struggles because of the 
importance of self-transformation and moral persuasion in this form of activism. For this reason, 
my analysis departs from the usual emphases in studies of social movement organizing—its 
structural preconditions, its strategies for accumulating resources and bringing powers to bear—
by exploring the ways that activists adopt, enact, and promote particular values and ethical 
positions. But in doing so, I do not depart from politics. Rather, I take ethics and politics to be 
                                                 
8 Indeed, Williams notes that, in asking how one should live, the “generality of one already 
stakes a claim” (1985, p. 4). Insofar as the use of the general pronoun “one” entails the problem 
of who determines how people should live, this claim is political in the sense I employ here. 
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complexly entangled in people's struggles, knotted into one another so tightly that any account of 
one without the other would display an obvious lack. My analysis attempts to pick at the knot—
not with any hope of separating ethics and politics into two parallel threads of social life, but so 
as to explore the ways in which they are bound together and, thus, improve our understanding of 
both. 
1.4 Locating People's Struggles in Kerala Political Culture 
The Indian state of Kerala occupies a long sliver of land on India's southwest coast, 
sloping east to west from the rainforests and tea plantations of the Western Ghats mountains 
down to the Arabian sea (see Figure 1). The state was formed along linguistic lines in 1956, 
several years after Indian independence, with Malayalam as the dominant language. The people 
of Kerala are commonly referred to as Malayalis. The region has long been one of the most 
densely populated in India, but the state contains none of India's major cities. The dominant 
settlement pattern could be called "rurban," with land parceled out into small plots, each 
separated from the next by a fence or stone wall (Sreekumar, 1990). The state's several cities and 
numerous towns are separated by an almost continuous spread of such plots, which are organized 
into large villages, each abutting the next. Fresh water and sunshine are abundant, and even the 
smallest plots will have a few coconut palms, a mango tree, or a small vegetable garden. 
However, few Malayalis make their living at agriculture. The average education level is high, 
and manual labor is considered low status.  
Situated centrally in the Indian Ocean, approximately halfway between the Gulf Coast 
and the archipelagos of Southeast Asia, the Kerala region has long been integral to circuits of 
trade and migration that extend beyond the subcontinent. The state's relatively large minority 
populations of Muslims (26%) and Christians (18%) reflect this history, with many of the latter 
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tracing their roots to before the 15th century arrival of Vasco da Gama (Census Organization of 
India, 2011). Some scholars argue that the early-20th century success of Communist ideology in 
the region was also supported by these longstanding global linkages (Franke, 1993). International 
emigration climbed in the late-20th century, particularly to the Gulf states. In 2014, about 2.4 
million foreign emigrants (compared to a domestic population of 34 million) sent home 
remittances amounting to approximately 36% of the state's net domestic product (Zachariah & 
Rajan, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Map of Kerala 
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Kerala is known among scholars of politics and development for its numerous social 
movements during the late-19th and 20th centuries as well as its late-20th-century achievements 
in "human development" measures such as literacy rates, infant mortality, and life expectancy 
(Franke, 1993; Jeffrey, 1993; Ramachandran, 2000). With regard to the latter, the "Kerala 
Model" of development became one of economists' "favorite anomalies" in the 1980s and 90s 
because its human development indicators were on par with so-called developed nations despite 
per capita GDP being well below the Indian average (Franke, 1993, p. 2; Parayil, 2000). Many 
have seen in Kerala's social movement history—particularly the rise of the Communist party and 
ensuing redistributive policies—as an explanation for this development "enigma" (Lukose, 2009, 
p. 28). Under the rubric of "public action," scholars have described Kerala as a place where an 
organized, newspaper-reading, and politically savvy populace has held the government to 
account, successfully demanding policy that contributes to widespread social welfare (Heller, 
1999; Jeffrey, 1993; Ramachandran, 2000; Sen, 2000; Tharamangalam, 2007). 
Aside from this reputation among scholars, Kerala is known among leftist activists  and 
NGO workers throughout India as a place where protestors are heard and development truly 
serves those in need. During an early documentary project on grassroots development projects, 
community organizers and NGO workers in other states often mentioned Kerala when they 
talked about their social change work; there, they said, such projects have actually succeeded. 
Similarly, activists in Delhi or Mumbai, such as the leaders of the National Alliance of People's 
Movements (NAPM), described Kerala's people's struggles as exemplars—that is, as instances of 
the same movements one finds elsewhere in India, but with a much better record of victory 
(Patkar, 2010). 
My first visit to Kerala in 2005 was inspired by these seemingly utopian acclamations of 
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Malayali public life. Having read a bit of the Kerala Model literature, I was eager to see what 
widespread "public action" looked like up close. I was particularly interested in the politics of 
samaraṅṅaḷ ("struggles"),9 a term denoting local modes of social movement claim-making and 
protest politics. I wanted to understand why participation in such forms of political action was so 
widespread in Kerala and how this might be linked to apparently high levels of support for 
redistributive policies. 
When I arrived in Kerala that first time, I had no difficulty locating samaraṅṅaḷ. Even for 
the most neutral, quietist Malayali, samaraṅṅaḷ are a pervasive and unavoidable part of everyday 
life, not just in the newspapers and on the TV news, but every time one sets out into the road. On 
any trip of more than a few kilometers, one can expect to meet a samaram or two along the way. 
From the window of a bus, one sees marchers hoisting their flags and chanting slogans as they 
make their way to the collector's office or the home of a local elected official. At a major 
intersection, one finds a small pavilion of blue tarps sheltering a lone man on a cot, doing his 
shift in a relay hunger strike. And occasionally, but more often than most Malayalis would like, 
one will not be able to set out at all; a political party, union, or action committee has called for 
hartal—a total shutdown of shops, auto-rickshaws, buses, or even the roads themselves. For most 
of those I met in Kerala, including many activists, samaram was primarily encountered in this 
way, simultaneously as spectacle and obstacle, something one moves through on one's way 
somewhere else.  
                                                 
9 The term samaram (singular of samaraṅṅaḷ) has no single, straightforward gloss in English. 
Although “struggle” is a common gloss among Malayalis, it can be a confusing stand-in for 
samaram because the English term does not have any necessary political connotation. However, 
other glosses such as “strike,” “movement,” and “protest” are also imprecise. Thus, I will use the 
Malayalam term when referring to samaram generally while glossing it as “struggle” in the 
context of janakīya samaram (“people’s struggle”), which is the main topic of the dissertation 
and makes up the majority of references. 
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Thus, many Malayalis described samaram as a nuisance to the people and an obstacle to 
development. This is not to say that they did not recognize the idyllic picture of movement-
driven progress sketched for me by out-of-state activists. Many praised the samaraṅṅaḷ of the 
past, such as the caste reform movements, the independence movement, the peasant rebellions 
and union strikes of the Communists, and the post-independence Vimochana Samaram 
("liberation struggle") of religious minorities against the first elected Communist government. 
Like Kerala Model scholars, even outspoken opponents of samaram attributed many of the 
state's accomplishments to this history. And they acknowledged that samaraṅṅaḷ are still 
common today—but too common. In contemporary Kerala, marches and rallies in the streets 
were seen as keeping busy people from getting to work; union strikes were accused of driving 
away foreign investment; and hartal was denounced for reducing economic productivity. By and 
large, samaram was not seen as a motor for change, but as precisely what was holding Kerala 
back.  
This rejection of the political culture of samaram is consistent with a late-20th transition 
in Kerala's political culture described by some anthropologists. In an ethnography of college 
student politics, Ritty Lukose has documented the rise of a neoliberal "civic public," in which 
some Malayalis see protest politics as an affront to the freedom of consumer citizens to 
participate in the market (Lukose, 2009, pp. 140,141). This transition can fruitfully be 
understood against the background of Filippo and Caroline Osella's ethnography of changing 
avenues for social mobility among the Izhava caste (Osella & Osella, 2000). While the 
samaraṅṅaḷ of early-20th-century Izhavas succesfully challenged widespread practices of 
unapproachability, temple restrictions, and discrimination in education (Namboodiri, 1999), the 
Izhavas of the 1990s pursued "progress" by migrating to the Gulf and sending money home 
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(Namboodiri, 1999; Osella & Osella, 2000, p. 20). If social movement activity helped to drive 
Kerala's human development achievements, the resulting higher levels of education have 
arguably driven these new strategies for the pursuit of affluence in the global economy. 
However, Kerala's shift from mobilization to marketization should not be overstated. As 
noted, the marches and hartals that mark "struggles" are still very much part of everyday life. 
Among these are those of the CPM and its youth organizations, which Lukose (2009) describes 
as a persistent counter to consumerist publicity. Moreover, as Adarsh once pointed out, while 
nearly everyone is opposed to samaraṅṅaḷ in principle, every critic is also a member of a trade 
union, a party, a caste or religious organization, a business association, or any of Kerala's 
countless other groups and organizations, all of which from time to time take up their own 
samaraṅṅaḷ as well. Consistent with this, I found that opponents of samaraṅṅaḷ generally made 
certain exceptions, drawing distinctions between legitimate and corrupt appropriations of 
Kerala's social movement history. Such distinctions help to explain why there were always 
plenty of samaraṅṅaḷ for everyone to complain about. 
People's struggles (janakīya samaraṅṅaḷ) were one such exception to the general 
irritation with samaraṅṅaḷ. Over time, I learned that describing my research topic as samaram 
was likely to elicit annoyance or even disapproval, but janakīya samaraṅṅaḷ were considered a 
more worthy topic. This was not true for everyone. For some, particularly those whose 
aspirations aligned with the consumer citizenship Lukose describes, the two terms were 
equivalently repugnant; anything blocking the road was nothing more than an obstacle to 
commerce. Indeed, because people's struggles often concerned conflicts over natural resources, 
they might be considered particularly obstructive. But for most, people's struggles were in a 
separate category from those struggles organized by political parties, religious organizations, 
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trade unions, or other organized groups. They were, by definition, samaraṅṅaḷ on behalf of, 
rather than at the expense of, the people. 
Part of what sets people's struggles apart, then, is that they are not organized by any of 
the parties, organizations, or factions to which, as Adarsh noted, every Malayali belongs. 
People's struggles are understood to be "grassroots" initiatives, organized by those who are in 
some way harmed by corporations, the state, or these other collectives—who are by definition 
only partial, interested political actors, not "the people.10" The Malayalam mass noun janam 
("the people"), in contrast to āḷukaḷ (plural of āḷ, "person"), is used when making an opposition 
between the people en masse and something else. For example, a frequently recited pun is that 
Kerala does not have janādhipatyam ("democracy," or "rule of the people") but panādhipatyam, 
the rule of panam, "money." As in this joke, oppositions between what is "of the people" and 
what is not are invariably normative, the former taking a positive valence. In other words, like 
the notion of "democracy," the concept of the people is stable in its highly positive ethical value 
but, for that very reason, always debated with respect to its defining attributes (Gallie, 1955). As 
I describe in Chapter 3, a large part of the politics of people's struggles is to promote a particular 
normative vision for what people's struggles ought to be.  
The application of the term "people's struggle" to Kerala's social movement history 
exemplifies the normative and contested nature of the term. All of the major social movements 
described above as central to popular narratives of Malayali progress were also frequently 
described to me as people's struggles. However, if others were in earshot, these claims were 
                                                 
10 Ranciere (Rancière, 1999) and Laclau (Laclau, 2005) have both described “people’s politics” 
that fits with this description, in which one group succeeds in representing its interests as those 
of the whole people, usually by virtue of being harmed by some interested part of the populace. 
For further discussion, see Chapter 4. 
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often debated. For example, when one man referred to the caste reform movements as people's 
struggles, another spoke up to counter that the appellation was inappropriate because these 
movements had only sought the uplift of individual castes. The first man rebutted that some of 
their leaders had preached caste equality for all and, besides, their ultimate impact had been on 
the caste system itself, not only the status of particular castes. Similarly, there were debates about 
whether the Communists had fought for the people or, on the contrary, the Liberation Struggle 
opposing Communist rule had done so. Thus, in the broadest sense, people's struggle could 
seemingly be applied to any social movement that one supported. 
However, with reference to contemporary politics, "people's struggle" was primarily used 
to describe conflicts over environmental resources, such as campaigns to stop pollution from a 
factory, to prevent construction of a dam, or to reduce granite quarrying near a village. These 
campaigns were commonly understood to be organized by those directly affected by these 
localized conflicts. Being geographically bounded, people's struggles were not seen to be 
motivated by disqualifying interests of caste, religion, or party. Moreover, their primary 
institutional form was the “action council” (English, or sometimes, samara samiti), a collective 
actor consisting of affected individuals that was formed exclusively for the purpose of the 
campaign and often included positions such as convener, secretary, treasurer, and legal 
coordinator. As noted in Chapter 3, the politics of these action councils often stood in for the 
politics of the people (janam). 
As suggested by the existence of the NAPM, the discourse and practice of people's 
struggle is not unique to Kerala. The term is used throughout India to refer to a wide variety of 
social movements, from armed uprisings in Jharkhand to the Indian independence movement. 
Since the mid-1990s, the term has been used interchangeably with "people's movement," by the 
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NAPM, which is a coalition of organizations pursuing a wide range of aims. As in Kerala's 
people's struggles, many NAPM campaigns and organizations focus on environmental conflicts. 
Moreover, the work of NAPM was an inspiration for the work of Kēraḷīyam—a magazine that 
served as a hub for people's struggle activism in Kerala and was one of two fieldsites for this 
research. The magazine has at times collaborated with NAPM to put on events or publish on 
topics relevant to people's struggles. In all of these ways, Kerala's people's struggles could be 
seen as part of a larger, national movement. 
Nonetheless, Kerala's people's struggles are, in many ways, disconnected from the 
national discourse associated with NAPM, which has had little success in bringing them into its 
coalition. Part of the disconnect is linguistic. When NAPM held its national convention in Kerala 
in 2012, organizers were frustrated by a lack of local participation, which they attributed to a 
lack of interest. While there may have been some truth to this, Malayali activists also described 
to me the difficulty of communicating with these predominantly northern visitors, who used 
Hindi as a lingua franca. In addition, Kerala's people's struggles are predominantly directed at 
state, district, or even pañcāyatt-level11 politicians and government officials. Thus, they rarely 
share the same targets with campaigns outside the state. Finally, as suggested above, while 
activists in Kerala's people's struggles work on similar issues to activists in NAPM organizations, 
they draw on social movement genealogies that are in many ways unique to Kerala. Thus, one 
could argue that what makes them appear as exemplary to activists in Delhi also makes them 
distinct from other Indian people's struggles altogether. 
People's struggles generally have two major constituencies, which also represent two 
                                                 
11 A pañcāyatt is a unit of local government in India that usually covers several villages or 
neighborhoods. 
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different vantage points from which this form of politics can be understood and pursued. People's 
struggles are, in one sense, the moral project of a loose network of environmental and social 
activists, including Faiza and Adarsh, who seek a leftist alternative to the politics of Kerala's 
dominant Communist parties. These activists intervene in various campaigns and protests, many 
related to conflicts over environmental resources, in order to realize their vision for a radical 
challenge to various social hierarchies (e.g., caste, class, gender, human-nature). Many of these 
activists describe samaram as a way of life, and their interventions in people’s struggles are only 
one way of practicing that way of life. But although most Malayali's are familiar with the notion 
of "people's struggles," few have any acquaintance with this group. For most, people's struggles 
are the campaigns and protests alone, which are generally understood to be endogenous to 
particular neighborhood's or villages. From this perspective, the chief protagonists of people's 
struggles are action councils.  
My field sites reflected this hybrid nature of people's struggles as both the politics of the 
activist network and the politics of action councils. To study the prior group, whom I call 
"solidarity organizers," I made a field site of the Kēraḷīyam magazine, for which Adarsh is 
assistant editor and sole employee. Kēraḷīyam was heir to a long tradition of magazines that 
served as institutional hubs for leftist alternatives to Communist party politics. In addition to 
spending many of my days, and a few nights, in the Kēraḷīyam office in Thrissur, I followed 
Adarsh on expeditions related to the magazine and its concerns. His work provided my primary 
route through the network, from which I branched out—interviewing, residing with, and 
observing the activities of others I met along the way.  
My second field site was a campaign to shut down a gelatin factory in the village of 
Gandhamur, located just outside of Thrissur and only about a thirty-minute bicycle ride from the 
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home I shared with Adarsh and Faiza. During the time of my study, this people's struggle was 
one of the most prominent in Kerala as well as the recipient, for several months, of extensive 
collaboration and support from the activist network. In an early field visit in 2010, when I 
attended a youth service project organized by solidarity organizers in Gandhamur, I was 
fortunate to befriend the convener and primary organizer of the Gandhamur Action Council. It 
was with his invitation that I began participant observation of everyday organizing processes in 
the village, where I eventually went on to study the lives of those who opposed or avoided the 
campaign as well. 
1.5  Kēraḷīyam Magazine 
The founding of Kēraḷīyam magazine in November, 1998 approximately corresponded to 
the early emergence of "people's struggle" as a prominent form of political action in Kerala. 
From the start, the driving force behind the magazine was Sunny, a gregarious and energetic man 
with an extraordinary capacity for sustaining a wide circle of friends. Sunny and his co-founders 
did not originally envision Kēraḷīyam as a magazine about people’s struggles, but they did intend 
the magazine to serve as a forum for discussing issues and coordinating activity among 
environmental and social activists across Kerala. As people's struggles increasingly became the 
focus of many of these activists, they also became bread-and-butter content for the magazine. A 
pivotal point came in 2004, when Sunny and others involved with Kēraḷīyam helped coordinate 
support for a campaign that succeeded in shutting down a polluting Coca-Cola plant (Aiyer, 
2007; Sreemahadevan Pillai, 2008). This campaign helped to make people's struggle a publicly 
recognized form of political action in Kerala. It also crystalized Kēraḷīyam's self-image as a 
magazine committed to people's struggles. 
Kēraḷīyam is published out of a small, rented office in the central-Kerala city of Thrissur 
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(see Figure 1). The office is located only a few blocks from the railway station, which lies along 
the major routes that run the length of the state. On any given day, a dozen or more visitors will 
stop in, some from the local area and some passing through on their way north or south. The 
office is often used as a meeting space as well—not for public gatherings, but for the meetings to 
plan these gatherings. One way or another, the magazine and its associates likely have a hand in 
any of the people's struggle-related events around the state. The magazine only reaches about 
700 subscribers, and is not available in book stalls. It was rare to meet any non-subscribers who 
even knew of its existence. The magazine was well known to police intelligence, however, who 
raided and ransacked the office shortly after my departure. According to Adarsh, suspicions 
about the magazine’s role in instigating people’s struggles motivated this raid. 
At the time of my visit, Kēraḷīyam was unique as a forum for discussion, collaboration, 
and community building among people's struggle activists. But historically, other magazines 
have played similar roles. Small-circulation publications have long offered an institutional basis 
for organizing among leftists who have broken with the dominant Communist parties in Kerala. 
As I noted above, print media were crucial to Communist organizing in the early twentieth 
century. This included not only pamphlets and newspapers intended for the masses, but also 
poetry, plays, fiction, and literary criticism. Beginning in 1937, the Communist Party of India's 
(CPI) Progressive Writer's Alliance sought to employ literature in the service of a Communist 
vision of social progress. Counter to these efforts, some writers and intellectuals published small 
journals that, though often left-oriented, rejected the ideological uniformity associated with the 
CPI (Govindan, 2008). Around these small magazines formed discursive communities composed 
primarily of intellectual elites. Today, Kēraḷīyam helps to connect just such a community of 
"alternative" leftists. 
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From the beginning, Kerala's alternative leftists, and their magazines, have been defined 
primarily by what they are not. Their rejection of party discipline, in particular, means that they 
are defined foremost by an explicit opposition to dogmatism, while otherwise taking up a wide 
range of ideologies. Throughout the twentieth century, it is possible to trace ideological trends 
among the alternative left—e.g., humanism to Maoism to environmentalism—which are 
traversed by life histories and genealogies of influence. But the strands of connection are many 
and the trends are never all-encompassing. What defines the tradition is, mainly, that it is 
"alternative." This is true not only for alternative leftism as such, but also for many individuals. 
Many of those involved in people's struggle politics were raised in Communist families, or were 
active in the Party as college students, but later broke away. They came to people’s struggle 
activism looking for an alternative. 
Although I coin the term "alternative leftist" to describe patterns of ideology and activism 
identified through fieldwork and archival research, my analysis draws on local discourse about  , 
"alternative" (badal). Sunny, Adarsh, and other Kēraḷīyam associates described the magazine and 
many of their projects as badal, contrasting them with what was mukhyadhāra (literally, "main 
flow" or "mainstream"), such as daily newspapers, popular cinema, or large political parties. The 
concept of badal was also one way in which interventions in people's struggles and the ethical 
rescaling practices described earlier hung together. People's struggles were badal in that they 
were not the much larger, more common, and more powerful samaraṅṅaḷ of political parties. 
The ethical evaluation and reform of ordinary practices, such as the use of plastic bags, set 
activists apart from those around them. Thus, being badal was central to being an activist.  
In addition to an emphasis on ideological freedom, opposition to institutionalization has 
been characteristic of Kerala's alternative left. Although those associated with Kēraḷīyam sought 
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to build a larger movement, most believed that forming a party or umbrella organization would 
only hinder them in doing so. The standard argument was that such an institution, once formed, 
would only seek its own growth and survival rather than furthering the cause it was meant to 
serve.12 This was arguably one reason that a magazine—with its office, its editorial board, and its 
subscription list—was the most robust institution binding this activist network together. 
Two important predecessors of Kēraḷīyam's work were Janakīya Sāmskārika Vēdi 
("People's Cultural Platform," hereafter “Vēdi”) and Pāḍhabhēdam (often glossed in English as 
"Altertext") magazine. The former was a literary group that some regarded as the "cultural wing" 
of Kerala's Maoist party. However, although Maoism was the dominant alternative left ideology 
of the time, the Vēdi and its magazine Prēraṇa brought together a wide array of intellectuals 
under a general program of "people's political power" (Sreejith, 2005). The group disbanded 
after only two years due to disagreements over the Maoist party's positions regarding the use of 
violence. Those involved would go on to pursue a wide range of causes, and the alternative left 
never again achieved such unity.  
Pāḍhabhēdam was founded in the late 1980s by a former editor of Prēraṇa, who like 
many participants in the Vēdi had abandoned Maoism. The magazine was inaugurated at a 
conference of activists representing the full diversity of post-Maoist alternative leftism: 
feminism, environmentalism, health justice, human rights, palliative care, and other causes.13 For 
several years, the magazine provided a platform not only for literary and intellectual exchange, 
but also for updates on "peoples resistance" (janakīya pratirōdham) throughout the state. Like 
                                                 
12 According to some activists, this was one reason that the NAPM had been unsuccessful in 
organizing in Kerala despite the large number of active people's struggles in the state. 
13 Some Maoists attended as well, but the conference had no institutional link to Maoist political 
parties, and Maoism was no longer a dominant ideological framework. 
  30 
 
Prēraṇa before it, Pāḍhabhēdam was published out of Vanchi Lodge, a rented room in 
downtown Thrissur, only a couple of kilometers from Kēraḷīyam's office today. According to 
one former activist who had made Vanchi Lodge his home for several years, it was an even more 
lively gathering place than Kēraḷīyam. The discussion there was so perpetual and earnest, in fact, 
that he hardly slept during the years he stayed there. The magazines came and went, he said, but 
the flow of activists through Vanchi Lodge never let up. 
The normative concept of people's politics is an ideological thread that runs through from 
the Vēdi and Prēraṇa to Pāḍhabhēdam to Kēraḷīyam today. Prēraṇa wrote in a Maoist idiom of 
"people's revolution," and Pāḍhabhēdam wrote primarily of "people's resistance," but the term 
"people''s struggle" was also occasionally used interchangeably with these other terms. And in 
each of these iterations of alternative leftism, the invocation of the people as a collective actor is 
in tension with the relatively limited subset of intellectuals who make this invocation. This 
tension is arguably most marked in the case of the Vēdi, whose magazine Prēraṇa primarily 
circulated avant garde literature and theory among an intellectual elite. Thus, within this 
tradition, the people was first adopted as a political ideal—a radical democratic alternative to the 
authority of the Party. What remained was to find people who would take up this people's 
politics. 
The  relation between Kēraḷīyam and people's struggles can be seen as one approach to 
resolving the problem of people's politics without people. Publication of Pāḍhabhēdam ceased in 
1992, and the building that housed Vanchi Lodge was torn down for road construction shortly 
thereafter. When Kēraḷīyam was founded in 1996, it occupied the space, both figuratively and to 
some extent literally, left by earlier Thrissur magazines. But while Kēraḷīyam took up 
Pāḍhabhēdam's place as a hub of alternative left activism, it came to focus more on advocacy 
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and campaign updates, and less on literature and theory. These emphases were more in line with 
Sunny's own interests, but they also responded to a growing number of environmental conflicts 
related to state development projects and economic liberalization—issues that were not being 
taken up by any of the major political parties. Thus, Kēraḷīyam and its associates found a 
political field fertile for the ideology of people's politics. The work of the magazine in 
constructing people's struggle as an emergent type of political action is the subject of Chapter 3. 
Kēraḷīyam brings together two somewhat disjunctive alternatives to mainstream leftism, 
which also represent two different approaches to the environmental conflicts that predominate 
among people's struggles. Many activists associated with Kēraḷīyam, such as Faiza, considered 
themselves environmental activists (paristhitika pravarttakar), and the members of the 
Gandhamur Action Council commonly referred to all solidarity organizers in this way. But some 
rejected this moniker. For example, Dhanya, the convener of the offical solidarity committee for 
the Gandhamur campaign, contrasted her "political activity" (English) with the eco-centric 
orientation of environmentalists. She said that she was not primarily concerned with the 
environment, but with social inequality, which she still understood in Marxist terms even though 
she rejected the politics of the dominant Communist parties. Likewise, across the activist 
network that Dhanya shared with Faiza and Adarsh, the relative importance of ecocentrism and 
social justice in people's struggles was a topic of much contention.   
The tension between environmentalist and Marxist visions of people's struggle, and of the 
role of Kēraḷīyam, can be read as one variety of entanglement of ethics and politics. While 
Dhanya called her approach "political" (English, or sometimes, rāṣṭrīyam) many of those who 
advocated a more eco-centric activism did so in the idiom of mūlyaṅṅaḷ, or "values." For 
example, Francis, who had a regular column in Kēraḷīyam, argued that an over-emphasis on 
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conflicts over the control of environmental resources would ultimately be self-defeating unless 
activists undertook to bring about a fundamental transformation of mūlyaṅṅaḷ as well. Invoked in 
this way, mūlyaṅṅaḷ connotes ethical values without any necessarily religious connotation. Thus, 
some activists contrasted with mūlyaṅṅaḷ with dhārmmikata, a term more often used in religious 
settings and associated with notions of purity, sin, and the conduct of one's proper role in the 
social order.14 Nonetheless, Francis and others who advocated for greater emphasis on mūlyaṅṅaḷ 
also at times stressed the need for the elaboration of a spiritual side to their activism. In line with 
Dhanya's criticism of environmentalism, Francis insisted that this transformation of values must 
not be human-centric, but eco-centric.  
For those who argued along these lines, consistently enacting environmentalist values 
through organic farming, vegetarianism, and "natural cure" (prakṛti cikilsa) was inseparable from 
intervention in people's struggles. As the leader of an organic farming collective told me, 
"people's struggle is a way of life.” For some, particularly followers a "natural life" tradition 
influenced by Gandhi's dietary activism, their own bodily practices were the crucial arena of 
struggle and campaigns like that in Gandhamur were only one avenue for enacting an alternative 
way of life. 
These disjunctures between Marxist and environmentalist approaches to people's struggle 
can be seen as rooted in the historical influence of both Marxist and Gandhian ideologies upon 
                                                 
14 Dumont (Dumont, 1970, p. 251) defines dharma,  the Sanskrit root of the Malayalam 
dhārmmikata, as “action conforming to universal order.” It is, in part, the connection Dumont 
describes between this moral concept and social hierarchy—especially, though not exclusively, 
caste-hierarchy—that make this concept distasteful to the activists described here. On the other 
hand, mūlyam, the singular of mūlyaṅṅaḷ, can be used broadly to describe orders of value other 
than the ethical, such as economic value. It is this semantic breadth that, arguably, makes it 
attractive for appropriation and resignification within a variety of activist ethical projects—
Francis’ argument being only one example. 
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Kerala's alternative leftists. Both Gandhian and Marxist approaches to organizing had their 
heydays in the 1920s-1940s. Even in that period, one can see tensions between the Marxist 
emphasis on power and interests and the Gandhian approach to organizing as a moral struggle 
(Namboodiripad, 1958).  
On the pages of Kēraḷīyam, and in the daily lives of activists like Faiza and Adarsh, the 
disjuncture between environmentalist and Marxist strands of alternative leftism was manifest as a 
tension between changing oneself and changing others. Work on "values" was primarily work on 
the self, while interventions in people's struggles was "political" insofar as it concerned 
inequities between people. But it should be clear from the example of Sunil's fear (and my own) 
that this contrast between changing oneself and changing others does not align tidily with the 
distinction between ethics and politics outlined above. And this is not only because that 
distinction is already inescapably untidy. The force activists exerted on themselves always 
overflowed, exerting pressure on those around them as well. Likewise, to challenge inequities 
between people was, obviously, a kind of response to the question "how should one live?” Thus, 
questions about relations between ethics and politics are good to ask in part because they were 
debated by activists themselves, but these debates are more useful for drawing our attention to 
these questions than for resolving them. 
While the activists associated with Kēraḷīyam were diverse with respect to caste, wealth, 
and level of education, they can broadly be described as middle class. An important caveat must 
be made, however: while those involved were generally "in the middle" in the sense that they 
were neither very rich nor very poor, they were definitively not middle class in their aspirations. 
For example, Francis grew up in a lower-middle class Christian family and received formal 
education through the tenth grade—the level to which public education in Kerala is both free and 
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mandatory. Thereafter, he worked for some time as an auto-rickshaw driver, during which time 
his involvement with the union led him into leftist politics and atheism. Later, he became a 
freelance insurance salesman but, finding this work incompatible with his values, he gave it up 
after several years. Today, he is self-employed, conducting magic shows with moral themes and 
selling leftist and environmentalist literature at public events. This way of life has been a source 
of some financial hardship and precarity for his family. Thus, he has had a level of privilege and 
opportunity that is neither remarkably high nor low, but he has used what opportunities he had in 
ways that run counter to increasing his wealth or improving his status in the usual sense (e.g., by 
building a house or giving his daughters large dowries). 
Many activists have more advantages than Francis, and some have fewer, but their 
economic and social status broadly tends to the same pattern. Adarsh, for example, comes from a 
Nair household (historically a dominant land-owning caste in Kerala) and has a master's degree 
in journalism. He and Faiza met in journalism school, she being the daughter of a Muslim public 
school teacher. However, their cumulative income as assistant editor of Kēraḷīyam and staff 
member of an environmental NGO, respectively, amounts to less than a man could make as an 
unskilled manual laborer in Kerala. Office work is certainly higher status than manual labor, but 
their jobs are also relatively illegible—our neighbors joked about not understanding what kind of 
jobs these were. Indeed, their social position was difficult to assess according to the usual 
standards of status in Kerala. 
Nonetheless, it is worth repeating that there were very few participants in Kēraḷīyam for 
whom access to food, clothing, or shelter were ever in doubt. As Adarsh explained with 
reference to himself, even most of those who lived on a shoestring did so with the knowledge 
that, should the string snap, they had kin or friends who could help them out. There was still risk 
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involved in such choices, of course, but there were few who came from such difficult positions 
that they could not afford to take such risks. 
My initial attraction to studying the activists associated with Kēraḷīyam was, in large part, 
due to the warmth and openness with which they welcomed me. I cannot say precisely what 
motivated this generosity on their part. I was introduced to Sunny through contacts made in my 
own past environmental justice activism, and certainly this helped me to be recognized by some 
as a fellow traveler. At the same time, Sunny and Adarsh expressed to me early on that they saw 
my work as valuable for the critical perspective that it could bring to their work. After 
preliminary fieldwork, I presented them with a report evaluating the impact of the magazine that 
was frank in its criticism, and they welcomed the feedback. Throughout fieldwork, I often spoke 
with Adarsh, in particular, about my emerging analyses and received critical feedback in return. 
Likewise, many of those involved with Kēraḷīyam accepted me as a fellow intellectual and 
interlocutor. I know that they are waiting to read, assess, and respond to my analysis of their 
work. 
1.6 The Gandhamur Action Council 
Like Kēraḷīyam, the Gandhamur Action Council was a collective effort, but was largely 
driven by the leadership of one person. Vijayan, official Convener of the Action Council, was a 
former employee at the gelatin factory who, as a result of a labor dispute, had been terminated in 
2005. After working in an Arabian Gulf country for two years, he returned in 2008 and 
immediately became involved with several other Gandhamur residents and area 
environmentalists in founding the Action Council. Vijayan grew up in Gandhamur and had an 
extensive friend network. By both his own account and those of longtime friends, he had always 
enjoyed being at the center of social activity. He also had been very active in student politics 
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during his college years. Beginning in the 1990s, there had been a few previous attempts to 
organize opposition to pollution from the gelatin factory, but they had quickly been bought off or 
petered out. That the Action Council had not met a similar fate was attributed, by supporters and 
opponents alike, to Vijayan's persistence and leadership ability.  
By forming an action council, Vijayan and other local leaders were conscientiously 
drawing on the existing repertoires of people's struggle organizing. People's struggles had 
become a widely recognized form of political action by this time, particularly after the success of 
the campaign against the Coca-Cola plant in 2004. Solidarity organizers from the region, many 
of whom had close connections with Kēraḷīyam, immediately began to collaborate with the new 
campaign. I first encountered the campaign and met Vijayan in 2010, when a Kēraḷīyam 
associate organized a week-long service trip for high school students in Gandhamur. Thereafter, 
my research gradually came to focus on this campaign and on the collaboration between 
solidarity organizers and the Action Council. 
According to older members of the Action Council, when the gelatin factory first arrived 
in 1975, everyone welcomed it except one naysaying Brahmin, who warned that it would destroy 
the land. But no one listened to the Brahmin because, other than him, everyone wanted a job. So 
the story goes. People disagree about whether the factory used to smell in those early years. But 
by the time I first arrived, the experience of pollution had become pervasive, and even opponents 
of the Action Council agreed that the smell was awful at times.  
The Gandhamur factory produced ossein, a fibrous protein that is a major component of 
bones, which was taken to a second factory for making gelatin. The factory primarily used the 
bones of pigs and cattle, which were trucked in from meat producers across India. To extract the 
ossein, the bones were soaked in hydrochloric acid until the mineral content dissolved. The 
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remaining liquid was then filtered and distilled. This produced a great quantity of gaseous 
emissions, which had a very distinctive and unpleasant smell, both chemical and putrid at once. 
People who lived near the factory complained of waking up at night, coughing, and many 
attributed breathing ailments to the smell. Another byproduct was a blackish sludge, which had 
the same smell that was emitted via an underground pipe into a nearby river. Though the river 
had previously been used for bathing and washing clothes, people now avoided the water, which 
they said caused itching and rashes. 
Gandhamur is located in a densely populated rural area between the cities of Thrissur and 
Kochi (see Figure 1). According to elderly residents, Gandhamur village has grown considerably 
since the gelatin factory arrived. But most did not attribute this growth to the factory. After all, 
though Gandhamur now has many more paved roads and concrete houses, so do other nearby 
villages. The people of Gandhamur are primarily Hindu and Christian, with only a small Muslim 
population. Among Hindus, there are only a few Brahmins. Nairs, who once owned most of the 
land, and Pulaya, who once did most of the agricultural labor, still reside here. But artisanal 
castes—carpenters, masons, and clay workers—predominate. Few among these practice their 
traditional trades, but caste, employment, and wealth are still roughly correlated: the Nairs of the 
former ruling family have larger houses and higher levels of education, the clay workers own 
provision shops and live in more modest houses, and the former agriculural laborers now go for 
construction work, mostly building other people's houses. Intermingled with these major groups 
are many families of various descent who have settled in Gandhamur as, with population growth 
and express ways, it has become less of a village and more of suburb of Thrissur and Kochi. 
Some have also arrived to work in the factory, which employs about 140 people from the area. 
The caste and class makeup of the Gandhamur Action Council was consistent with the 
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demographics of the village as a whole. Active participants in the Council included Rani, the 
descendent of Nair aristocracy whom some still referred to casually (and out of earshot) as "the 
princess" (tanpurāṭṭi), as well as Rajan, a descendent of her former bonded laborers, whom she 
still occasionally hired for gardening work. A significant portion of campaign participants were 
men, usually of artisinal castes, employed in skilled contract work—e.g., painting, plumbing, or 
electrical work—who could easily take a day or two off at short notice. Vijayan, who was Nair 
but not royalty, had made some money in the Gulf, but his brother was an unskilled laborer. 
More generally, leadership in the campaign was dominated by Hindu and Christian men of 
relatively high caste, education level, and financial means. 
A significant contingent of women were involved in the campaign as well, including 
some who had limited leadership roles. By law, fifty percent of elected representatives in local 
government must be women, and some of these representatives were active in supporting the 
campaign. However, while women were often in the forefront when representing the campaign 
to the public (e.g., at sit-ins or in the presentation of written appeals to politicians), most strategy 
and decision-making was done by men (Binoy, 2014). This was a topic of contention and is 
explored further in Chapter 2. 
My fieldwork in Gandhamur centered on the "struggle tent" (samarapantal), which was 
also the center of activity for the campaign. Action Council meetings were held in the tent, and it 
was also used as a forum for campaign events, such as visits by prominent social figures. This 
was a canvas pavilion covering a concrete platform, like a theater stage, set up at the edge of the 
road just outside the factory gates. During the first several months of my final stint of 
dissertation research, when many campaign participants believed victory might come any day, 
there were always a few people occupying the tent. Every evening twenty or more people would 
  39 
 
gather to discuss the latest developments. A few men slept in the tent as well. Sunil and I rode 
our tandem bicycle to the tent nearly every day during this period, stopping at tea shops along the 
way to hear the news. Later on, when things slowed down and the tent was often empty, we more 
often arranged ahead of time to visit specific people, usually at their homes. 
Despite this focus on the campaign, its participants, and their activities, I gave 
considerable time and effort to understanding the lives and perspectives of campaign opponents 
and non-participants as well. Although management barred factory employees from talking with 
me shortly after I arrived, there were several who were very eager to share their stories. Chief 
among these were three mid-level employees, one retired, who had worked at the factory for a 
long time and wished to defend it. I also spent time with many in the village who were upset 
about the pollution but did not wish to participate in the campaign. The vast majority of residents 
were in this latter category. 
Like the Kēraḷīyam office, the Gandhamur struggle tent was the site of many 
conversations about justice and injustice. Moreover, claims about injustice were crucial to 
campaign strategy, which consisted largely of attempting to win the support of popular opinion. 
However, unlike Kēraḷīyam associates, for whom a tactical commitment to moral persuasion was 
rooted in ideologies of intellectual freedom and egalitarianism, the Action Council employed 
persuasion out of necessity. Despite having some wealthy members, the resources of the 
Council—in terms of money and political contacts—were no match for those of the factory, 
which is a joint venture between a Japanese company and the Kerala State Government. Vijayan 
and other leaders made it clear that they would not have shirked from employing whatever 
advantage they could gain, including using physical force in various ways, as I discuss in 
Chapter 4. Nonetheless, this is not to say that seeking and arguing for justice were less 
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authentically pursued in Gandhamur than in Thrissur. Action Council members understood 
themselves to be pursuing justice, and the mix of tactics they employed makes their work all the 
more interesting for exploring entanglements of ethics and politics. 
My fieldwork in the Gandhamur campaign was limited in two important ways. First, I 
was often much more observer than participant. This was in part because of legal restricitions on 
the participation of non-citizens in such activities. It was also because I realized early on that, if I 
became overly identified with the campaign, I would likely lose all possibility of meaningful 
fieldwork with opponents and non-participants. Second, beginning in 2012, I was unable to 
actually reside in Gandhamur, or stay there overnight, because the police warned me that I did 
not have permission to do so. Although the basis of this restriction was questionable, I complied 
because the police had otherwise been very accomodating, with one local official even agreeing 
to sit with me for extensive interviews. Given the various controversies surrounding the 
campaign at the time, I considered my level of access fortunate.  
1.7 Methods 
My first encounter with people's struggle politics was during exploratory fieldwork in 
2005, when I visited the site of the Coca-Cola campaign mentioned earlier. There, I met Sunny, 
the founder and managing editor of Kēraḷīyam. At the time, he and other Kēraḷīyam associates 
were highly involved in this campaign, which had become an international news story when it 
was eventually successful in shutting down the factory (Giridharadas, 2005; Sreemahadevan 
Pillai, 2008). Between 2005 and 2014, I conducted six field visits to Kerala, observing people's 
struggle activism and related activities for a cumulative total of approximately three years. 
However, it was only with my final, fourteen-month stint of dissertation fieldwork, between 
2013 and 2014, that I focused in on Kēraḷīyam magazine and Gandhamur village as my primary 
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field sites.  
Fieldwork was ethnographic in the anthropological tradition, the hallmark of which is 
intimate, long-term acquaintance with everyday life—in this case, chiefly with the everyday lives 
of activists (Agar, 1980, p. 120; Malinowski, 1984). In keeping with this tradition, the primary 
method, participant observation, primarily consisted of carrying a notebook, audio recorder, and 
camera with me at all times, and jotting notes or taking recordings of whatever seemed pertinent 
to my various lines of inquiry or, alternatively, suggested a new line of inquiry (Wolcott, 2005, 
pp. 57-60, 81). Ideally, I would write up fieldnotes, transcribe recordings, and organize other 
materials (e.g., photos, pamphlets, newspaper clippings) in the evenings. However, because I 
lived with Faiza and Adarsh, even these activities were often punctuated by unexpected 
encounters with new "data" in the form of dinners, movie outings, visiting family members, and 
late-night discussions. Likewise, when I was not with organizers or writing up my notes, I was 
no less doing research—haircuts, grocery trips, and pick-up basketball all presented new 
opportunities to hear gossip about the Gandhamur campaign and other people's struggles, trace 
networks of kinship and friendship, and explore the cultural context in which the organizers I 
studied were trying to make change.  
My collaboration with Sunil, who served as a full-time research assistant during the bulk 
of the time I lived with Faiza and Adarsh, greatly enriched my fieldwork and analysis. I had 
sought out a full-time assistant after a chronic medical condition took a turn for the worse in late 
2012, and I was uncertain whether I would be able to write my own field jottings. Fortunately, 
my condition had greatly improved by the time I began fieldwork. Nonetheless, I trained Sunil in 
taking field jottings and in the use of recording equipment, and he accompanied me nearly 
continually throughout the research process. In the evenings, we would sit on the balcony and 
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share our jottings with one another, discussing all we had observed. Recordings of these 
discussions proved to be an invaluable resource. Sunil was from a Muslim family in a relatively 
rural part of Kerala. Having just completed his BSW, he was eager to learn more about regional 
social issues, but people's struggle activism was entirely new to him. As such, he helped me to 
grasp what activist lives look like from a non-activist Malayali perspective. At the same time, the 
process of his emergence into activism became an object of inquiry in its own right. 
Fieldwork was organized around questions that emerged from the research process (Agar, 
1980, pp. 119-120). Over time, I narrowed in on emergent topics in how I oriented my attention 
during observation, in how I asked questions of those I studied, and in the amount of space I 
gave them in my notes (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, pp. 26-30). Likewise, selection of events 
and people to observe was tactical; I sought out a diverse range of perspectives on any given 
issue until I reached a point of apparent "saturation" (Padgett, 1998, p. 52). Selecting what to 
follow and what to leave aside was one of my greatest challenges. Adarsh often made fun of me 
as I scrambled to keep up with countless new activist acquaintances, new developments in the 
Gandhamur campaign, or new lines of inquiry. To state the obvious: activist lives are often 
active, frequently pivoting to the next project or the next paradigm, and tracking all this motion 
could easily become a frantic enterprise. Adarsh compared my predicament to his early days as a 
journalist, when he also had aspired to document everything that mattered. Over time, the 
impossibility of both our work became a running joke between us.   
The activists associated with Kēraḷīyam were frequently on the move, traveling to 
different struggles, protests, seminars, documentary screenings, poetry readings, and other 
events. In conducting research, I could expect to see a certain number of the most involved 
activists from time to time, but it was hard to know beforehand who would turn up when and 
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where. This was true to some extent for local activists in the Gandhamur campaign as well. For 
many of them, people's struggle was mostly about gathering every evening in the struggle tent 
(samarapantal) that served as campaign headquarters. During the more active periods of the 
campaign, I could always find at least a few men there (women stopped by, but not as frequently 
or for as long) chatting about the latest developments. But Vijayan, the convener of the Action 
Council, was a whirlwind of motion. He moved in tighter orbit than Adarsh, but he was just as 
difficult to follow. 
The challenge posed by the high activity of activists was only partly about keeping up. 
The greater challenge was locating patterns in all of the activity. Anthropological insight often 
relies on cyclical motion. To understand the importance of a cultural practice in everyday life, 
for example, it is best to see it multiple times. But activists' self-understanding worked against 
this logic because they had a strong tendency to see every event as unique. For example, when 
protesters gathered at the gates of the Gandhamur gelatin factory were beaten by police, the 
Action Council received unprecedented media attention. Adarsh called it an opportunity that had 
never come before and would never come again, and the same sense of urgency was reflected in 
the mood of local activists. Likewise, with regard to a particular court decision or the visit of a 
particular politician, activists stressed that wins and losses were one-time events. This is why 
they were always in motion; action was needed now. 
Of course, even in the most radical projects of social change, there are cycles. In the 
format of magazine articles, the seating arrangements during activist seminars, or the rituals of 
display by which a polluted paddy field was made to appear unjust, I did begin to find recurrent 
patterns. But I was always aware of a tension, present in the lives of the activists I studied, 
between attention to any moment as unique and attention to that same moment as a recurrence. If 
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analysis was only about pulling out the patterns, then I would lose sight of much of what 
activism was all about. The problem, then, was to find the balance between narrating the 
progression of events and finding the stability in the flow. 
This problem of temporal context became central to my analysis. Upon returning from 
my final stint of fieldwork, I began by reorganizing my photo, video, and audio files into dated 
folders, one for each day I had been in Kerala. My fieldnotes, which were ordered 
chronologically in the manner of a diary, then became the backbone of my analysis, with other 
materials easily locatable for any day's notes. This helped me to retain awareness of how, for 
example, interviews with Adarsh in July, October, and December might be differently situated 
with regard to ongoing events. This is not to say that I assumed the temporality of my fieldnotes 
as standard. Rather, I gave close attention to how activists narrativized their own projects and 
experiences, and this process was aided by the temporal framework of my own materials. In this 
way, I gradually narrowed in on key storylines in order to construct accounts of what happened, 
why, and how. 
I use these stories to inquire into the puzzles that came to occupy my attention during 
fieldwork. Often a puzzle had to do with some tension or dilemma that I glimpsed again and 
again in various shades and forms—for example, the problem of how an activist's expression of 
ethical freedom can be felt as a coercive force by those around them. In much of my analysis, I 
select stories that bring a tension to the fore, and then follow them along to see how things play 
out down the line. Some chapters are dominated by a single storyline, while others combine bits 
and pieces of stories to build a more traditional, temporally diffuse ethnographic account. And 
then there are the stories—like that of Sunil's activist education or the Gandhamur campaign's 
descent—that make occasionally appearances in relation to the various puzzles of multiple 
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chapters. In each of these ways, I attempt to sustain a sense of the progressive temporality of 
activist lives while also addressing enduring problems that define an activist life as such. 
There are some puzzles and themes that are present across several chapters, but never 
become the main focus of analysis. Gender relations in people's struggle activism, and activists' 
efforts to transform gender relations, form one such broad theme. The politics of gender, and 
especially the roles of women in Kerala's public life, have been the focus of several major works 
(Arunima, 2003; Devika, 2007; Jeffrey, 1993; Lindberg, 2005; Oommen, 2007), including one 
which focuses on people's struggles (Binoy, 2014). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, activists 
associated with people's struggles included the transformation of gender norms as one aim within 
their broader vision for eliminating social hierarchy in Malayali life. Nonetheless, the 
environmental and social activism described here continued to be largely dominated by men, and 
the effects of this dominance are apparent in the stories told here (see, in particular, Chapter 7). 
However, a full analysis of these forms of patriarchy and the mechanisms of their perpetuation 
must remain for future work. 
1.8 From Freedom and Unfreedom to Creativity and Persuasion 
The activists described here—both those associated with Kēraḷīyam and those in the 
Gandhamur Action Council—self-consciously organized their everyday lives around certain 
social change agendas. They are the sort of people who, when a researcher asks them about the 
values that motivate their work, not only have ready answers, but are also ready to show why 
these values should motivate the researcher as well (cf. Harding, 1987). In their self-
understanding, they are "self-conscious people who aspire to stand apart from the taken-for-
granted flow of life in order to act upon it" (Keane, 2016, p. 200). Whether by striving to 
transform their own lives or by attempting to influence the lives of others, these activists exert 
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force upon evalutive practice. That is part of what it means to be an activist. 
If our aim is to understand the forces that drive ethical change—whether in the lives of 
activists or in the lives of those they seek to influence—one answer might be found in activists' 
own agency. Following cues from activists' self-undertanding, we might portray them as 
critically distancing themselves from the norms in which others are immersed, inventing 
alternative values that are not beholden to these norms (or, perhaps, to any norms (Warner, 
1999)), and then working to get others to re-orient to these values as well. Dave's (2012) analysis 
of activist ethics tells such a story, in which the inventive "ethics" of activists is rigorously 
distinguished from the socially-enforced norms of "morality" which they struggle against. 
Similarly, other depictions of activist approaches to ethical life have emphasized the agentive 
efficacy of activists, even when activists' self-understandings credit change in themselves and 
othes to forces outside themselves (Hirschkind, 2006; Mahmood, 2005). And as Keane argues, 
such self-conscious objectification of existing norms and effortful work for reform is surely one 
important driver of ethical change (Keane, 2016, p. 200). 
However, as Sunil's plastic bag story suggests, the very efficacy of activists' upon the 
lives of others also implies a limit to accounts of free self-invention and resistance to norms. If 
Faiza and Adarsh are having such an impact upon Sunil, then this should also lead us to ask 
about their impacts upon other activists or upon one another. Does Adarsh pack a bag daily as a 
free act of self-invention, or is he also worried about how Faiza will see him? Moreover, even by 
their own self-description, Faiza and Adarsh did not become "activists" by an endogenous act of 
critical distancing, but through the inspiration of examplars, the persuasive appeals of others, and 
the stubbornly apparent injustices they saw around them. Might we not expect that, even now, 
their ethical lives continue to be influenced as much by such prods and lures as by their own 
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agency? Thus, once we start exploring how people exert force upon the ethical lives of those 
around them, distinctions between the freedom of change-oriented ethics and the unfreedom of 
other ethical lives begin to come undone.  
One of the reasons that anthropological accounts of activist ethics have not attended more 
closely to unfreedoms is that the anthropology of ethics, generally, has tended to focus on 
relations between ethical subjects (usually, though not always, individuals (Laidlaw, 2014b)) and 
moral codes, rather than on relations between people. Part of this has to do with the pervasive 
influence in this literature of Foucault's ethical theory, which describes the moral domain as 
composed of "codes of behavior and forms of subjectivation" (1990, p. 29). As noted earlier, the 
latter are the ways in which the subject works upon itself, a process that can include orienting in 
various ways to moral codes. While this arguably includes cultivating responsiveness to 
disciplinary forces from outside oneself, as Mahmood (2005) describes, Foucault takes up this 
framework with another purpose in mind. He wishes to explore the possibility of ethical 
freedom, which he describes not as an obedience to codes but, on the contrary, as a search for 
zones in which moral codes are relatively undeveloped, opening up spaces in which freedom can 
be exercised (Faubion, 2001, p. 89; Foucault, 1990, p. 30). 
Anthropologists have found Foucault's framework useful for exploring how ethical 
subjects remake themselves, and some have argued that such analyses are an important 
supplement to earlier work describing how social norms produce ethical subjects and reproduce 
themselves. However, this framework obscures or marginalizes some other aspects of ethical 
life. First, we have no tools for describing the remaking of moral codes, such as the work 
undertaken by many of the activists described here. In Foucault's framework, subjects orient to 
codes in various ways, but in doing so they remake themselves, not the codes. Second, and 
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relatedly, we have no tools for describing how subjects act upon one another. For Foucault, 
teasing, serving, battling, debating, or giving pleasure to others can all be taken up as ethical 
techniques, but they are only ethics insofar as they contribute to work upon oneself. And this 
makes it difficult to appreciate the unfreedoms that work upon oneself may (even inadvertently) 
entail. We can well analyze what avoiding plastic does for Adarsh and Faiza, but it becomes 
more difficult to appreciate the impact of these practices upon Sunil. 
Indeed, what Sunil's case makes clear is that once we attend to how people remake norms 
or put pressure upon one another—the quintessential activities of an activist ethics—the apparent 
"unfreedoms" of ethical life multiply. Accountability to moral codes may be one source of 
limitation to a subject's freedom, but so can accountability to another person's evaluation even 
when no systematic code is in place. Such was often the case among activists associated with 
Kēraḷīyam, whose alternative leftism was resolutely opposed to ideological conformity but 
nonetheless committed to radical moral change. Indeed, for newcomers to this social circle like 
Sunil and me, anxiety about missteps was only heightened by the lack of any ethical rule book 
that one might consult. Such forces are difficult to account for in Foucault's framework, which 
imagines the absence of codes as a space of relative freedom.  
If the anthropology of ethics has insufficiently attended to these forms of unfreedom, it 
may be because most studies have examined ethnographic setting in which moral codes are 
relatively explicit and well-developed (Hirschkind, 2006; Laidlaw, 1995; Mahmood, 2005; 
Robbins, 2004). While Foucault was looking to get away from codes, it should be no surprise 
that anthropologists have found his dual concern with subject-code and subject-self relations 
most helpful for theorizing ethical domains, like religions, in which codes often play a defining 
role. For it is in the context of such coherent and consistent "morality systems" (Keane, 2016; 
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Williams, 1985) that the question of individual agency has seemed primary. And it is also from 
this perspective that activists' challenges to morality systems have appeared to be radically 
freeing (Dave, 2011). However, as Keane (2016, p. 200) reminds us, activists do not only disrupt 
morality systems—they also often make them. 
In order to bring the "unfreedoms" of activist ethics into view, I begin from a more open-
ended analysis of social interaction, in which the relevant actors and trajectories of force remain 
to be discovered. Activists work upon the moral order, breaking down some standards and 
asserting others, but they do not do so alone nor, necessarily, of their own volition. As Keane 
notes, studying the accomplishment of ethical lives in social interaction helps draw attention to 
the ways in which even the most purposeful, agentive ethical projects are afforded by 
intersubjective encounters with others (Keane, 2016, pp. 33, 262). Rather than Foucauldian 
ethical subjects who shape themselves with the tools given them by social norms, my approach 
to activist subjectivity is inspired by the fellow-feelers of Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. Beginning from social interaction, Smith describes how ethical desires and demands 
are co-constructed in the company of others, putting the distinction between evalutation of 
oneself and evaluation by others under question (A. Smith, 2002, pp. 150-151). Thus, beginning 
from such an understanding of ethical subjectivity as grounded in intersubjectivity, I explore how 
some topics are made morally important while others are left aside, how some normative 
categories become obvious while others are suspect, and how some claims about justice become 
compelling while others fall short. 
In order to give a full account of ethics in social interaction, I also find it necessary to 
consider not only how humans inspire, cajole, or convince one another to change, but also how 
their ethical views are shaped by the material world. In doing so, I build upon recent calls for an 
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expanded conceptualization of social interaction, in which non-human actors have a major role 
(Latour, 2004, 2005; Mol, 2002). However, I also attempt to address a problem that, as I argue in 
Chapter 7, has not been adequately treated in this literature: what are the implications of non-
human agency for human ethical evaluation? In doing so, I do not concern myself with what sort 
of agency should be attributed to non-humans; what matters here are the effects of the material 
world upon human ethics. I give an account of activist ethics that is neither determined nor 
merely afforded by the material world, but that allows for the possibility that non-humans can 
intervene in human evaluations, inspiring visions for change, demanding recognition of injustice, 
or otherwise taking sides in human contention over how one ought to live. 
As suggested earlier, undertaking analysis on these terms immediately makes the 
dichotomy between freedom and unfreedom awkward. If we find it troublesome to distinguish 
between evaluation of oneself and evaluation by others, how can we know if a project of self-
cultivation is undertaken freely? If a certain circumstance strikes a person as unjust, should we 
count that as a free act of evaluation by that person or, instead, as an act by that circumstance 
upon that person? With regard to either question, any clear-cut distinction between freedom and 
unfreedom makes it difficult to account for both possibilities together and, moreover, to 
appreciate the varieties of "freeishness" and "unfreeishness" that might carry us down a 
particular moral path. 
Nonetheless, even if we set aside these terms, it is worth retaining something of the 
concern motivating the freedom/unfreedom distinction for two reasons. First, because many 
activists involved in people's struggles were themselves so concerned with freedom. For those 
associated with Kēraḷīyam, like Faiza and Adarsh, the notion of activism as both expressing 
one's own freedom and promoting freedom for others was central. We must be able to account 
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for that aspect of activist experience. Second, and relatedly, some version of the 
freedom/unfreedom dichotomy will continue to be important to our analysis of the closely allied 
distinction between changing oneself and changing others. 
Thus, in place of freedom/unfreedom, I propose that we take our starting point from the 
notions of creativity and persuasion. With these concepts, we can retain some of the notion of 
autonomous force suggested by "freedom" and some of the notion of external force in 
"unfreedom." In the manner I propose to use them here, however, creativity and persuasion are 
far more agnostic about the boundaries between internal and external, self and other, agency and 
determination. To be clear, my aim is not to make the case for creativity and persuasion as an 
overarching framework for describing activist ethics, let alone all human ethics, to supplant 
Foucauldian or Heideggerian frameworks proposed by others. Creativity and persuasion are, 
rather, only two mechanisms that might matter to ethical life. Indeed, although some versions of 
these mechanisms were important to activists involved in people's struggles, I will only 
occasionally find it helpful to describe activist ethics in these exact terms. Nonetheless, I find it 
helpful to introduce these concepts as this point because, taken together, they help to extricate us 
from the conceptual traps of the freedom/unfreedom question and start us down a more 
promising path. 
Iris Murdoch, in a critique of the role of will in ethical life, draws an analogy between the 
pursuit of good and a certain account of artistic creativity (Murdoch, 1970, p. 59). A good 
painter, she claims, does not simply paint things as she likes, but as she apprehends them to be. 
Similarly, she argues, answering the question of how one should live should not simply be a 
matter of choosing what one wants, but rather of developing the ability to see clearly. She 
describes the development of such moral vision as a process of orienting and attending to an 
  52 
 
external world (Murdoch, 1970, pp. 22, 23). Understood thus, creativity retains much of the 
striving and reflexive self-cultivation currently slotted under the rubric of freedom in much of the 
anthropology of ethics. But creativity is also a kind of obedience—an openness to influence from 
forces outside oneself (Murdoch, 1970, pp. 39, 40). 
My aim in taking up these ideas is not to argue that the ethical lives of Kerala activists 
conform to Murdoch's theory, which at any rate is less a description of actual conduct than a 
program for how people ought to live (Murdoch, 1970, p. 45). Nonetheless, her notion of 
creativity is helpful for understanding the ethical dimension of social change, particularly change 
of the self, among activists in people's struggles. In adopting and enacting alternative ways of 
life, Faiza and Adarsh did not take themselves to be imposing their preferred moral framework 
upon a morally neutral world; they found the demand for change in the state of the world as they 
found it. The term most often used to describe this work was anvēṣaṇam ("inquiry," or 
"searching"), a practice often involving extensive first-hand experience, reading, and discussion. 
The logic of anvēṣaṇam implied that, with careful searching, the moral truth of matters could be 
found out; activist commitment was understood to grow out of a continual process of 
anvēṣaṇam. One young man, after several years of intervention in people's struggles, insisted to 
me that he was not yet an activist; he was still conducting anvēṣaṇam, still trying to learn, and 
even older activists often described ongoing inquiry as important to their work. Likewise, Faiza 
and Adarsh described Sunil's encounter with people's struggle activism—and the changes in him 
that resulted—in similar terms; as a growing apprehension of reality. To the extent that they 
sought to influence him, they understood this as a process of facilitating his attunement not to 
their own opinions and desires, but to the world which they all shared. 
In taking up this notion of creativity, I do not mean to claim that Adarsh and Faiza, or any 
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of the activists I studied, were in a state of enlightenment, nor even that they consistently and 
sincerely sought the truth. Rather, I only mean to take seriously the possibility that the world can 
inspire or demand certain ethical positions, and that activists care about that possibility. Whether 
or not the world acts in such ways upon particular people, and whether or not those people are 
receptive to such forces, are questions to be explored empirically. I take the notion of creativity 
to open up such exploration alongside consideration of other forces, allowing for analysis of their 
interaction. 
With Adarsh and Faiza's understanding of their influence on Sunil, our topic has already 
begun to pivot from changing the self to changing others. Persuasion, as I use the term here, 
contains much the same play between freedom and attunement as creativity, but shifts emphasis 
to outwardly directed force. To some it may seem strange to speak of persuasion as an exercise 
of force, insofar as it is generally understood as symbolic and not physical action. However, 
philosophers have long been concerned with the power of persuasion to direct the actions of 
others. Plato has Gorgias describe persuasion as the greatest of powers, which in the form of 
rhetorical speech "practically captures all powers and keeps them under its control" (Plato, 1979, 
pp. 19, 23), and it was the alleged misuse of this persuasive force that Socrates and Plato took 
issue with in their debate with Gorgias and other Sophists. More recently, the feminist 
philosopher Sally Gearhart (1979) has argued that, insofar as persuasion attempts to change 
others, it must be understood as a form of violence (see also, Foss & Griffin, 1995). And yet, as 
the Oxford English Dictionary has it, to persuade is to "induce to believe or accept," "to talk 
into," or "to coax out of"—actions upon others that are not unilateral, that require some 
participation, some acceptance, on the part of those we seek to influence ("Persuade," 2017). It is 
this element of cooperation that makes it difficult to speak of persuasion as a form of 
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domination, though it clearly has power to change others. 
We commonly use the notion of persuasion in two distinct ways. We can persuade 
someone to do something, and we can persuade someone to take on a certain belief or ethical 
position. In speaking of moral persuasion, I am interested in the latter—not only of getting 
people to act as one wishes, but of convincing them, of winning them over. Empirically, 
however, there is often ambiguity between the two senses of persuasion. Sunil was persuaded to 
drop the plastic bag, but how can we know whether or not he was persuaded to oppose the use of 
such bags? In analyzing forces of persuasion, then, the relation between moral persuasion and 
other persuasive forces, which we might call political, remains to be explored. 
This concept of moral persuasion is closely allied with the notion of moral reasoning 
found in some recent work in the anthropology of ethics (Hirschkind, 2006; Keane, 2016; Sykes, 
2009). However, I choose to use "persuasion" both because of its emphasis on changing others 
and because of its comparative neutrality with regard to the means of influence. I take reasoning 
to indicate a normative ideal of persuasion, which selects certain persuasive techniques as those 
conducive to the discovery and promotion of truth. Activists associated with Kēraḷīyam certainly 
regard their practices of inquiry (anvēṣaṇam) as moral reasoning, but for me to describe them in 
this way would suggest that I take activist practice to be just what the activists I study understand 
it to be. However, as with the notion of creativity, my aim is to make the workings of influence 
on others open to empirical exploration without deciding ahead of time what is there to be found. 
Analyzing activist ethics in these terms, then, leaves room for consideration of how 
selves act upon themselves, how they act upon by others, and how they are acted upon by other 
people and things. In the first three chapters, I focus primarily on the various forces at play in the 
enactment of people's struggle. Chapter 2 examines conflicts between the Gandhamur Action 
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Council and solidarity organizers from the activist network associated with Kēraḷīyam. I show 
how the two groups' differing perspectives on the proper "scale" of the campaign against the 
gelatin factory amount to different ways of distributing ethical value. These different moral 
perspectives were crucial to the distinction between insiders and outsiders in the campaign and, 
by extension, to opinions about the proper roles of insider and outsiders. Although Action 
Council members and solidarity organizers shared the common goal of shutting down the gelatin 
factory, they situated this goal differently within their respective projects of social change. 
Chapters 3 and 4 look more closely at these two ethico-political projects, which are each 
ways of realizing a normative vision of people's struggle. In Chapter 3, I describe how activists 
associated with Kēraḷīyam constructed "people's struggle" as a type of political action. Although 
this was, to some extent, a process of imposing a normative framework upon the social world, it 
was also an encounter with qualities of the world that inspired, suggested, or constricted the 
work of typification. I analyze how Kēraḷīyam shaped the social world, but also how the social 
world entered into the activist imagination. In Chapter 4, I explore how the Gandhamur Action 
Council performed people's struggle through staging a variety of events in public roads. Here, we 
find the normative concept of "the people" caught up in a different contention of forces, as 
Action Council members deploy kinship and friendship, arguments and violence, displays of 
outrage and bodies blocking the street—all with the aim of harnessing the elusive force of public 
opinion. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 look more deeply at implications of activist ethics for anthropology's 
understanding of ethics works. Here, I am interested in how activists brought their own forces to 
bear on ethical life—holding one another accountable to certain practices, living consistently 
with particular values, or seeking to persuade non-activists about their views—but also with how 
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other forces bolstered, countered, or otherwise interacted with activist agency. In Chapter 5, I do 
a close analysis of an interaction in which the leader of an awareness-raising event berated others 
for eating cookies. Tracking the various responses of participants in the event, I show how the 
evaluative force of the original condemnation of cookies is extended and amplified by those who 
continue to eat them. I argue that this "stickiness" of ethical accountability in this instance was 
reducible neither to the authority of the group'’s leader nor to the reasons he gave for avoiding 
cookies, but took on a certain momentum of its own. 
In Chapter 6, I show how making ethical change requires activists to take ethical 
positions at odds with those around them, which can create rifts in social relations. Activists 
struggle to be consistent despite these social consequences, but too much consistency can also 
isolate them, hindering their impact on others. At the heart of this problem, I argue, is the social 
force of evaluative alignment and disalignment. Engaging with literature from linguistic 
anthropology on evaluative stance as well as on the moral theory of Adam Smith, I argue that 
ethical stancetaking is uniquely difficult to segregate from other aspects of relationship. Thus, 
activists must often choose between maintaining consistency between their own ethical positions 
and compromising their principles in order to sustain relationships. 
In Chapter 7, I examine the evidentiary practices by which the Gandhamur Action 
Council and its supporters attempted to persuade visiting supporters, government agencies, and 
the broader public that the effluents from the gelatin factory are unjust. I argue that both activists' 
and government researchers’ uses of evidence presuppose implicit moral realist ideologies, and I 
compare these to two dominant moral epistemologies in anthropology. Ultimately, I argue that 
without some limited realist moral epistemology, it is difficult to make sense of the central role 
of contention in much ethical evaluation. 
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In Chapter 8, I conclude by returning to Sunil's story and the problem of the place of 
freedom in activist ethics. Having considered a wide range of forces that contribute to change of 
self and others, I track the complex dynamics of Sunil's freedoms and unfreedoms within his 
experience of becoming an activist. In doing so, I offer a picture not only of the limits of ethical 
freedom, but also of the unfreedom it can engender. It is this dual character of ethical freedom, I 
argue, that makes ethics a field of contention.  
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Chapter 2: Scales of Value 
2.1 Making Insiders and Outsiders 
Late in the hot season of 2013, there was a fish kill in the Neelajalam river, not far 
downstream from the gelatin factory in Gandhamur. Hundreds of thousands of glistening fish 
bodies bobbed along in the current, making their way past villages that the factory's noxious 
smell had never reached. Many of the people in these villages had not heard about the campaign 
to shut down the Gandhamur gelatin factory, but the stench of dead fish drew them out of their 
homes and into the roads. Jaison and Ravindranath were among the downstream residents who 
gathered at a major intersection, blocking traffic in protest of the smell. That day both men 
learned about the campaign for the first time and decided to become active participants. But in 
the ensuing months, their stories would take divergent trajectories; Jaison would increasingly be 
accepted as an insider by leaders of the campaign, while Ravindranath would gradually be 
marginalized. At last, in a heated meeting several months later, Ravindranath was expelled from 
the campaign and Jaison was inducted as an official member of the Gandhamur Action Council. 
In this chapter, I examine how these men ended up in such different positions and, more 
generally, what was at stake in the making of insiders and outsiders in Gandhamur. 
How should insiders and outsiders be distinguished from one another in community 
organizing and what are their appropriate roles in the organizing process? This question is 
arguably fundamental to community organizing, but it is answered differently by different 
organizing traditions. In Kerala, as in the US, the dominant view is that organizing should be 
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community driven; outsiders may work in solidarity, providing resources and guidance, but 
insiders should define aims and make major decisions. However, in the Gandhamur campaign, 
the distinctions between insiders and outsiders were sometimes fuzzy, and roles became a matter 
of controversy.  
As in many other environmental campaigns, insiders and outsiders in the Gandhamur 
campaign were primarily distinguished from one another in spatial terms, as locals and non-
locals. As Jaison’s and Ravindranath's stories illustrate, however, being local or non-local was 
not merely a matter of residence; in that sense, both men were insiders and outsiders in 
approximately equal measure. Situating these mens' stories within the broader controversy over 
insider and outsider roles in Gandhamur, this chapter shows that what made Jaison a local and 
Ravindranath a non-local were the ways each man aligned himself with conflicting perspectives 
on the importance of local belonging. Insiders and outsiders in the Gandhamur campaign, I find, 
were distinguished by different ways of measuring, or "scaling" (Carr & Lempert, 2016), the 
value of localness that entailed mutually opposed perspectives on the purpose of the campaign. 
Such tensions, I argue, are not adequately addressed by appeals to community self-determination 
or blanket formulas for appropriate insider and outsider roles. 
Jaison’s and Ravindranath's stories are key threads of a larger narrative of attempted 
collaboration between insiders and outsiders in the campaign against the gelatin factory. After 
the fish kill, the campaign received unprecedented involvement from a network of environmental 
and social activists who regularly intervene in people's struggles across the state. The 
Gandhamur campaign had always self-identified as a people's struggle, and local organizers had 
long been in contact with some of these activists, including the editors of Kēraḷīyam. Indeed, in 
early visits to Gandhamur, local leaders had complained to me about the relative lack of 
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coverage their campaign received from Kēraḷīyam in comparison with some other people's 
struggles and had expressed desire for greater involvement from activists associated with the 
magazine. Now, collaboration between the Action Council and solidarity organizers greatly 
intensified, with several of these activists residing as guests in the homes of Action Council 
members in order to work full time on the campaign. Soon after an official "solidarity 
committee" (aikyadārḍhya samiti) was formed to promote and coordinate the participation of 
activists from across the state on behalf of the campaign, and a solidarity convention was 
planned. 
Ravindranath was centrally but ambiguously positioned in this collaboration. He had 
been involved in environmental activism before, though never in people's struggles, and had 
some friends among the Kēraḷīyam crowd. During the early months of the collaboration, he led 
much of the day-to-day organizing in Gandhamur while also working as a liaison between the 
Action Council and the solidarity committee. Jaison's influence, on the other hand, was 
considered suspect by many solidarity organizers. He had long been involved in politics as a 
member of the Congress party,15 which was in power at the time and was perceived as negligent 
of the Gandhamur campaign's demands. Nonetheless, among Action Council members, many of 
whom were members of the Congress party, he was generally seen as bringing high-level 
contacts and political clout to the campaign. 
By the time of the solidarity convention, it was clear that the collaboration was not going 
                                                 
15 While generally considered centrist at the national level, in Kerala the Congress party is the 
more right-leaning of two dominant parties, the other being the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), or CPM. As at the national level, Kerala has a parliamentary system of government, 
which is generally controlled by either the Congress-led UDF coalition or the CPM-led LDF 
coalition. The UDF was in power during the bulk of my fieldwork, including the period during 
which the events described in this chapter transpired. 
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well. About 250 activists from other parts of the state came, but only fifteen or so Action Council 
members showed up, even though the convention was held at a school just outside of 
Gandhamur. By my own observation, it appeared that the collaboration was strained by conflict 
over key aspects of how the campaign was run. And indeed, Action Council members and 
solidarity organizers privately complained about conflicts over many of the same issues—
including gender roles, the facilitation of meetings, and involvement of politicians like Jaison—
but from different perspectives. Ravindranath's expulsion and Jaison's induction marked a 
turning point in this conflict, a moment in which local organizers reasserted control over the 
campaign. Thereafter, most of the non-local activists stopped coming to Gandhamur, and 
collaboration ceased.  
In this chapter, I examine the conflicts over organizing processes that troubled the 
Gandhamur collaboration, looking closely at how Action Council members and solidarity 
organizers talked about the campaign and about each other. Within this analysis, I return to 
Jaison’s and Ravindranath's stories in order to shed light on how distinctions between insiders 
and outsiders were made. I find that what troubled the collaboration in Gandhamur was a 
fundamental disagreement about how to situate the gelatin factory campaign within "people's 
struggle." This disagreement can usefully be described in terms of different spatialized scales of 
value; both groups positioned the Gandhamur campaign as a local instance within the broader, 
geographically dispersed politics of people struggle, but they disagreed in the relative importance 
they attributed to localness vis-à-vis broadness. Because of this difference in perspective, local 
Action Council members and solidarity organizers shared a common goal of shutting down the 
factory, but they did not share a common cause, or further ethical purpose in relation to which 
this goal was understood to be important. This case illustrates how scales of value can help us to 
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understand what is at stake in insider/outsider distinctions in community organizing and how 
those distinctions can lead to conflict. Although there is no single way of resolving such conflict, 
sensitivity to the ethical and political implications of scalar perspectives can aid organizers in 
collaborating across insider/outsider distinctions. 
2.2 Insiders and Outsiders in Kerala’s People’s Struggles 
Studies of environmental movements have documented the importance of spatial 
categories, particularly distinctions between locals and their others, in this form of politics 
(Giugni & Grasso, 2015; Rootes, 1999, 2007, 2013; Tsing, 2005). An important insight of this 
literature has been that sorting actors and events into such categories is often part of the 
organizing process (Choy, 2005; Towers, 2000). Chaskin makes a similar point with respect to 
the concepts of "community" and "neighborhood" in American neighborhood organizing, in 
which distinctions of local belonging have often been central (Chaskin, 1997). According to 
Chaskin, the boundaries of neighborhoods and other local communities are not simply 
geographic; these are social boundaries between those who belong and those who do not, 
between insiders and outsiders. The politics of drawing these boundaries is often central to the 
organizing process. 
Likewise, distinctions between locals and nonlocals are central to the politics of people's 
struggles in Kerala. As noted in Chapter 1, many struggles are conflicts over environmental 
hazards or access to resources, but there is no unifying people's struggle topic or issue. For 
example, campaigns to ban bars in predominately Muslim regions are also commonly included in 
the category. Sunny, the managing editor of Kēraḷīyam, explained that this categorization is 
controversial because opposition to alcohol is contrary to many readers' own views. Nonetheless, 
he and Adarsh held that these campaigns were people's struggles because they represent the 
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views of those who belong to those places. Thus, the strongest point of consistency in the politics 
of people's struggle is that the "people" are understood to be the people of a particular place. 
What people's struggles share is that they make claims on the state based on belonging to a place. 
Thus, the map of people's struggles in Figure 2, originally published in Kēraḷīyam, depicts each 
one as located in a place, as a dot, but also as partaking of a broader type of organizing and a 
common claim to representing the people. Each people's struggle has its locals; they are the 
people of people's struggles. 
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Figure 2: : Map of "people's struggles" from Kēraḷīyam magazine (8/2012) 
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Distinguishing insiders and outsiders is not only part of organizing local communities, 
but any community. The concept of community always includes such distinctions or exclusions, 
setting apart those who belong from those who do not (Young, 1986). Within community 
organizing, the position of the organizer with respect to these distinctions has been treated in 
diverse and contrasting ways. In both Alinsky-style and consensus organizing, two traditions 
often juxtaposed in the literature, the organizer is generally assumed to be an outsider who 
moves from community to community, collaborating with locals (Alinsky, 1971; Beck & 
Eichler, 2000; Pruger & Specht, 1969). Similarly, some scholars have distinguished between 
"leaders" and "organizers" as appropriate roles for insiders and outsiders, respectively (Staples, 
2000). In other traditions, the ideal is for insiders to take the primary organizing roles. This has 
been the dominant position in multicultural organizing in the US, in which distinctions between 
ethnic or racial insiders and outsiders have been particularly salient (Bradshaw, Soifer, & 
Gutierrez, 1994; Gutierrez, Alvarez, Nemon, & Lewis, 1996; Rivera & Erlich, 1992). Consider 
the diagram in Figure 3, in which Rivera and Erlich divide relative insiders and outsiders into 
three concentric rings designating primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of appropriate 
"organizer contact," or participation in key organizing processes (1992, p. 11). Here, 
insider/outsider distinctions are critical. How you should participate is proportional to how much 
you belong. 
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Figure 3: "Organizer's Contact Intensity and Influence" (Rivera & Erlich, 
1992, p. 11) 
Not all approaches to organizing foreground insider/outsider distinctions. In his letter 
from Birmingham Jail, for example, Martin Luther King Jr. famously argued that when it came 
to the pursuit of racial justice in America, there were no outsiders (King, 1997). One solidarity 
organizer I encountered made a similar point, arguing that because environmental hazards like 
the pollution from the gelatin factory affect Kerala rivers, they are equally an issue for all 
Malayalis. Such claims do not necessarily mean that insider/outsider distinctions are not in 
play—King's letter was a response to those who claimed he was an outsider in Birmingham—but 
it is certainly possible to imagine organizing without community—that is, as King suggests, to 
refuse to distinguish insiders from outsiders. However, because the gelatin factory campaign and 
other people's struggles are localized by definition, distinguishing locals from non-locals is 
inherently important to this form of organizing. 
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In Malayalam, members of the Gandhamur Action Council were referred to 
interchangeably as nāṭṭukār (people of a particular place), janaṅṅaḷ (the people), or samarakār 
(people of struggle) by both themselves and solidarity organizers. And as noted earlier, the action 
councils are generally considered the primary actors in people's struggles. However, solidarity 
organizers also take intervention in people's struggles as their major mode of political action. In 
Malayalam, these activists are referred to as pravarttakar (“organizers” or “activists”)16, a term 
that was mutually exclusive with the terms used for local organizers. Many solidarity organizers 
are producers of alternative and mainstream media, and they actively work to frame people's 
struggles as contributors to a larger movement for social transformation. In this sense, the map in 
Figure 1 also exemplifies the essential role of solidarity organizers in people struggles. They are 
not depicted anywhere on the map, but they are the ones who made the map. 
While the notion of Action Council members as spatial insiders is straightforward, it may 
not seem clear why solidarity organizers are necessarily outsiders. This is one part of the 
problem this chapter undertakes to address. For the moment, however, it is worth noting that 
while the term pravarttakar does not mean non-local in all contexts, it takes that meaning here 
by contrast to the terms that designate local organizers.17 I use the term "solidarity" to highlight 
this defining contrast—to work in solidarity is to ally one's efforts with a person or group while 
also taking them as other (Wright, 2016). The Gandhamur campaign drew support from many 
                                                 
16 The term pravarttakar could be most literally glossed as "workers" or, simply "doers." It is 
commonly used for people doing political work (e.g., as a member of a political party) or social 
work (e.g., as someone with an MSW), not for manual labor or office work. Often, solidarity 
organizers were referred to specifically as paristhitika (environmental) pravarttakar or samūhya 
(social) pravarttakar to distinguish them from rāṣṭrīya pravarttakar (political party workers). 
17 Within the discourse of people's struggle, this contrast was ubiquitous. Notably, even the 
solidarity organizer who made the MLK-esque argument that there are no outsiders in people's 
struggle still used the contrasting terms samarakār and pravarttakar in making his case. 
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non-resident individuals and groups (e.g., representatives of religious organizations, political 
parties, unions) who were not solidarity organizers. What set solidarity organizers apart from 
these other outsiders was their role in defining and perpetuating people's struggle as a form of 
political action (see Chapter 3). 
Like Rivera and Erlich's diagram, the distinction between locals and solidarity organizers 
separates different kinds of organizers according to levels of belonging. But in Gandhamur, the 
appropriate roles associated with these different kinds of organizers were not always clear. 
Following the fishkill, for example, solidarity organizers temporarily residing in the village 
participated in key decision-making meetings even though they were not technically members of 
the local Action Council. The positions of Ravindranath and Jaison were both particularly 
ambiguous. Initially, Ravindranath was given a central leadership role working closely with 
Vijayan, the head of the Action Council. He used his connections with the solidarity organizer 
network to build support for the campaign, but in his interactions with them, he self-identified as 
a representative of locals. Jaison's public role was initially much more peripheral, but he also 
participated in some decision-making meetings. As noted earlier, his status as a Congress 
politician led many solidarity organizers and a few Action Council members to suspect him as a 
hijacker. In short, both men were neither wholly on the outside nor wholly on the inside. As 
tensions grew between the Action Council and the solidarity committee, however, the boundaries 
of appropriate roles became increasingly important. By examining the roots of these tensions, we 
can understand what came to matter most in distinguishing insiders and outsiders in Gandhamur 
and why Ravindranath was gradually excluded while Jaison's role became more central. 
2.3 Consciousness and Cause 
The solidarity organizers who arrived in Gandhamur following the fishkill quickly 
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involved themselves in the everyday work of the campaign—coordinating social media, 
participating in marches and roadblocks, making speeches, joining strategy meetings, and 
fasting. Through their involvement, they sought to influence organizing processes in line with 
their own normative understanding of people's struggle. Among other things, they sought to hold 
more regular and transparent meetings, resist cooptation by party politicians, and increase the 
participation of women in decision-making and leadership roles. They had an impact in some of 
these areas. For example, nightly public meetings soon became a fixture of the campaign.  
The head of the Action Council, Vijayan, and other local organizers resisted these 
changes. For example, many of the nightly meetings never happened because Vijayan, whom 
both Action Council members and solidarity organizers acknowledged to be the central player in 
all campaign activities, never showed up. Likewise, an attempt by solidarity organizers to 
organize a committee of local women, which would operate independently of the Action 
Council, was quickly stifled by Vijayan, who claimed it was impractical. Again and again, 
solidarity organizers complained about the way things were run and attempted to institute new 
processes. Again and again, Vijayan and other Action Council members undermined those 
processes.  
Solidarity organizers often framed their concerns about the Gandhamur campaign in 
terms of a lack of local "consciousness" (bōdham or bōdhyam). For example, Dhanya, the 
convener of the official Gandhamur "solidarity committee" (aikyadārḍhya samiti) described 
efforts to organize the independent women's committee as an attempt at raising consciousness. 
When this and other attempts to influence the campaign failed, Dhanya explained: 
"[Locals] are not organizing for a cause [English]...For example, if they offered to take 
the factory's waste somewhere else, the people in Gandhamur would agree to that very 
  70 
 
quickly...but this waste will make the same problems there that it is making in Gandhamur. But 
these people still don't have that consciousness yet. I see that as this struggle's biggest 
weakness."  
Here, Dhanya argued that the consciousness locals lacked was consciousness of the ways 
in which the goal of shutting down the gelatin factory fit into larger conflicts over environmental 
resources. In her view, locals in Gandhamur lacked consciousness of these larger conflicts 
because, she asserted, they would be willing to allow the company to move the pollution to some 
other village. For her, this demonstrated that they did not recognize their own plight as 
equivalent with injustices elsewhere. Without such recognition, locals were not working for a 
cause.  Dhanya described "cause" as the "the motor inside me, the aim." Without a cause, she 
argued, the campaign was weak and unlikely to succeed. 
For Dhanya and other solidarity organizers, to be conscious was to approach the 
campaign from a particular scalar perspective. Studies of environmental politics have employed 
the concept of scale in examining how categories like "local," "regional," and "global" are 
socially constructed (Gupta, 2014; Neumann, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2004; Towers, 2000). 
Anthropologist Anna Tsing defines scale as "the spatial dimensionality necessary for a particular 
kind of view, whether up close or from a distance, microscopic or planetary" (Tsing 2005: 58). 
As Dhanya explained, to be conscious is to see the campaign from a certain scalar vantage point, 
a perspective from which the pollution in Gandhamur and pollution in another village are 
equivalent. To have a cause is to configure one's aims in this same way—that is, to pursue 
people's struggle in any particular place as part of people's struggle generally. Moreover, it is 
worth noting here that, in Malayalam, the idiom of "raising consciousness" has a dual sense of 
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offering knowledge and correcting someone's actions.18 Thus, as used here, consciousness 
already includes not only a certain scalar perspective or understanding, but also an ethical 
orientation to action at this scale; consciousness implies cause. 
A glance back at the map in Figure 2, which was published in a magazine by and for 
solidarity organizers, suggests one way of imagining the scalar perspective of "consciousness." 
Here, the campaign against the Gandhamur gelatin factory is one dot in an array of equally-sized 
dots arranged on a plane viewed from above, a bird's-eye view. Like Dhanya's argument about 
consciousness and cause, the map constructs a vantage point from which the Gandhamur 
campaign is equivalent with other people's struggles. For solidarity organizers, such geographic 
equivalence is essential to representing people's struggles as part of a "broader" social 
movement. 
The concept of scaling can also help to make sense of solidarity organizers' descriptions 
of gender roles or nightly meetings as a matter of consciousness. While much of the literature on 
scale focuses on spatial categories, Carr and Lempert (2016) point out that not all scales are 
spatial and that scalar perspectives are often constructed in multiple dimensions at once. Indeed, 
Carr and Fisher (2016) argue that interscaling, or "drawing connections between disparate 
scalable qualities so that they come to reinforce each other," is one of the ways that a particular 
                                                 
18 "Raising consciousness" in Malayalam conflates two distinct verbal clauses, 
"bōdhavalkarikkuka" and “bōdhyappeṭuttuka” For much of my fieldwork, I believed that these 
two terms were equivalent because solidarity organizers, in their talk of raising consciousness, 
used them interchangeably. However, in analyzing transcripts, I came to realize that local 
organizers used bōdhyappeṭuttuka, but hardly ever said bōdhavalkarikkuka. In consulting 
informants about these two terms explicitly, I was told that although they technically have the 
same dictionary meaning, bōdhyappeṭuttuka has more of a sense of correcting someone's actions, 
of right and wrong. The other term bōdhavalkarikkuka is more about simply offering new 
knowledge or information.  
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scalar perspective can be rendered compelling (see also, Philips, 2016). When Dhanya described 
both the dominance of males in decision making and a willingness to move the pollution 
elsewhere in terms of a lack of consciousness, she made just such an analogic connection 
between two ways of situating the campaign within "broader" projects of social transformation. 
A dearth of female leadership in the campaign is to widespread gender inequality as pollution in 
Gandhamur is to pollution anywhere. 
Dhanya's scaling of the Gandhamur campaign should also be understood in the context of 
the ethical import many activists associated with Kēraḷīyam give to apparently "small" aspects of 
everyday life—the scalar practices at the root of Sunil's plastic bag troubles. As I describe in 
Chapter 7, many activists involved with people's struggles were also, to varying degrees, 
committed to taking each person's body (especially with regard to its habits of consumption) as a 
battleground in struggles with corporate capitalism, environmental degradation, Western 
imperialism, and other mechanisms of injustice. Likewise, in Chapter 3, I describe how activists 
attempted to model the changes they hoped to create in society—such as gender equality—in 
their relations to one another. These practices scale social change in a manner parallel to the 
"consciousness" Dhanya describes—in which each campaign is an equivalent site within a 
broader political project, and in which broad social change (the "cause") is pursued through 
intervention in a multiplicity of such "local" sites. 
Dhanya's discussion of cause and consciousness indicates one probable factor in how 
Ravindranath became an outsider. When Ravindranath came to Gandhamur, he came as someone 
from downstream, but he also came with a cause. Even though he positioned himself as a local 
liaison to solidarity organizers, rather than as one of them, his participation sometimes implied a 
scale of social action similar to that associated with "consciousness." For example, it was often 
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he who attempted to gather everyone for the nightly meetings. Ravindranath was sympathetic to 
many of the solidarity organizers' complaints. Solidarity organizers saw him as a local ally, but it 
was this very alliance that arguably made him less local. While Vijayan was butting heads with 
solidarity organizers, Ravindranath collaborated with Dhanya and others in organizing the 
solidarity convention, which, in keeping with solidarity organizers' scalar perspective on the 
campaign, was titled "Gandhamur is Kerala." Nonetheless, at the time, Ravindranath still saw 
himself as a local participant; he described himself as the only local representative to speak at 
that convention. A few weeks later, Vijayan and other local leaders expelled him from the 
campaign. 
2.4 For the Nāṭ 
Sunitha, one of the most active local participants in the Gandhamur campaign, once told 
me about a "consciousness raising" effort she had attended many years before. It was a small 
seminar at the village library and, like Dhanya's effort to form the independent women's 
committee, its aim had been to mobilize local women. Sunitha credited it with giving her the new 
consciousness that motivated her to get involved in the campaign: 
"They gave us a class explaining all of the science behind this. So after getting this 
awareness (bōdhyam) is when the mothers here began to come to the forefront of the struggle... 
After that, we had awareness about the bad effects on our village (nāṭ), and we mothers joined 
[the Action Council] in order to save our village (nāṭ)."  
One might say that through this seminar Sunitha gained both consciousness and cause. 
But this is not consciousness and cause in Dhanya's terms. Sunitha recounted that the awareness 
she and other mothers gained was of bad effects on "our village," motivating them to save "our 
village." In fact, the term she uses here does not translate neatly as "our village." Nāṭ is a deictic 
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term with person-centric meaning: the nāṭ is the place where one belongs, with belonging being a 
relative property (Daniel, 1984, pp. 68-70). Figure 4 is a visual representation of the shifting 
reference of some common uses of nāṭ. If in the US, a Malayali might use the term nāṭ to mean 
India. If in Delhi, it would likely mean Kerala; if in Kerala, one's village. Not necessarily the 
village where one lives, but the village where one belongs—usually the village of one's family 
origins. By describing her consciousness in this idiom of nested spaces of belonging, Sunitha 
distinguished her nāṭ-centric "cause" from the geographically-dispersed social transformation of 
Dhanya and other solidarity organizers. She and other Gandhamur mothers were organizing for 
the nāṭ. 
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Figure 4: Diagram of shifting meaning of "nāṭ" 
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I have called Sunitha's commitment to the nāṭ her "cause," but we might also see this nāṭ-
centric framing of the campaign as support for Dhanya's contention that locals do not have a 
cause. Near the end of my fieldwork, many months after the solidarity organizers had withdrawn 
from Gandhamur, there was a rumor going around that the gelatin factory might be moved to 
Gujarat, a state in northern India. In an interview, Vijayan, the convener of the local Action 
Council, talked about this new development as a victory for the campaign. He spoke with 
anticipation about putting the struggle behind him and taking up a new life as a farmer. When I 
asked him about the Action Council's stand with regard to moving the pollution elsewhere, he 
said simply, "Our stand is that here, in the circumstances of our village, this factory cannot be 
allowed. Where they'll take it or what they'll do with it tomorrow is not our issue." This explicit 
rejection of equivalence between opposing pollution in Gandhamur and opposing pollution 
elsewhere would seem to confirm Dhanya's claim that local organizers lacked "consciousness" 
and a "cause." 
From the nāṭ-centric perspective elaborated by Sunitha and other Action Council 
members, however, the Action Council's stand looks very different. I found these differences to 
be particularly salient in how Action Council members talked about responsibility and agency in 
organizing. Many asserted a nāṭ-centric approach to responsibility that contrasted with solidarity 
organizers' approach to people's struggles as equivalent. For example, one active local organizer 
said he did not consider it his job to offer support to other people's struggles in other places, but 
expressed a strong sense of responsibility to work on behalf of fellow villagers who lived on 
nearby riverbanks and suffered the worst of the pollution. Such framings of responsibility were 
often tied to statements about the spatial limits of the Action Council's agency—that is, the 
extent of change they took the campaign to be capable of effecting. For example, in describing 
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why he rejected the moniker of environmentalist (paristhitika pravarttakan) often used for 
solidarity organizers, Vijayan said that his heavy involvement in the Gandhamur campaign 
rendered him incapable of working on other issues or campaigns, even though he was interested 
in them. As with responsibility, Action Council members contrasted their nāṭ-centric agency 
with the geographically-dispersed agency of the solidarity organizers. 
Sunitha and others asserted a scaling for the campaign that ran counter to solidarity 
organizers' attempts to encompass it in efforts for "broader" social transformation. What is most 
striking about Sunitha's description of her new "cause" is how it re-scales the "breadth" of 
solidarity organizers' interventions. From a nāṭ-centric vantage point, breadth only distances 
solidarity organizers from the campaign's core purpose. Sunitha marginalizes solidarity 
organizers even as she credits them with facilitating her new awareness of the pollution's "bad 
effects on our nāṭ." Solidarity organizers cannot claim such nāṭ-centric awareness. They might 
claim awareness of effects on Gandhamur, but they cannot claim to know the effects on 
Gandhamur as nāṭ. Nor can they take up the cause of saving Gandhamur as nāṭ. Campaigning at 
this scale is only available to those who belong. 
Jaison employed a similar nāṭ-centric scaling for his own involvement in Gandhamur, 
particularly with regard to responsibility. Many solidarity organizers had been suspicious of 
Jaison's party affiliation, and some said that he had been on the wrong side of another people's 
struggle—a protest of a proposed dam a bit further upstream on the same river. When I broached 
these criticisms in an interview, Jaison did not deny them, but instead nullified them through a 
deft re-scaling. He openly avowed that his participation in the Gandhamur campaign was strictly 
tied to the impact of the pollution on himself and his community. Likewise, in speeches and at 
Action Council meetings, Jaison positioned himself as one motivated by nāṭ-centric aims, rooted 
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in his encounter with the dead fish months before. Despite solidarity organizers' criticisms, 
nearly all members of the Action Council told me that they found this persuasive. Just as 
Ravindranath became an outsider because he oriented his work according to the scales of 
solidarity, so Jaison becomes a local because he scaled his intervention as nāṭ-centric. 
2.5 Same Goal, Different Causes 
Contrary to Dhanya's view, the locals had a cause—but their cause was not the solidarity 
organizers' cause. Here, building on Dhanya's use of the term, I understand a cause to be some 
further ethical purpose in relation to which a campaign goal is important—an ethical motive for 
pursuing a goal. Action Council members and solidarity organizers constructed the goal of 
shutting down the gelatin factory as important in relation to different and ultimately incompatible 
causes, and these differences had implications for their approaches to organizing. From the 
solidarity organizers' perspective, leadership of women and democratic meetings were 
mechanisms for promoting gender equality and democracy, respectively, and alliances with party 
politicians were taken to hinder broader challenges to the political system. But Action Council 
members did not take themselves to be responsible for nor capable of making these kinds of 
change.  
As a scalar distinction, the difference between locals' and solidarity organizers' causes is 
well-represented by the contrast between Figures 2 and 4. From a bird's-eye view (Figure 2), all 
particular struggles are encompassed by and equivalent within the broader politics of people's 
struggle and its aims of social transformation. The solidarity organizers move from struggle to 
struggle seeking to further these broader aims, and any one struggle is valued insofar as it 
contributes to their vision for geographically-dispersed transformation of a wide range of social 
hierarchies. In local organizers' use of the term nāṭ, we have another kind of map (Figure 4). 
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Here also, the relative importance of goals is diagrammed spatially, but space has a community-
centric shape. The gelatin factory campaign is still situated within a "broader" politics, but the 
perspective is one of core and periphery (to repurpose a famous scale (Wallerstein, 1974)). The 
campaign goal is important because it is situated at the center, the focus of responsibility. 
Campaigns in other places, or efforts to address broader social concerns, are beside the point. 
Note that both diagrams represent scales of ethical value, and it is the spatial 
configuration of value, or importance, that makes them incompatible. In purely geographic 
terms, as two ways of mapping space, there is no necessary disagreement between them. We 
might imagine, for example, a map of all people's struggles similar to that in Figure 2, but within 
which each dot is a set of concentric circles similar to that in Figure 4; each dot is a nāṭ for 
somebody. But because these are scales of relative value, framing the importance of the 
campaign from a birds-eye perspective commits one to a cause that is opposed to the nāṭ-centric 
view of cause. One cannot have it both ways. 
These scales of value can also be understood as different perspectives on the 
insider/outsider relationship itself. As ways of diagramming people's struggle, both depict "the 
people" as localized, but they configure the relation between the local and the non-local 
differently. For the solidarity organizers, being local puts the people on the map, positioning 
them as claimants and contributors within a broader cause. For the local organizers, being local 
puts the people at the center, and the "broadness" of the solidarity organizers' vision for people's 
struggle only makes it more peripheral. In other words, like Rivera and Erlich's diagram in 
Figure 3, these can be taken as views of the appropriate roles of relative insiders and outsiders in 
the organizing process. These two scalar perspectives do not stipulate precisely who ought to do 
what, but they are opposed in the importance they give to insider and outsider roles. It is not hard 
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to see how this difference would contribute to conflict between the Gandhamur Action Council 
and the solidarity committee. 
The difference between the configuration of these two scales is at the heart of our story 
about Jaison and Ravindranath. Despite being seen by solidarity organizers as an instrument of 
the ruling political party (i.e., an outsider of the worst sort), Jaison managed to position himself 
as one of "the people" as far as local organizers were concerned, and he did this by framing his 
motives as having the same scalar configuration as their own. Ravindranath, on the other hand, 
came to be seen by both Action Council members and solidarity organizers as working at a scale 
configured with a birds-eye perspective. Moreover, the two groups' different scales of purpose 
led them to value Ravindranath's contribution in opposite ways. Thus, Ravindranath became a 
casualty in the broader conflict over whose approach to the campaign would prevail. 
To what extent are these conflicting perspectives specific to the cultural and 
sociopolitical context of the Gandhamur campaign? Malayalam categories like nāṭ are clearly 
important to the insider/outsider dynamics described here, and ethnographic studies of Indian 
environmental justice campaigns describe tensions in collaborations between locals and non-
locals that resonate with the Gandhamur case (Baviskar, 2004; Fortun, 2001). Nonetheless, 
local/non-local collaboration also appears to be characteristic of environmental movements 
globally (Rootes, 2013; Tsing, 2005), not to mention other place-based organizing traditions 
(Fisher, 1994). While the relevant scales of ethical value will likely differ, there is good reason to 
think that scaling would be important to insider/outsider collaboration in other contexts.  
To recognize the full relevance of scaling to insider/outsider distinctions, we need to look 
beyond spatial scales. Consider Figure 3 once more. Rivera and Erlich's diagram presents a 
particular scalar perspective on ethnic belonging, similar to the nāṭ-centric perspective of 
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Gandhamur Action Council members. This is a normative model, used to make a case about how 
organizing should be done. What the analysis above should help us see is that this is not the only 
way of scaling insider/outsider relationships. Different scalar configurations would provide 
different normative perspectives on the relative importance of insider and outsider roles and 
purposes. Whether these scales are used to organize relationships based on space, ethnicity, or 
some other criteria, they are always also scales of value—not only models of the world, but also 
normative models for the world (Geertz, 1973, pp. 94-95).  
Is one of these perspectives better than the other? As noted at the outset, different 
organizing traditions have addressed this question in different ways. In addition, the Gandhamur 
case illustrates that even within a single tradition there may be multiple irreconcilable positions. 
In American social work, one might argue that the core ethical principle of community "self-
determination" (Hardina, 2004) makes resolution of such conflicts more straightforward; 
whatever their perspective, non-locals should accede to local purposes. However, it is also true 
that practices of consciousness-raising are a major feature of American organizing traditions 
(e.g., Sarachild, 1970/2000). And as in India, the desired forms of consciousness emphasize 
understanding of broader social issues and commitment to the purposes they entail.19 Our 
analysis of the conflicts of scalar perspective in Gandhamur highlights a tension between these 
two points of view, but it does not tell us how to resolve that tension. Indeed, it may be that such 
tensions are inherent to the different positions set up by the very process of distinguishing 
insiders from outsiders. Rather than proposing a wholesale solution, I recommend that attending 
                                                 
19 Indeed, Indian and American practices of consciousness raising share a common genealogy. 
Concern with transforming consciousness as a part of social transformation has precedent in 
Indian philosophy as well as in Marxist, Freirean, and feminist influences on Indian organizing 
(Halliburton, 2002; Steur, 2011). 
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to scalar perspectives in organizing can help us to better assess the stakes in insider/outsider 
distinctions, improving our ability to negotiate such tensions, whether or not they can be 
overcome. 
2.6 The Shape of Space 
Not long after the fish kill that brought Ravindranath, Jaison, and many solidarity 
organizers to Gandhamur, participants in the campaign had a major clash with police in which 
many were injured. The police confiscated cameras and cell phones and deleted nearly all of the 
photos and video of the violence, but in the small amount of footage that remains, Action 
Council members and solidarity organizers can be seen shouting, tussling, and ultimately fleeing 
side-by-side. This event brought a new wave of support from solidarity organizers. But 
ultimately, it also heightened existing tensions in their collaboration with the Action Council. 
The company, the police, labor unions, and some newspapers framed the violence as instigated 
by "extremists" (tīvravādikaḷ) from outside the village. Solidarity organizers demanded that the 
Gandhamur Action Council publicly refute these claims, especially after one politician close to 
Vijayan implied that they were true. But although Vijayan acknowledged these claims were 
false, he was not as vocal about it as solidarity organizers would have liked. 
There are many ways one might interpret Vijayan's "silence" regarding these accusations, 
but many solidarity organizers later described this as the beginning of the end of the 
collaboration. Some described Vijayan's failure to adequately refute these accusations as an 
intensely painful betrayal of their relationships with the local people. They acknowledged that 
they were outsiders (and many acknowledged being "extremists" as well), but they wanted 
Vijayan to affirm that locals and solidarity organizers had endured the blows of police batons 
together. In particular, they wanted him to stand up to the offending politician—who, like Jaison, 
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was a member of the ruling party. For them, Vijayan's failure to correct this politician was taken 
as a sign that the local Action Council had, in fact, been hijacked. 
Claims by campaign opponents about outsiders in Gandhamur exacerbated already 
existing tensions within the campaign. The conflict between insider and outsider perspectives 
had been primarily a conflict over aspects of the organizing process, but now it also became a 
conflict over how the campaign would position itself within a broader public discourse about 
insiders and outsiders in people's struggle. Claims about meddling outsiders in Gandhamur 
implicitly asserted a normative scalar configuration that circumscribed the legitimate 
representatives of the people to particular locales, while non-localized mobilization was rendered 
"extremist" and targeted for repression. Thus, an organizer's personal vision was not the only 
thing at stake in claims about the scalar configuration of purposes or roles; there were also 
tactical choices to be made, responding to other claims within a contentious political arena. And 
organizers were far from the loudest or most authoritative claimants.  
The tactical implications of accusations by the campaign's opponents point to an 
additional reason that there is no single best way of scaling insider and outsider roles: scales of 
similar configuration can be employed to very different ends. In opponents' claims about 
outsiders, we have a normative scaling of "the local people" that is very compatible with nāṭ-
centric organizing. Perhaps this is one reason that Vijayan did not make more effort to oppose 
these claims. But here, nāṭ-centric scales were turned against the campaign, threatening to isolate 
it from outside support, or even to undermine its legitimacy as a people's struggle altogether. 
Because scales can be repurposed in such ways, decisions about the best scale cannot be made 
once and for all.  
In this chapter, I have shown how insiders and outsiders in an environmental campaign 
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were distinguished by different perspectives on the shape, the moral bent, of space. As we saw 
with Jaison and Ravindranath, different scalar perspectives can become a litmus test for sorting 
insiders from outsiders. But the same scales of value involved in insider/outsider distinctions can 
also be important to sorting legitimate campaigns from illegitimate. This makes the stakes in 
understanding potential conflicts in scalar perspective that much higher. Paying attention to 
scaling can help organizers to understand where others—both collaborators and opponents—are 
coming from and to assess the ethical and tactical implications of different ways seeing the 
world. For insiders and outsiders, understanding the other's point of view might not lead to any 
shared perspective, but it does offer a starting point for finding ways to work together.  
Thus, we have seen how different evaluative frameworks entailed divergent approaches 
to organizing processes and tactics, ultimately making collaboration between solidarity 
organizers and Action Council members unsustainable. Within this analysis, the activists' 
different scalar perspectives appear as one kind of causal force driving the pursuit of 
environmental and social change. In the next two chapters, I follow the activists associated with 
Kēraḷīyam and the Gandhamur Action Council down their divergent paths, exploring how each 
creatively elaborated its particular understanding of people's struggle and sought to persuade 
others to join its cause.  
My analysis begins, in the next chapter, with an analysis of the work of the magazine in 
constructing people's struggle as a publicly recognized and performable type of politics. I trace 
the trajectories of force that motivate activists associated with Kēraḷīyam to intervene in 
campaigns like the one in Gandhamur and to represent these campaigns as instances within a 
broader social movement. Thus, I give an account of how the scalar perspective of 
"consciousness" presented in this chapter becomes so powerful for them.  
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Chapter 3: Typing People's Struggles 
3.1 A Categorical Refusal 
"No, I do not want anything more to do with your research. You came in here asking 
about people's struggles, but that term is all wrong. I do not agree at all with your analysis." 
At first, I was sure that Ganesh had misunderstood me. Gripping the phone tight to my 
ear, I rushed to explain myself more clearly, fumbling to find the words that would set things 
right. I had not expected this kind of reaction at all. I had visited and interviewed Ganesh only a 
few days before, and it had all been quite cordial. Why was he so angry now? 
"I am sorry if I said anything that offended you," I pleaded, "I only wanted to ask if I 
might come and look at some of the older magazines." 
But Ganesh told me bluntly that he would not permit me to view any more copies of his 
radical intellectual magazine Altertext, nor would he assist me with my research in any way. 
"I know you are working with those people at Kēraḷīyam," he said, "I have serious 
disagreements with them." 
When I hung up the phone a few minutes later, I was still not sure what had gone wrong. 
It all seemed to hinge on my use of the term "people's struggles" (janakīya samaraṅṅaḷ). My 
previous interview with Ganesh had been largely with the historical role of Altertext and several 
other magazines in the emergence of people's struggles. Not only was Ganesh the founder and 
managing editor of Altertext, but a decade earlier he had edited the magazine of the People's 
Cultural Platform, Prēraṇa. As I describe in Chapter 1, these magazines, which were hubs of 
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social activism in the 1980s and early 1990s, can be seen as predecessors to Kēraḷīyam in a local 
tradition of using small magazines as a platform and organizing tool for "people's politics." 
Indeed, it was Sunny, Adarsh, and other Kēraḷīyam associates who had referred me to Ganesh as 
a forebearer and an invaluable resource for understanding the historical roles of magazines in 
people's struggles. And indeed, in our interview, although Ganesh had used the term "new social 
movements," I had believed that we were talking about people's struggles the whole time. Now I 
saw that I had been far too shortsighted.  
My phone call with Ganesh unsettled my implicit assumption that people's struggle was a 
stable category describing things in the world. People's struggle is a common term in Kerala, 
heard regularly on the TV news. Up until that point, I had not realized that it was such a 
contested category—that is, I had known people to contest whether any particular protest was a 
people's, but I had not heard them challenge the category itself. But in the weeks after that 
difficult phone call, I began to see the category of people's struggle as a claim within a 
contentious field. When the editors at Kēraḷīyam put together articles about people's struggles, 
they were making a claim about how diverse campaigns and protests ought to be grouped 
together—a claim that Ganesh rejected. When I started looking, I found that not only Ganesh, 
but others—a mainstream Communist, a journalist, a Muslim youth organization—made their 
own claims about how these same campaigns and protests should be classified. For my research, 
this meant that the category of people's struggle could no longer be only a topic of study; it had 
to become a research question as well.  
What makes diverse political actors and events all of the same type? How is it that a 
fishworkers' strike, a protest of a polluting gelatin factory, and a campaign to ban alcohol from 
certain Muslim villages all come to be instances of people's struggle? In Chapter 2, I introduced 
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the scalar perspective of the solidarity organizers associated with Kēraḷīyam, for whom the 
campaign in Gandhamur was only one localized site for the pursuit of a "broader" social change 
agenda. In this chapter, I take a closer look at the work involved in consolidating the category of 
people's struggle, the vantage point from which the Gandhamur campaign and other 
contemporary Kerala protests look this way. I describe three inter-linked processes of 
"typification" by which the editors of Kēraḷīyam and their subscribers contributed to producing 
people's struggle as both a description of existing campaigns and protests and a claim about how 
politics ought to be.  
The typification of politics is not only crucial to the work of solidarity organizers, but 
also to social movement organizing more generally. The term social movement is often used to 
describe a pattern of events that are all, in some crucial sense, instances of the same type. For 
example, in early 20th century Kerala, several violent rural conflicts were claimed by Communist 
activists to be class uprisings and, thus, part of their movement (Menon, 1994). Likewise, the 
recognition of any movement as a movement depends upon the construction and stabilization of 
recognizable, replicable types of political action.  
In both sociology and anthropology, typification is generally described as part of the 
interpretive work of social movement actors. In sociology, the dominant concept for theorizing 
such interpretive work is "framing," a process in which social movement organizations (SMOs) 
select and highlight certain elements of reality. Framing emphasizes the agency of SMOs in 
strategically constructing representations of reality that further their goals. In anthropology, the 
concepts of recognition and essentialization have been central (Nash, 2005). Activists in social 
movements must fit themselves to certain established categories in order to receive recognition 
from the state, the public, or others to whom they appeal. But the process of fitting movements to 
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categories is always essentializing; it always requires erasing some of the diversity and 
complexity of actual people and events. Thus, in contrast to accounts of strategic framing, 
anthropology has often been more concerned with the semiotic violence of typification and the 
limits of activists' agency in representing themselves (Stephen, 2005; Sylvain, 2005). 
Nonetheless, what these literatures share is an emphasis on typification as a matter of 
interpretation in which there are strategic choices, however limited, to be made. 
My conversation with Ganesh prompted me to re-examine the category of people's 
struggles, but it also made me question accounts of social movement typification as a strategic 
interpretive choice. Indeed, what was most puzzling was not that people's struggle was a 
contentious category—my familiarity with dominant theories of meaning in linguistic 
anthropology should have led me to expect as much. What was most puzzling was that a 
category that aroused such adamant objections from Ganesh had, up to that point, seemed so 
utterly uncontested. Conducting participant observation among the activists associated with 
Kēraḷīyam, people's struggle had always seemed part of the background of strategy—a source of 
concepts, principles, and aims—not a strategic choice itself. And this was confirmed when I told 
Adarsh and others about Ganesh's objection to the term; they proclaimed themselves to be as 
surprised as I was and said they could not make any sense of it. Likewise, when I asked them 
about where the term had come from, or when it had originated, many found the question 
wrongheaded. One older activist replied, "What makes you think there was ever a time without 
people struggles?" and pointed out that many Malayali activists considered the rebellion of 
Spartacus a people's struggle.20 It was not just that Kēraḷīyam activists claimed that people's 
                                                 
20 Ironically, this activist, who had been involved in alternative left activism as far back as the 
Janakīya Sāmskārika Vēdi, was referring to a theatrical adaptation of the Spartacus story that 
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struggle was the accurate way of describing things; they seemed unaware of the need for any 
such claim. And yet, the counter-claims of Ganesh and others, together with the sheer diversity 
of campaigns of and protests that solidarity organizers called people's struggles, belied this 
obliviousness to construction and contestation, provoking me to continue inquiring about what 
work, if not strategic interpretation, was upholding the stability of people struggle as a 
sociopolitical type. 
This tension between naturalness and contestation makes the work of Kēraḷīyam an apt 
site for examining the social forces that drive the typification of social movements. On the one 
hand, as Ganesh suggests, "those people at Kēraḷīyam" appeared to be engaged in establishing 
and sustaining their version of reality as dominant. On the other hand, they took the category of 
people's struggle as stable and pre-existent—a condition for their strategizing, rather than an aim. 
Together, these two perspectives present us with a chicken-or-egg paradox: is people's struggle 
an impetus for the work of Kēraḷīyam or a product of that work? To tackle his paradox 
adequately, we must depart from accounts of typification as strategic interpretation, which 
privilege the notion of types as products rather than motives of social movements. The typifying 
work of Kēraḷīyam and its associates, I argue, is better understood as an engagement with the 
enticements and prompts of value-laden real types than a strategic imposition of normative 
structure onto a formless and value-neutral world. 
3.2 People's Struggle Type 1: Ink and Paper 
The most obvious place to begin our inquiry about Kēraḷīyam is on the pages of the 
magazine itself. As noted in Chapter 1, the monthly periodical covers a wide range of topics—
                                                 
Ganesh had penned during that period. Thus, his claim to the eternal and uncontested status of 
people’s struggles was also, in effect, a bold usurpation of enemy territory. 
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including environmental conservation, political corruption, natural health remedies, bicycling, 
education, agriculture, and human rights. But it is best known for its coverage of people's 
struggles. The editors, Sunny and Adarsh, pride themselves on covering developments in 
ongoing struggles not only when they are already in the public eye, but, more importantly, when 
the mainstream media has turned its inconstant gaze elsewhere. Even issues primarily concerned 
with health or organic farming techniques will also include the latest news from one or two 
struggles. In short, reading Kēraḷīyam, one gets the impression that people's struggles are a 
pervasive feature of the political scene in Kerala. Not surprisingly, then, it is also in Kēraḷīyam 
that individual campaigns and protests appear most self-evidently as instances of a type. 
Consider, for example, the "people's struggle map" (janakīya samara bhūpaṭam) from 
Chapter 2, Figure 2, which was published as Kēraḷīyam's rear cover in August 2012. As noted 
earlier, the use of dots  and place names to designate each struggle strips diverse campaigns and 
protests of all of their particularity except their positions in space. The map contributes to the 
typification of people's struggles by suggesting an iconicity between the struggles and the dots. 
According to Charles Peirce, an icon is a sign that represents an object by means of a similarity; 
for example, "a geometrical figure drawn on paper may be an icon of a triangle or other 
geometrical form" (Peirce, 1992, p. 306). But how can a dot be similar to a social movement? In 
this case, the two are similar in the sense that they are spatially defined. Just as the dots are only 
differentiated by their spatial positioning so, the map suggests, people's struggles are the same 
thing occurring in multiple places. They are tokens of a type. 
Part of the work of producing Kēraḷīyam magazine consists of generating iconicity 
between ink-and-paper representations of campaigns and protests. During the period of my 
research, much of this work fell to Adarsh, the assistant editor. Part of this was because Sunny, 
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the magazine's founder and managing editor, had taken a job as a clerk in another town in order 
to help support his ailing parents. But even if Sunny had been around more, Adarsh probably 
would have done most of the actual editorial work for the magazine. Sunny was a born 
networker, but Adarsh was a journalist by training and by heart, and his main commitments were 
to producing solid content and readable prose, in that order. He solicited the articles and 
illustrations; conducted, transcribed, and wrote up the interviews; layed out the pages; checked 
the proofs and delivered them to the printers; and brought the printed copies back to the office 
for mailing. Because I lived with Adarsh and his wife, Faiza, during most of my research, I came 
to know this process intimately. 
Just as the dots on the map erase certain particularities while retaining others, so Adarsh 
constructed iconicity between struggles by means of selection and emphasis. This was not 
accomplished all at once; representations of struggles were filtered and re-formatted at multiple 
stages of the editorial process. Consider, for example, the process of producing a one-page 
update on the campaign to shut down the gelatin factory in Gandhamur village. About six 
months after the police violence described in Chapter 2, when the ensuing surge in media 
attention had died down and most solidarity organizers had ceased visiting Gandhamur, Adarsh 
decided it was time for an update on the campaign. Early on a Sunday morning, we set out to 
interview Vijayan, the leader of the Gandhamur Action Council.  
The interview was held in Vijayan's front visiting room. We took an audio recording, but 
Adarsh also took notes in a palm-sized spiral notebook. The interview lasted over an hour, with 
Vijayan going into complex details of engineering, legal process, and local politics. There was 
tension surrounding the recent withdrawal of solidarity organizers, and Adarsh asked him some 
pointed questions. Previously, I had watched Vijayan evade such questions from both Adarsh 
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and myself, but this time he candidly addressed criticisms that had been made of the campaign 
and his own leadership. Adarsh made many notes during these more controversial moments, but 
this was only the first transcript he would make. A few days later, I would sit by him in the 
Kēraḷīyam office while he listened to the interview again, with another, larger notebook in hand, 
taking a second set of notes. The first notes were just a guideline, he told me, to aid him in 
making the second set, which covered about fifteen pages of a re-purposed diary. He called these 
his transcription. They would be the basis for the update. 
With each listening, each re-writing, Adarsh filtered Vijayan's words, selecting those that 
pertained to the purpose of the update. Sitting beside Adarsh at the computer, watching him type 
up and arrange the final columns of text, I could only catch glimpses of this filtration. The cursor 
flicked across the screen, cutting bits from here, pasting them there, adding a line, taking a line 
away. Adarsh rarely seemed to need much time to reflect; he wrote as he listened, then typed and 
tweaked. He manipulated the words and images on the screen so quickly that it was hard for me 
to follow. And even when I could follow the flow of his decisions across the screen, I had little 
insight into the reasons for those decisions. Adarsh was not interested in talking about that part 
of the process. He worked quickly, quietly, and alone. 
Even without tracking every stage of the filtration process, however, it is not hard to see 
how the final article retains some particularities while reducing others, shaping Vijayan's words 
to fit a standard mold. The final article fits on a single page, printed on the back cover of that 
month's issue. It is arranged in five bold-faced questions with answers below. Each of the 
questions focuses on recent developments: a court verdict allowing the company to repair its 
waste pipe, a recent meeting with the Minister of Industry, the discovery by struggle participants 
that factory waste is being sold to a company in a nearby village, and the campaign's stand with 
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regard to the upcoming elections. The answers provide relevant details and commentary on each 
of these events. The specific information is all particular to the Gandhamur campaign, of course, 
but the sorts of questions and answers presented, the characters (e.g. the struggle participants, the 
government officials, the company) described, and the style of language are all familiar. They 
are consistent with other updates on people's struggles, which make up a substantial portion of 
Kēraḷīyam's content. Even the format of the title, "X Struggle Continues," is common for such 
updates. 
This iconicity between the format of Vijayan's interview and other "struggle updates"21  
is crucial to how Kēraḷīyam makes the Gandhamur campaign recognizable as a token of the 
"people's struggle" type. Just as the similarity of the dots on the map suggests similarity between 
struggles, so also with the similar formatting of updates. This is most evident in Kēraḷīyam's 
"Kerala of Struggle" (Samarakēraḷam) issue, a compendium of updates on major people's 
struggle throughout Kerala. 22 Like the article described above, the articles in "Kerala of 
Struggle" are generally composed by Adarsh based on interviews with leaders in individual 
struggles. Presented side-by-side, it is easy to pick out similarities in style, such as the frequent 
use of military metaphors, or even the repetition of specific phrases such as "on to the final 
battle" or "arriving at a crucial stage." Most updates have a standard narrative structure, 
beginning with an initial description of the injustice that is the basis of the struggle, a story of the 
formation of an action council, challenges to victory such as injustices by police and goverment 
                                                 
21 I coin this term here for convenience' sake. There is no single term used by Adarsh and 
Sunny to describe such content in Kēraḷīyam. However, this lack of a local term should not be 
taken to indicate the non-existence of a coherent type. The editors do group this content together 
in other ways, as can be noted by its appearance under a single heading in their digital archive, 
for example, and as should be evident from the analysis here. 
22 Adarsh often spoke of a desire to publish additional compendia, but lamented that it was 
much more time-consuming than other issues of the magazine. 
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officials, and, finally, a call to support the struggle in its next phase. 
The opponents and aims represented on the pages of "Kerala of Struggle" are extremely 
diverse: from campaigns to shut down landfills and quarries, to demands for farmable land from 
the government, to efforts to ban alcohol from certain villages. In all cases, the protagonists are 
"people" (janaṅṅaḷ), an iconicity that deserves further examination. Janaṅṅaḷ is the plural form 
of janam, which is also the root for janakīya, "of the people," in janakīya samaram, "people's 
struggle." Unlike āḷ, "person," the singular janam means the people as a collective or mass (in 
old Communist magazines, "the masses" is glossed as "bahu" janam, or "big" janam). Collective 
reference to janam is used when making an opposition between the people and something else, 
as in "popular opinion" (janābhiprāyam), "people's representative" (janapratinidhi), or 
"democracy" (janādhipatyam, literally, "rule of the people). As suggested by these examples, the 
people/non-people contrast is often employed in political discourse. The plural janaṅṅaḷ retains 
this sense of contrast. Janaṅṅaḷ are people (plural) acting as the people. 
On the pages of Kēraḷīyam, "people" (janaṅṅaḷ) designates participants in a campaign or 
protest, usually members of a local Action Council, or sometimes those who are affected by the 
campaign's issue, such as the victims of pollution from the gelatin factory. The contrastive 
valence of the term sets up an opposition with other non-people actors. In the update on 
Gandhamur, these include the gelatin company, the police, political parties, the courts, the local 
government (panchayat), and other government agencies. All of these other actors have "people" 
(āḷukaḷ, plural of āḷ, "person"), but they do not have janaṅṅaḷ; they do not have people acting as 
the people. While this distinction would seem obvious to any Malayali (companies and courts 
cannot, in any context, be called janaṅṅaḷ), it also sets up a distinction between the struggle 
participants in Gandhamur, for example, and all of the other people in Gandhamur who might 
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take themselves to be part of janam, "the people."23 In Gandhamur, for example, campaign 
participants were a relative minority of inhabitants; there were many who supported the company 
and even more who avoided the conflict altogether. When discussing their positions with respect 
to the gelatin factory controversy, these others also claimed the moniker of "the people," and 
those who supported the company described the Action Council as opponents of the people. 
Even campaign participants would sometimes refer to these other village residents as janaṅṅaḷ as 
well. But in the narratives of updates on struggles, these other possible claimants to the people 
were absent.  
The iconicity of the people/non-people opposition in struggle updates is part of how 
Kēraḷīyam constructs and delimits the people's struggle type. While the term people's struggle is 
part of common parlance, heard often on TV news channels, it is also common to hear contention 
over which contemporary protests count as people's struggles. The Gandhamur campaign's 
opponents often claimed that it was not a real people's struggle. One Communist politician 
claimed that no such politically unaffiliated campaign could be called a people's struggle; real 
people's struggles were campaigns run by the Communist Party. Part of Adarsh's filtering work, 
however, consisted of tidying up this messiness and contention. In the "Kerala of Struggle" issue, 
there is no ambiguity about what counts as a "people's struggle." They are listed in the table of 
contents. 
In many ways, Adarsh's filtering work fits well with accounts of "framing" in the 
sociology of social movements. For sociologists seeking to understand the causal factors that 
                                                 
23 In this respect, the use of the term "locals" (nāṭṭukār) in Kēraḷīyam parallels the use of 
"people" (janaṅṅaḷ). In most other contexts, all people living in the area would be considered 
"locals," including any people who oppose or avoid participating in a particular campaign. But in 
struggle updates, this term is used to contrast those participating in the struggle from their 
opponents. For further discussion of localness in people's struggle politics, see Chapter 2.  
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contribute to the formation and success of movements, theories of framing have been the 
dominant way of accounting for human agency and the role of interpretation. Building on the 
work of Bateson (1972) and Goffman (1974), sociologists turned to the notion of "frames" 
beginning in the late 1980s to describe the interpretive work of social movement actors, and the 
concept has since become standard fare in social movement studies. Within this literature, 
framing is conceptualized as a discursive process in which "slices of observed, experiences, 
and/or recorded 'reality' are assembled, collated, and packaged" (Benford and Snow 2000: 623). 
As Goffman points out, though some "reality" may be presupposed by this concept, the focus 
here is on interpretation as a social activity—the assembling, collating, and packaging (Goffman, 
1974, p. 156). Thus, many studies of framing focus on how activists either produce media or 
attempt to influence the production of media. When Adarsh edits Vijayan's interview, selecting 
and re-arranging words, images, or other sign, this could all be described as framing. Indeed, 
insofar as Vijayan's narrative already frames recent events in the campaign for Adarsh, the 
latter's typifying work might be described as re-framing.  
In addition to describing well the filtering work necessary to producing "struggle 
updates," the concept of framing also gives helpful emphasis to the contentious nature of this 
interpretive work. According to one influential definition, framing, "is contentious in the sense 
that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but 
that may also challenge them" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). In other words, a frame is not 
only an interpretation, but also a claim about how reality should be interpreted; frame-making is 
claim-making.  
The framing analytic draws attention to how Adarsh's typifying work positions 
Kēraḷīyam within a contentious field populated by other actors, such as Ganesh and Altertext, 
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with their own stakes in the typification of people's struggles. In a later interview with Ganesh, 
who did eventually agree to continue the conversation, he explained that current issues of 
Altertext used the term "new social movements" to refer to what Kēraḷīyam called people's 
struggles. He considered the latter term to be part of a Maoist idiom—one he himself had 
employed during his days as editor of Prēraṇa—whereas "new social movements" was 
consistent with his current, post-Marxist analysis. Another alternative "framing" could be found 
on the pages of Mādhyamam, which released its own compendium of "Struggles for Life" 
(jīvitasamaraṅṅaḷ) shortly after the publication of "Kerala of Struggle," listing most of the same 
campaigns. Through the activism of its youth wing, Justice Now, the Muslim group that 
publishes Mādhyamam has made support for these campaigns and protests central to its efforts to 
gain traction in Kerala politics. 
However, as noted earlier, the notion of framing as claim-making also points to the limits 
of the concept's applicability to the work of Keralayeeam. Whereas Ganesh's decision to use the 
term "new social movements" in Altertext might be seen as the kind of strategic claim described 
in the literature on social movement framing, I could find no parallel among Ganesh's chosen 
opponents. When I recounted Ganesh's various terminological arguments to Adarsh, he replied 
that he did not see how the latter term was incompatible with "people's struggle." Indeed, though 
people's struggle was the more common term in Kēraḷīyam, "new social movements" 
occasionally appeared in its place. In conversation, Kēraḷīyam associates used the two terms 
interchangeably, and I could find no one who thought that "people's struggle" was the more 
Marxist of the two. More generally, as noted earlier, people were baffled by the notion that there 
was any need for contention about the matter. Indeed, although Adarsh often called himself a 
media activist, and his editorial work clearly served to construct people's struggle as a type, it is 
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not clear that he understood the category of people's struggle to need constructing, nor that 
contention over this category was part of what his activism was about. 
Adarsh talked about the importance of coverage of people's struggles in a couple of ways. 
The first, which was also common to hear among subscribers, was as "documentation" (English). 
Adarsh said that Kēraḷīyam needed to cover people's struggles because there was so much that 
the corporate newspapers and TV channels, which were always chasing the next thrill, would 
inevitably miss. Thus, his update on the Gandhamur struggle had been motivated, in part, by a 
desire to document what would otherwise go unrecorded. Likewise, while several of the 
Kēraḷīyam subscribers most involved in people's struggles often did not read the magazines they 
received (a matter I will come back to in a moment), they did tend to keep them. Newspaper 
subscriptions were regularly trashed, but old issues of Kēraḷīyam would pile up on a shelf or in a 
corner—a practice that readers attributed to the magazine's value as documentation.  
As a motive for Kēraḷīyam's typifying work, documentation runs against the usual logic 
of social movement framing in two ways. First, social movement framing is primarily about 
persuading others to join or support the movement. Here, however, all of Adarsh's filtered and 
formatted struggle updates go, at best, onto the shelves of the magazine's seven hundred 
subscribers. But although Sunny and Adarsh actively worked to find new subscribers within 
activist circles, they made no effort to distribute the magazine via Kerala's many newsstands. 
They claimed not to be interested in reaching non-activists. Second, documentation presupposes 
that people's struggles are already out there. Framing theory also requires something to be out 
there, but the meaning and value of what is out there are imposed by the social movement actor 
and motivated by that actor's interests. Documentation is not an imposition of meaning and 
value, but a salvage effort, motivated by the concern that something out there might not make it 
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into print. In documentation, people's struggle appears to be the impetus as much as the product. 
While documentation was the most common way that Adarsh described the importance 
of people's struggle updates, he suggested another motive with regard to the particular update on 
the Gandhamur struggle analyzed here. In the days leading up to Adarsh's visit to Vijayan's 
house, we spoke a lot about why he wanted to conduct an interview just then. As usual, Adarsh 
had no illusions that Kēraḷīyam could do anything to recover the campaign's fading fame. What 
worried him, he said, was what might happen in Gandhamur when no one was paying attention. 
He was concerned that the readers and friends of Kēraḷīyam were not going to Gandhamur 
anymore, not participating in rallies or meetings; he was worried about what direction the 
campaign might take in their absence. Adarsh believed that, by publishing a struggle update, he 
might help to sustain the connection between Gandhamur and the solidarity organizers and, thus, 
keep the campaign from veering off course. 
What kind of connection could this short article, destined for the shelves of solidarity 
organizers no longer very interested in Gandhamur, possibly sustain? To understand Adarsh's 
reasoning, it will be necessary to shift scenes from the lone computer in the back of the 
Kēraḷīyam office, where people's struggle is typified in ink and paper, to the role of the magazine 
as an institutional hub for a network of solidarity organizers. And with this shift, we will also 
come a step closer to resolving the chicken-or-egg paradox, exemplified by the work of 
documentation, in which people's struggle is simultaneously before and after Kēraḷīyam's 
typifying work. 
 
3.3 People's Struggle Type 2: Iconicities of Ethical Stance 
Adarsh and Sunny were not unconcerned about the reach of Kēraḷīyam. In the past, the 
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magazine had been delivered to as many as 1200 subscribers, but that number had dwindled in 
recent years. Adarsh attributed this to the absence of Sunny, who had been forced to resume 
employment as a government clerk in order to fund the magazine and support his ailing parents. 
Adarsh loved the work of gathering material for the magazine and editing it, and he knew he was 
good at it, but he did not believe he had Sunny's penchant for networking. During my research, 
Adarsh was actively searching for a marketing assistant who could help to fill the gap left by 
Sunny's absence, but he was unable to find anyone willing to take the job. 
While Sunny's diminished involvement with Kēraḷīyam may have led to fewer 
subscriptions, his role as networker should not be primarily understood in terms of its effect upon 
the magazine's reach. As noted earlier, at least some Kēraḷīyam subscribers did not regularly read 
the magazines they received. This was most true of those who were most active in people's 
struggles, many of whom said that they already knew what was going on, so struggle updates 
were redundant. Adarsh and Sunny were both painfully aware that the magazine often went 
unread, and they were under no illusion that more subscribers necessarily meant more reading. 
They described two motives for seeking subscribers. The first was purely economic; more 
subscriptions meant more revenue. The second motive was more complex; it was in some sense 
about reaching more people, but it was not necessarily about getting the magazine's pages before 
more eyes. It was about building a community of people's struggle activists. To appreciate the 
latter motive, it will help to look more closely at Sunny's networking activity. 
Let's start at a folding table just outside the doors of a large lecture hall. Inside, activists 
are giving speeches to close a fifty-day "Dialogue Journey" (samvādayātra), a walking tour 
down through the foothills of the Western Ghats mountains aimed at garnering support for 
stronger policy to protect mountain rainforests. The journey organizers carried Western Ghats-
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focused issues of Kēraḷīyam with them, though not many were sold. Some of those that remain 
are displayed on the table now, side-by-side with other old issues that Sunny and Adarsh have 
brought to sell. A young woman who joined the Dialogue Journey along the way, Preethi, is 
scanning the titles. 
Sunny has a chair near the end of the table, but he is rarely in it. The speeches have been 
going a few hours now, and it is getting late. People have begun to drift out of the meeting hall, 
some just for a cigarette or a chat, but others to their motorbikes and cars, or down the road in 
search of a bus. Sunny mingles in the outflow from the hall like a trapeze artist; grasping the 
hand of one acquaintance, swinging away to the shoulder of the next, and introducing the two of 
them to each other as he twirls away to nab a third. He is in especially good form tonight, the 
best I have seen in over a year. Earlier this evening, he told me that he is beginning to feel like 
his old self again; inviting people to a recent Kēraḷīyam book release has gotten him active on 
SMS and phone. He says it is hard because he knows this means he has less time and energy to 
care for his ailing mother, but he is much happier. 
Hot on the scent of a ripe ethnographic happening, I catch up with Preethi and, executing 
a small twirl of my own, guide her over to Sunny. He shoots a sly grin at my notebook as he 
introduces himself, happy to play along. He asks whether he has not seen her somewhere before 
and, while she fumbles for a polite response (he hasn't), he draws the latest issue of Kēraḷīyam 
out of his bag. Has she heard of it? She believes she has heard of it before somewhere, she says, 
but she is sure she has never read it. He presses the magazine into her hands as he launches into a 
little eulogy of all its virtues and importances. It is all hyperbolic, all said with a laugh, but it is 
earnest nonetheless. 
Preethi readily agrees to buy the magazine, but Sunny is after more. He wants a 
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subscription or, better yet, an article; she could write a piece on her experiences on the Dialogue 
Journey, he says. They could publish it in the next issue.  
"This is an activist magazine, not a mainstream publication," he explains, "We are trying 
to build a kūṭṭāyma (collective) of activists."  
But the more he presses, the more her she shrinks down behind the magazine, 
unresponsive, but he persists. 
"Have you met Father Sebastian?" he asks, reaching out and snagging the priest's hand as 
he goes by.  
And she has, of course, since Father Sebastian is one of the leaders of the Dialogue 
Journey.  
"What! You have met Father Sebastian and yet you don't know Kēraḷīyam? Sebastian is 
our top salesman!”  
And though Fr. Sebastian hurries on without a word, his warm smile suggests that this is 
not entirely an exaggeration. 
Like this, as he continues his pitch, Sunny "introduces" Preethi to one person after 
another: Ranjith, Manan, Amna and Amra ("What! You already know Amna and Amra? They 
are our brand ambassadors!"). All are people Preethi has already met on the Dialogue Journey. 
By the time he pulls aside Saleem, whom she knows from her own hometown, she is convinced. 
She ducks away to find her purse, and Sunny turns and catches hold of a passerby, a heavy-set 
man with a long-nosed camera and several oddly shaped bags hanging from his shoulders. Sunny 
hands him a copy of the magazine, reminds him he is expecting photos for the next issue, and 
takes his phone number. By the time Preethi returns, he has sent the man a copy of an SMS he 
keeps ready in his drafts folder for just such occasions—an introduction to Kēraḷīyam. 
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We might see this vignette as a glimpse into the art of an expert salesman—and to some 
extent, Sunny's interest in recruiting both Preethi and the cameraman is straightforwardly 
financial. But Sunny wants to recruit Preethi to be more than just a dues payer; he wants her to 
contribute in other ways as well. In making this part of his pitch, he tells Preethi that "we are 
trying to build a collective of activists." In light of this comment, Sunny's attempts to draw ties 
between the magazine and Preethi's existing acquintances are more than just another tactic to get 
her to reach for her purse. He is sketching out a web of relationships—a web in which she 
already has begun to have a place. One might say that he is trying to build Kēraḷīyam's 
"collective" (kūṭṭāyma) right there before her eyes, and he wants to build her right into it. 
The term kūṭṭāyma, which I've glossed above as "collective," can be found on the pages 
of Kēraḷīyam as well. Announcements of upcoming events and calls for article submissions or 
subscriptions are usually addressed to the "Kēraḷīyam kūṭṭāyma." Occasionally, those most 
closely associated with the magazine talked about themselves in the same way. According to a 
Malayalam professor who is  active in the gelatin factory campaign and several other struggles, 
the term is a relatively new in activist circles. But kūṭṭāyma appears to have deeper roots in 
Christian discourse, where it is commonly translated to English as "fellowship." Recently, it has 
become common in the titles of neighborhood organizations and volunteer groups as well, 
including some contemporary caste-based organizations. 
Within alternative leftist activist circles, kūṭṭāyma connotes social relations distinct 
different from those of samudāyam ("community"), which is generally used to refer to caste and 
religous groups, and kuṭumbam ("family"). Among activists associated with Kēraḷīyam, the 
hereditary and hierarchical connotations of the latter terms are seen as negative. Kūṭṭāyma, on the 
other hand, suggests a voluntary gathering and has no necessary hierarchical structure—whether 
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internally or in relation to other groups. Unlike its grammatical sister noun kūṭṭam ("group"), 
with which it shares the root verb kūṭṭuka ("to gather (transitive)"), kūṭṭāyma can be used to 
describe both a quality of togetherness and an actual collective of people. This makes the term 
fitting for the aspirational usage of Sunny and other Kēraḷīyam activists. They were a kūṭṭāyma 
("collective"), to some extent, but they still needed to increase their kūṭṭāyma ("togetherness"). 
Sunny and other activists commonly employed kūṭṭāyma in a third way as well: as a 
descriptor of certain overnight outings that were also sometimes referred to with the English term 
"camp." These gatherings have their roots in genealogies of environmental activism, which has 
used them to raise awareness and build community among young people since the early 1970s. 
During the period of my research, many of Kēraḷīyam's closest associates organized moonlight 
camps (nilāv kūṭṭāyma), rain camps (mal̤a kūṭṭāyma), song camps (pāṭṭ kūṭṭāyma), and even 
gossip camps (paradūṣaṇa kūṭṭāyma)24, in which people would tell each other openly what they 
usually only said behind each other's backs. Although Sunny did not organize all of these camps 
himself, the initiative of other organizers was usually traceable in part to his persistent urging. 
During my final stint of dissertation fieldwork, there were few camps because Sunny was rarely 
around and always tired. But shortly after the end of the Dialogue Journey, temporarily energized 
by his return to SMSing and magazine peddling, he organized a rain camp, and Preethi was one 
of the attendees. 
The camp was held at the seaside—a likely location when one is hoping for rain. About a 
dozen of us gathered at Kēraḷīyam, where we were picked up in a big, old van used for many 
                                                 
24 One of the major limitations of this dissertation is surely that I never had the opportunity to 
observe one of these “gossip camps.” It seemed that whenever I returned to Kerala, one had only 
just been held. And, though I asked about them often, they were never held again until I had 
departed. 
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such events—the "struggle van" (samaravaṇṭi). It was dark by the time we reached the beach. A 
fat moon was high overhead, drawing the waves up into teetering white peaks and dashing them 
against the seawall. The waves were so loud we had to shout. Sunny shouted to those near him, 
and they shouted to those near them, and eventually we had all been gathered into the living 
room of a small, unfurnished beachhouse, a loan from a poet friend of Sunny's. We spread out on 
the tile floor facing one another, the ring of our bodies expanding as more come in, until every 
back was against a wall. We just fit. Then, Sunny called for a song. As usual, for a minute or two 
everyone was trying to convince everyone else to start. But at last Fr. Sebastian, having already 
refused a few times, agreed to raise his voice above the rest: 
"Nām onn allēēē? (clap clap clap) Nammaḷ onn allēēē? (clap clap clap)”  
(Are we not one? Are we not one?)  
It is a common song among the Kēraḷīyam crowd—the song I had heard far more than 
any other during the past three years. It is the same song we sang on the Dialogue Journey every 
time we marched into a major junction or a bus stop. It is the same song Fr. Sebastian sang at the 
start of my first such camp—a full moon camp—three years before.  
"Nammukkūḍēyōmmm? (clap clap clap)  Ī maṇṇilūḍēyōmmm? (clap clap clap) 
Nammaḷ allēēē? (clap clap clap) Nammaḷ allēēē? (clap clap clap)" 
(Through ourselves? Through this soil?Are we not? Are we not?) 
I am not entirely sure why Kēraḷīyam activists sang this song so much—Adarsh's wife 
Faiza once suggested to me that it was simply because the words are easy to remember. But as an 
opening to a camp, it was fitting. The repetition of a simple rhetorical question —"Are we not 
one?"—drowned out the breaking waves. With all voices singing in unison, all hands clapping in 
rhythm, we declared and enacted what kūṭṭāyma, both as camp and as activist collective, is all 
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about. 
When the song was done, Sunny made the song’s message even more explicit, describing 
in brief the purpose of the rain camp and the tradition to which it belongs. He said that camps are 
ways of bringing "people who are different" (vyatyastamāya āḷukaḷ) together for shared 
experience and increased awareness. Here, he said, such people can "experience relief and make 
bonds.” He described those gathered in the beachhouse as people who "can envision things 
differently, who can stand apart and see differently...who intervene differently.” In other words, 
it was their difference from others that made all of those in the circle similar.  
As we went around the room, each introducing him or herself, I heard this point echoed 
again and again—similarity with each other and difference from the world beyond. Peter earns 
his income as a medical technician, but really he is a farmer at heart, and he is working on 
developing new organic agricultural techniques that generate enough profit to support his family. 
Fr. Sebastian is a priest, but he is not like the priests you've met; he has no parish and spends all 
his time on people's struggles. Preethi has now left her job as a teacher in a government school 
and is collaborating with Saleem on a project to start an environmentalist commune. Each person 
described him or herself as different from the mainstream, just as Sunny had suggested, but they 
were different in predictable ways. All of these differences, which made these people similar to 
one another, could be found on the pages of Kēraḷīyam. And here was people's struggle again, 
among these other differences—not any campaign or protest, but the activity of people's struggle 
generally, used to indicate how one is different from some and similar to others. People’s 
struggle invoked as a means, that is, of introducing oneself as an instance of a specific type of 
person. 
In the rain camp, then, we can see how Kēraḷīyam contributes to a second sort of 
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typification. Typification in the camp, like the representation of people's struggle as a type in ink 
and paper, produces iconicity, only here we are primarily concerned with iconicity between 
people. Or, more accurately, iconicity between where people stand in relation to the mainstream.  
In their introductions, when activists highlight their participation in activities like organic 
agriculture, people's struggle activism, or establishing environmental communes, these are not 
only attributes they hold in common. They are also, in Sunny's terms, ways that the rain camp 
participants "stand apart and see differently" and "envision things differently." The contrast 
between those gathered in the beachhouse and the rest of the world is not only a factual contrast, 
but an evaluative contrast. In other words, what marks those at the camp as instances of a type 
are iconicities, or alignments, of ethical stance.  
Sociolinguists and linguistic anthropologists have developed the spatial metaphor of 
stance to describe evaluation in linguistic practice (Englebretson, 2007; Jaffe, 2009). To take a 
stance is, essentially, to evaluate some object.25  A key insight in this literature is that positioning 
oneself with respect to an object of evaluation also entails alignments or disalignments with 
others who evaluate the same object (Heritage & Raymond, 2005). Du Bois (2007), for instance, 
proposes that we understand evaluative stance in terms of a "stance triangle" (see Figure 5). The 
stance triangle helps to visualize how, when multiple subjects evaluate the same object, they also 
position themselves in relation to one another.26 For example, in the following transcript, speaker 
                                                 
25 This understanding of stance is most obvious with respect to the practices of assessment 
described here, though less so with respect to "epistemic stance," which positions subjects as 
knowing/not knowing in relation to an object. Du Bois (2007) argues for a definition of stance as 
broadly evaluative, however, which would include epistemic stance. This definition is also taken 
up by later authors (Jaffe, 2009).  
26 DuBois points out that alignment/disalignment is gradient along a continuum, not a binary 
distinction (2007, p. 162). As I show in Chapter 6, it is also clear that there is no single gradient 
for evaluative alignment/disalignment, but that different kinds of evaluation may entail different 
kinds of alignment or disalignment, even within a single evaluative act.   
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C makes an assessment of public schools, and D responds with an assessment of the same object: 
 
C: ... 'hh a:n' uh by god I can' even send my kid tuh public school  
b'cuz they're so goddamn lousy. 
D: We : : ll, that's a generality. 
C: 'hhh 
D: We've got sm pretty (good schools.) 
C:       //Well, yeah, but where in the hell em I gonna live.  
 (Pomerantz, 1984, p. 72) 
In this example, D and C are both evaluating the same object, but they take different 
positions. The difference between C's assessment of public schools as "so goddamn lousy" and 
D's assessment of the same schools as "pretty good" marks a disalignment between their 
positions with respect to public schools. Thus, the evaluative statements of D and C are not only 
isolated descriptions of individual preferences, but also acts of positioning relative to one 
another. 
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Figure 5: DuBois' Stance Triangle (2007, p. 163) 
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In the rain camp, conversations are littered with linguistic stance alignments, but they are 
rarely as explicit as the example of disalignment between C and D. For example, after Paul 
described his own love of farming, others also introduced themselves as would-be farmers to 
varying degrees, marking their alignment with this endorsement of agriculture. More generally, 
in each introduction participants mark themselves as different from mainstream society, and 
different in certain stereotypical ways—love of nature, anti-patriarchy, skepticism of organized 
religion and political parties, commitment to people's struggles. They introduce iconicities into 
their stances with one another, typifying a certain mode of being an activist.  
Much of the literature on stance-taking has focused on evaluation in language. To 
appreciate iconicities of stance in the rain camp, however, it is necessary to look beyond 
linguistic utterances to the embodied practices that participants share. With two monsoon 
seasons, Kerala is a fairly rainy place, but most Malayalis do not seek the rain. For most, a 
chance of rain is a reason to carry an umbrella if not a reason to stay in doors. But the camp 
participants' love of nature is such that, for them, a chance of rain is a reason to sit out all night. 
In doing so, they mark their disalignment with most Malayalis and their alignment with one 
another. 
If the people's struggle type, on the pages of Kēraḷīyam, reads as a claim about the way 
things are, the typification of ethical stances at the rain camp can be understood as a claim about 
the way things are not, but ought to be. A little while after the introductions were over, I lay on 
the beach watching the lasts wisps of cloud dissipate in the starlight. The rain had not arrived, 
and the waves had calmed. Amna came and lay down next to me, only a few inches away, but I 
did not notice her just then. I did not notice her until the others came, telling us that they were 
headed further down the beach and inviting us to join. It is only then that I thought how strange it 
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was to lie next to a woman on a beach in India. At night. As strange as sitting out in the rain with 
no umbrella. But Amna seemed to think nothing of it, and before long we were all lying beside 
each other on a huge tarp—a tarp that could have been used to cover our heads—singing songs 
and waiting for the rain. Together, we were making present what was not present in the world 
around us, marking the changes that remained to be made and modeling the work required to 
bring about those changes.27  
I have described the contrasts camp participants marked in their "different" introductions, 
their disregard for traditional gender roles, and their scorn for umbrellas as all part of the same 
politics, suggesting not only iconicity with respect to any single us/them contrast, but also some 
iconicity between these diverse contrasts that binds them together. But if it was not for my 
familiarity with Kēraḷīyam, I doubt I would have seen how the diverse vectors of difference 
marked in the rain camp had anything in common. I would have seen iconicity between multiple 
invocations of farming in the introductions, but I probably would not have seen how farming, 
people's struggle, and environmentalist communes were similar, nor how all of these were linked 
to lying next to Amna on the beach. In Kēraḷīyam, however, articles on alternative agricultural 
methods and gender norms are folded in with struggle updates, and occasionally one finds an 
essay arguing for an integration of these diverse topics of concern into a single politics. Thus, the 
work of the magazine was there, even though the magazine itself was nowhere to be seen. In the 
rain camp, activists enacted what was represented more explicitly on the pages of the 
magazine—iconicity between forms in ink and paper became iconicity between forms of ethical 
life. 
                                                 
27 This process is well-described by Boggs' notion of "prefigurative politics," in which activists 
attempt to bring about social change by producing in their relations with one another the forms of 
sociality that they would like to bring about in society at large.  
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Within the rain camp, people's struggle became a central activity in an activist life. 
Participants in the camp talked about the struggles they had recently visited and those they would 
be visiting soon, sharing news and gossip about struggles and debating what should be done. At 
times, camps were held on the sites of struggles, and the participants in local action councils 
were invited to join. Just as Kēraḷīyam magazine integrated struggle updates with articles on 
organic agriculture, nature cure, and alternative schooling, and gender relations, so activists in 
the rain camp integrated talk about struggles into the work of aligning with one another in their 
differences from the rest of Malayali society.  
Like the representation of people's struggles on the pages of Kēraḷīyam (typification-1), 
the performance of iconicities of ethical stance in the rain camp contributed to the typification of 
people's struggle as a key activity in an activist life (typification-2). Like typification-1, 
typification of people's struggle in the rain camp also presupposes the prior existence of 
iconicities between campaigns and protests. In making people's struggle central to their 
alignment with one another, activists connected their solidarity with these campaigns and 
protests with desires and obligations regarding gender, money, food, forests, and caste—drawing 
the people's struggle type into a dense web of aligned moral stances. Alignments of stance not 
only engendered community among camp participants, but also made the idea of people's 
struggle larger and more vital here than anywhere else.  
It is in large part through camps that activists elaborate the scalar perspectives on social 
change described in Chapter 2's analysis of solidarity organizers' talk about "consciousness" and 
"cause" in the Gandhamur campaign. As noted in the introduction, many activists associated 
with Kēraḷīyam argued that the "struggle" (samaram) in people's struggle did not simply refer to 
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campaigns and protests; struggle should be a total way of life.28 For example, one man argued 
that the Gandhamur campaign participants were not really committed to samaram because they 
continued to build with concrete (made from granite quarried from the ecologically sensitive 
Western Ghats mountains) even as they protested pollution in their own river. In camps, activists 
perform this way of life together, prefiguring in their relations with one another their vision for 
what people's struggle, as an activity central to an activist life, out to be. In other words, in the 
rain camp, the narratives of self-other opposition found in Kēraḷīyam's struggle updates are 
embedded within a common effort for self-transformation. 
In a key intervention in the sociology of social movements, Poletta (1997) argued that the 
conceptualization of framing as strategic action, in which interpretive constructs are means to 
preselected ends, does not adequately account for how such constructs may transform activists 
self-understanding and chosen aims. Subsequent analyses of the role of "culture" in social 
movements have sought to correct for this shortcoming (see Poletta (2008) for a review). In the 
previous section, we saw how Adarsh's self-understanding, particularly with the notion of 
documentation, conflicted with the analysis of typification as strategic persuasion in any 
straightforward sense. The centrality of self-transformation in rain camps further undermines 
such an account; here, people's struggle is not a construct manipulated for the sake of pre-
determined interests or pre-conceived aims. Rather, the people's struggle type has become a 
guidepost for re-orienting aims and reforming lives. 
The anthropology of social movements has long made processes of self-transformation 
central to accounts of activists' efforts for recognition. In seeking to make claims on state 
                                                 
28 As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, much of this way of life focused on avoiding the 
consumption of products perceived as environmentally or socially unfriendly. 
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agencies or appeals to public opinion, activists must present themselves as recognizable 
instances of certain morally sanctioned types—the aggrieved mother, the human trafficking 
victim, the rights-bearing citizen. As Dave (2012) describes in her account of lesbian activists 
New Delhi, the typifying work necessary to gain recognition from others can restrict the life 
possibilities of activists—the more successful they are in gaining recognition, the more they may 
find themselves conforming to fit essentialized identities. Thus, seeking recognition may 
overflow the outwardly directed presentation of self to others and become self-transformation in 
a more fundamental sense. 
As in Dave's account, stance alignment in the rain camp mixes representation of self and 
reform of self. However, the logic of recognition here is not directed at the state or the public. 
Seated in a circle on the floor of the beachhouse, introducing themselves to one another, each 
participant seeks recognition in the eyes of others. However, they seek to be recognized not as 
instances of a type sanctioned by non-activists, but as different from those others. In seeking 
recognition from one another as different in certain mutually recognizable ways, they conform to 
an essentialized activist identity. But they also produce the identity to which they conform.  
If self-transformation in the rain camp unsettles the account of strategic action at the heart 
of the framing concept, then, it also suggests a new motive that may drive the typification of 
people's struggles: the desire for recognition. In the rain camp, participants find belonging in not 
belonging. Sitting out on the beach, they align with one another by performing their disalignment 
with the values of those imagined to be inside their homes or under their umbrellas. Multiple 
alignments of stance bind them together as a moral community, a kūṭṭāyma. This, after all, is 
what Sunny sometimes describes as the real aim of Kēraḷīyam.  
And yet, if Sunny, Preethi and others do come to the rain camp in search of recognition 
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and belonging, this is still not enough to explain what drives the typification of an alternative 
form of life nor the position of people's struggle (Type 2) within this form of life. If one only 
wishes to belong, why choose to find belonging in not belonging? As I describe in Chapter 6, 
many Kēraḷīyam activists find themselves out of place because of their alternative values and 
practices, out of alignment with their family members, their neighbors, and most of the people 
they encounter in everyday life. Camps are an exception; brief nights of intense alignment that 
contrast with the experience of disalignment that pervades an alternative life. Thus, even if the 
desire for belonging drives activists to produce iconicities of stance with one another, we must 
ask what prompts them to seek belonging here and in this way. If they produce the identity to 
which they conform, then why do they produce an identity so out of sync with those around 
them? 
It is worth noting here that, just as the logic of "documentation" pre-supposes the 
existence of campaigns and protests, so activists described kūṭṭāyma as pre-supposing the need 
for solidarity activism. While Sunny and some others did at times claim that kūṭṭāyma was their 
central aim, they also often justified camps with regard to other ends. Indeed, they were often in 
a position of needing to justify camps because there were other prominent activists associated 
with Kēraḷīyam who saw them as a waste of time. The latter argued that camps were just 
discussion for discussion's sake, distracting from the urgent task of winning people's struggles. 
Thus, far from justifying the typification of people's struggles in terms of their own desire for 
belonging, Kēraḷīyam activists often described the need for kūṭṭāyma in terms of its contribution 
to the politics of people's struggle. Paradoxically, then, while desire for belonging may be one 
motivation for the typification of people's struggle as an activity central to a form of life, many 
activists justified the pursuit of belonging by the need for the intervention in people's struggles. 
  116 
 
To fully consider the latter vector of motivation, however, it will be necessary to shift to a third, 
and final, scene for the typification of people's struggles: the campaigns and protests themselves. 
3.4 People's Struggle Type 3: Modes and Tactics of Political Action 
The Dialogue Journey (samvādayātra) through the Western Ghats mountains was in 
many ways an extended "camp" (kūṭṭāyma). Like another environmentalist trek through the 
mountains twenty-five years before, the most explicit aim of the fifty-day foot journey was to 
raise awareness among mountain residents about the need for stricter environmental regulations 
in the region. This was to be done through an egalitarian model of conversation, or "dialogue" 
(samvādam),29 with activists listening to locals, affirming their experiences, and, if necessary, 
posing questions that could help them to see things differently. But fifty days of conversations 
with locals were also fifty days of conversations with one another, fifty afternoons waiting for 
the day to cool enough to continue down the road, and fifty nights of men and women lying side-
by-side, sometimes under moonlight. As I describe in Chapter 5, many of those participating in 
the journey—including Ali, the journey "captain"—considered activists' interactions with one 
another to be far more important than their conversations with locals. For Ali, the Dialogue 
Journey, like a camp, was about making better activists. And, although the changes in 
environmental policy sought by activists were not directly associated with any people's 
struggle,30 people's struggles were often a topic of conversation. 
                                                 
29 For further discussion of the notion of samvādam, and the purposes and techniques of the 
Dialogue Journey, see Chapter 5. 
30 Indeed, in the regions we visited, several local campaigns had been organized in protest of 
the policy changes that Kēraḷīyam activists favored. However, while these campaigns might have 
been interpreted as oppositions between "the people" and "the state," and were interpreted in this 
way by many locals, the Dialogue Journey participants did not call them people's struggles, nor 
were they represented as such on the pages of the magazine. Activists described them, instead, as 
organized or incited by the Catholic Church and the Communist Party--two groups with large 
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But the Dialogue Journey was also about people's struggle in another way. All along their 
route, the organizers of the journey met with the local leaders of anti-quarry campaigns. On the 
final day, just a few hours before I introduced Sunny to Preethi outside the lecture hall, several 
journey participants facilitated a meeting of these local leaders to plan the formation of a state-
wide coalition of quarry struggles. The journey organizers had not publicized this aspect of the 
campaign, but it had been part of the purpose of the Dialogue Journey from the beginning. Some 
organizers told me that, in their view, the quarry coalition was always the primary purpose, and 
many Kēraḷīyam activists later talked about its formation as the major outcome of the Dialogue 
Journey.  
The journey participants' interactions with quarry leaders, like their "dialogues" with 
mountain residents about environmental policy, were conducted with a great deal of concern 
about authority. They sought to organize struggles into a larger movement, but they did not want 
to lead that movement (Staples, 2000). In the planning meeting on the final day of the journey, 
this became a topic of contention. Many of the quarry struggle leaders wanted Dhanya, the 
activist who facilitated the meeting, to take the role of chair of the coalition as well. They 
pointed out that they did not have time to take this role because of their commitments to their 
own campaigns. Dhanya, moreover, had already taken an organizing role by gathering them 
there and leading the meeting, and she already knew all of them, whereas they had only just met 
each other. But Dhanya flatly refused. She and other journey participants, she said, would assist 
the coalition with media contacts, legal support, and advice, but it was not their place to lead it. 
For a campaign to be a people's struggle, the people had to lead. 
                                                 
constituencies in the region. While these constituencies are, obviously, made of people, insofar 
as they are acting under the control of hierarchical religious or political organizations, they are 
not "the people." 
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This emphasis on supporting and facilitating, rather than leading, distinguishes Kēraḷīyam 
activists' work in people's struggles from the activism of earlier environmental movements in 
Kerala. Activists marked this shift with the term "dialogue" journey, meant to contrast with a 
similar environmentalist walking tour through the Western Ghats, called the "conservation 
journey" (samrakṣayātra). Participants in the Dialogue Journey critically recounted how activists 
in the earlier journey had sought their own agenda, whereas the vision of the latter journey was 
to, somehow, support local people in conserving mountain ecology themselves.31 Similarly, in 
their work with the quarry coalition and other people's struggle activism, Kēraḷīyam activists 
often claimed that the ultimate agendas of people's struggles must be set by locals, who should 
also take the lead in carrying out those agendas. These activists had their own agendas—agendas 
that in many ways were consistent with those of earlier environmentalists—but they made 
people's struggle central to these agendas. And people's struggle was, by definition, by and for 
the people. 
There is, to some extent, a paradox here: activists intervened in campaigns and protests 
and sought to influence them, but they also insisted that they remain "of the people." Thus, in 
organizing the coalition of quarry struggles, Dhanya did take a leadership role, in one moment, 
and refused on principle to take a leadership role in the next moment. Of course, assembling the 
coalition and chairing the coalition are two different kinds of leadership, and the interventions of 
solidarity organizers in people's struggles often hinged on such distinctions. For example, in 
Chapter 2, I described how solidarity organizers worked to persuade leaders in Gandhamur to 
                                                 
31 This contrast parallels a similar normative distinction between organizers and leaders in late 
20th century American community organizing (Staples, 2000). For further discussion of this 
distinction and its relation to normative models of insider and outsider roles in organizing, see 
Chapter 2. 
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hold more regular meetings. But solidarity organizers did not call the meetings themselves. 
Likewise, they called a meeting of women privately, with a few carefully chosen women, to 
make a push for more female leadership in the campaign. But they were not the public face of 
this effort. Just as effecting change through "dialogue" was often about asking the right 
questions, so influencing the course of people's struggles was about making suggestions, offering 
support, or amplifying the influence of those locals one knew shared one's views. In all of these 
ways, Kēraḷīyam activists impacted struggles without leading them. 
Relatedly, much of the influence of Kēraḷīyam activists on people's struggles was 
directed at means more than ends. The support these activists offered a local campaign in 
pursuing its goals also nudged, sometimes guided, that campaign toward a certain path. 
Sometimes this was a matter of explicit strategic decisions. For example, when residents of a 
predominantly Catholic village found out about government plans to locate an industrial zone 
there, they called Father Sebastian to help them organize. He guided them in setting up an action 
council, organizing a torch-led march, and drawing media attention to their opposition. More 
often, however, the influence of activists' support was more subtle, directed at quotidian aspects 
of the organizing process. Attempts in Gandhamur to organize nightly meetings or increase 
female leadership are examples of such influence, but not all impacts were so intentional. The 
legal contacts offered by Kēraḷīyam activists, for example, would affect the kind of legal advice 
a campaign received and, thus, the legal avenues it pursued. 
The multifarious influences of Kēraḷīyam activists on struggles have certain regularities, 
introducing certain similarities into the campaigns and protests in which these activists intervene. 
Fr. Sebastian, arriving in the village slated for the industrial zone, guided them in organizing a 
torch-led march, and this march was conducted in a manner that bore similarities to other 
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marches in which Fr. Sebastian had participated. Or, perhaps, similarities to his notion of what a 
torch-led march should be. The latter, normative sort of similarity was evident in the attempts to 
influence gender roles in the Gandhamur campaign, an effort in which Dhanya took a lead role. 
It was not just that Dhanya had seen women take leadership roles in other campaigns; what 
mattered was that she considered these campaigns to be stronger, better, and more representative 
of people's struggle. Thus, through their support for people's struggles, Kēraḷīyam activists 
introduced iconicity between actual campaign and protests and ideal people's struggles. This was 
rarely iconicity in the issues campaigns took up or the explicit aims for which they worked. 
Rather, it was iconicity in the form of political action—that is, participant roles, leadership 
styles, tactical repertoires, and other aspects of how campaigns were conducted.  
In other words, the interventions of Kēraḷīyam activists give diverse campaigns and 
protests features that make them recognizable as instances of a type of politics. By introducing 
formal similarities into how campaigns are conducted, activists contribute to the realization of 
people's struggle as a type of activity that is undertaken in many times and places. The story of 
conflicting scalar perspectives in Chapter 2 can be seen as a failed attempt at bringing the 
Gandhamur campaign into conformance with the people's struggle type.  
Kēraḷīyam activists were not, by far, the only actors generating the iconicities that hold 
this people's struggle type-3 together. By the time I conducted my dissertation fieldwork, 
people's struggle was a widely known, if fluid, genre of politics which received a great deal of 
coverage by the mainstream media. This was not always the case. According to many activists, 
the advent of private TV news in the early 2000s, followed by the victory of a high profile 
campaign against a polluting Coca-Cola plant in 2005, both contributed to widespread public 
recognition of the people's struggle type. Thus, one does not need to read Kēraḷīyam or consult a 
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Kēraḷīyam activist to have some sense of the key elements—e.g., Action councils, struggle tents, 
torch-led marchs, fasting—that make up a people's struggle. Many campaigns and protests that 
have had no contact with Kēraḷīyam activists adopt the name of people's struggle. There are also 
other individuals and activist groups, like the Muslim youth organization Justice Now, that 
regularly intervene in people's struggles and shape them in other ways. Thus, the iconicities of 
type3 do not all originate with Kēraḷīyam activists; their work is one typifying mechanism that 
tends to produce certain patterns of political action. 
What differentiates the influence of Kēraḷīyam activists from other typifying mechanisms 
are the ways that multiple similarities hang together. Just as the stances of typification-2 mirror 
the mix of articles in Kēraḷīyam, so also the influences of activists in typification-3 enact this 
same mix of normative positions in actual campaigns and protests. Efforts to promote gender 
equality and "democratic" meeting practices in Gandhamur are examples of this. But activists 
also sometimes encouraged locals to take up organic farming and other valued practices found on 
the pages of Kēraḷīyam—in Gandhamur, locals sometimes joked with each other about 
Kēraḷīyam activists' "alternative" views. The magazine's integration of people's struggle with 
other radical projects was never even remotely achieved, nor attempted, in any actual people's 
struggle. The magazine had a whole issue about bicycles, for example, but my research assistant 
Sunil and I were the only ones who ever cycled to the sites of struggles. But Kēraḷīyam activists 
spoke often of their desire to realize such integration more fully, and complained about the lack 
of recognition in Gandhamur, for example, of the broader cause in which their campaign 
partook. This vision of a broader, integrated politics of people's struggle, though never realized 
itself, gave a coherence to their influence on the typification-3 of people's struggles that was 
distinct from other influences. 
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Because both the sociological literature on framing and the anthropological literature on 
recognition and essentialism theorize typification as a representational processes, neither is very 
helpful for describing the work of Kēraḷīyam activists in typification-3. Benford and Snow 
describe framing as a way of interpreting and representing the "world out there" (2000: 614), but 
in this case activists are giving shape to the world itself, not only to representations of the world. 
People's struggle is not only an ideal type, but also a real type.32 Moreover, this shift from 
typification as representational process to typification as transforming reality also forces a 
revision of our account of the making of the people's struggle type in ink and paper. If 
typification-3 generates similarities between actual campaigns and protests, then typification-1 is 
better described as drawing upon, amplifying, or editing these existing similarities, rather than 
creating them ex nihilo. The world, in other words, is no longer so very "out there."  
3.5 Circuits of Motivation 
The typification-3 of campaigns and protests as people's struggles sheds new light on 
typification-1 on the pages of Kēraḷīyam and typification-2 in the rain camp. The logic of 
people's struggle updates as documentation, we noted earlier, presupposes the existence of 
iconicities between campaigns and protests. Such iconicities also afford Father Sebastian's 
introduction of himself as someone who spends all his time on people's struggles. Moreover, in 
describing their motivations for publishing struggle updates and holding rain camps, activists 
invoked the existence of ongoing people's struggles. This type of political action, they claimed, 
urgently required documentation. It also inspired them to pursue an alternative way of life. With 
our account of typification-3, we can now understand how diverse campaigns and protests 
became instances of people's struggle capable of requiring and inspiring this work. 
                                                 
32 Thanks to Philip Gorski for suggesting this terminology in another context.  
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At the same time, it is not quite right to say that people's struggles as campaigns and 
protests pre-existed people's struggles in ink and paper or people's struggles as an activity central 
to a way of life. The interventions of solidarity organizers that produced iconicity among 
campaigns and protests were also informed and inspired by Kēraḷīyam and the camps. Thus, 
typification-3 presupposes the processes of typification-2 and typification-1 as much as the latter 
presuppose typification-3. The iconicity elaborated in each process recapitulates the iconcity 
already present in the others, so that in each process, the similarities that activists produce are 
never arbitrary but, rather, always already there. 
The notion of real types, then, applies not only to types of political action, but also to ink 
and paper types and types of activist life. In each process of typification, the pre-existence of 
people's struggles was part of the motive for the work activists undertook. Adarsh updated 
readers about people's struggles. Sunny and other activists made people's struggles central to 
their way of life. Dhanya intervened in people's struggles. In each case, these activities 
presuppose that people's struggles already exist. If there was no people's struggle type already, 
then it is hard to see why Kēraḷīyam activists would undertake what we have described as 
typifying work. In each process, the existing people's struggle type also motivates some further 
work of building iconicity between struggles, whether the latter are ink-and-paper 
representations, activities defining an activist life, or campaigns and protests. 
The motive forces driving the three processes of typification can be diagrammed as in 
Figure 6. Typification-1, on the pages of Kēraḷīyam, renders people's struggles as a consistent 
narrative of opposition between the people and their others, and tucks this narrative in between 
articles on cultural critique and alternative lifestyles. In camps and other joint activities, 
typification-2, activists align with each other in stances that, in turn, align more or less with the 
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positions taken on the pages of the magazine. This work is, at times, inspired by the magazine, 
but the magazine is also shaped by the stances of its readers, who are often also its writers. In 
typification-3, activists enact their aligned stances in their interventions in campaigns and 
protests, attempting to realize a vision of people's struggle as it is found on the pages of 
Kēraḷīyam and in the shared experience of camps. But the resulting similarities between these 
campaigns and protests also inspire the work of publishing struggle updates and holding camps. 
They are what demand documentation and give urgency to the pursuit of "struggle" as a way of 
life. 
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Figure 6: Circuits of motivation in the typification of people’s struggles 
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Notably, in diagramming this tripartite process, the one relation lacking a clear vector of 
influence is from typification-1 to typification-3. While people's struggle as represented on the 
pages of Kēraḷīyam is vital to the production of the web of moral stances that bind together a 
collective of activists engaged in people's struggles, it is not apparent that the magazine has any 
direct impact on campaigns and protests. Adarsh regularly visits various action councils to gather 
material for struggle updates and other articles, but what he writes rarely makes it back to the 
sites of these campaigns. Indeed, when one member of the Gandhamur Action Council requested 
dozens copies of an issue dealing extensively with the campaign, which he hoped to distribute 
locally, Adarsh resisted. He said that past experience made him doubt that anyone would read 
them. For the most part, then, it would appear that typification-1 is only taken up in actual 
campaigns and protests via intervention by members of the activist collective that the magazine 
helps to produce, that is, via typification-2. 
This circuitous model of the forces driving the typification of people's struggle helps to 
explain how activists can describe people's struggle as already present in the world even as they 
give so much effort to producing the iconicities that bind it together. At every stage in the 
typification process, people's struggles are both there and in need of making. Part of this 
ontological hybridity has to do with the nature of icons. Peirce notes that an iconic sign is fit to 
be taken as "the same" as its object, even if it is never interpreted that way. Thus, what defines an 
iconic sign is this naturalness of fit that, when interpreted to be a similarity, is encountered as 
always already there. Kēraḷīyam activists perceive this naturalness of fit among campaigns and 
protests in part because they, through their interventions as solidarity organizers, have helped to 
produce it. For the same reason, however, the fit is never so natural as to not require further 
work. The similarity they encounter between campaigns is real, but it is still also a potential 
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waiting to be realized. In this hybridity of the people's struggle type between reality and 
possibility, activists find a vision for the world as it ought to be. 
Adarsh's impulse to publish a struggle update on Gandhamur during a low point in the 
campaign arises from precisely this hybridity of people's struggle between the real and the yet to 
be realized. For Adarsh, Gandhamur was a people's struggle. At the same time, however, he said 
he was concerned about the direction the campaign might take now that nearly all solidarity 
organizers had withdrawn. Adarsh's representation of Gandhamur in the struggle update, which 
made it conform to a standard format, was consistent with what he understood the campaign to 
be. However, his motive for publishing the update then was less about the Gandhamur campaign 
was than about what it might become. He was concerned, specifically, that the campaign would 
be co-opted by party politicians and diverge from the normative model of what a people's 
struggle ought to be. By putting out the update, Adarsh hoped to keep Gandhamur connected to 
people's struggle as an activity undertaken by solidarity organizers, to keep it in the circuit of 
Kēraḷīyam's typifying work. Though he believed himself to be documenting what was already 
there, he also feared that if he stopped representing Kēraḷīyam as a people's struggle, then it 
might also stop being a people's struggle.  
3.6 A People’s Struggle Movement? 
The efficacy of the magazine's typifying work should not be overstated; the circuit of 
influence I have sketched here is far from tight, and the force by which it draws people's struggle 
together is countered by other forces pulling in other directions. This is what I encountered in my 
phone call with Ganesh. Doing fieldwork inside the circuit of Kēraḷīyam's work, people's 
struggle seemed like a stable and unquestioned type—a sort of natural kind. But this naturalness 
was unsettled when I realized that there were other typification processes working away at the 
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same materials. Iconicity is not only a matter of interpretation, but the inherent qualities of things 
make many resemblances possible. Any campaign can be made to belong to many types. 
Kēraḷīyam's work is never complete because there are always many other actors with their own 
ways of typing movements as well. 
Both the sociological and anthropological literatures on social movements show that the 
assembly of diverse organizations, campaigns, or uprisings as recognizable members of a larger 
category is important to the making of a movement. My account of how Kēraḷīyam produces 
iconicity between people's struggles might be read as a story about bringing diverse campaigns 
and protests into a larger movement. However, the lack of a strategizing SMO driving the 
typifying work of Kēraḷīyam activists makes it a stretch to describe this work as movement-
making in the traditional sense. Though there may be strategic moments at any stage of the 
circuit, such as Adarsh's decision to publish an update on Gandhamur, this is not the coherent, 
fixed strategy of an SMO—there is no single destination, no one calculus determining all 
decisions. 
In considering whether the processes of typification described here have a role to play in 
social movement organizing, it will help to consider the work of Kēraḷīyam in light of the more 
explicit movement building efforts of the National Alliance of People's Movements (NAPM). As 
noted in Chapter 1, a small subset of Kēraḷīyam associates—five or ten people, depending on 
how you count—were active members of the NAPM, which had been building a coalition of 
progressive movements and organizations across India since the early 1990s. In addition, many 
who read Kēraḷīyam or participate in camps sympathize with the NAPM's aims. The NAPM was 
also directly involved in the production of the map shown in Figure 2 as well as the publication 
of the "Kerala of Struggle" compendium. Moreover, in a prefatory note in "Kerala of Struggle," 
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the NAPMs national convener describes Kerala's people's struggles as a model for its work 
elsewhere (Patkar, 2010). From this point of view, the campaigns listed in the table of contents 
are encompassed by a national-level type for which NAPM is a standard bearer. 
But this is not the view from the offices of Kēraḷīyam. Both Adarsh and Sunny were 
inspired by the work of national-level NAPM figures and regularly sought contributions from the 
few Kēraḷīyam associates involved in the organization. But while the NAPM website includes  
Kēraḷīyam in a list of its publications, the Kēraḷīyam website mentions no such relationship, nor 
did Sunny and Adarsh ever describe the magazine in this way. When NAPM held its national 
conference in Kerala in 2012, attendance by Kerala activists was remarkably low. Those who did 
attend participated only marginally, mingling little with the Hindi-speaking national organizers. 
Those Kēraḷīyam activists who were actively involved in NAPM openly admitted that the 
organization was weak in Kerala. Only a handful of people's struggles were officially members 
of the alliance, and the coalition was no more than a list. As our analysis thus far shows, such 
list-making is important to Kēraḷīyam’s work as well, but only insofar as it is connected with 
other mechanisms of typification. 
In describing their reluctance to join NAPM, Kēraḷīyam activists explained that they were 
against forming such organizations in principle. As noted earlier, the notion of the people as a 
political actor was often defined by a juxtaposition with formally organized institutions. As 
described in Chapter 1, activists within Kerala's alternative left had long turned to this notion of 
the people as an alternative to the leftism of the state's many Communist parties. They believed 
that not only political parties but also NGOs and other durable institutions, even when set up to 
promote people's politics, would inevitably end up working in their own interests rather than 
working for the people. Thus, even though many shared NAPM's aims, they were opposed to its 
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institutional form. It is for these same ideological reasons, arguably, that Kēraḷīyam was the most 
robust, durable institutional framework for these activists' work. 
Although the typifying work of Kēraḷīyam was not movement making in the coalition 
sense, it did accomplish some of what NAPM sought to achieve. In particular, because many 
Kēraḷīyam activists were inspired by NAPM's work, the typifying work of the magazine was 
consistent with the organization's vision for its coalition. In "Kerala of Struggle," we see this 
vision most perfectly realized, if only in ink-and-paper form. And we can now see how ink-and-
paper people's struggle is, to some extent, translated into other forms through building an activist 
collective and intervening in people's struggles. This work is, in part, what makes it possible for 
the leader of NAPM to see Kerala as a model for the realization of the coalition's vision. People's 
struggles are multiplying, even if members of the coalition are not. 
In this chapter, I have shown how the Kēraḷīyam magazine contributes to the production 
of "people's struggles" as a type of politics in Kerala. I have argued that activists engage with the 
people's struggle category as both already real and as a form of politics that ought to be realized. 
Thus, my analysis builds on that of Chapter 2 by showing how the understanding of the 
Gandhamur campaign as only one instance within a broader movement is rendered compelling 
both to solidarity organizers and others. I also suggest how their work, in making a particular 
genre of people's politics available for appropriation by action councils like the one in 
Gandhamur, influenced the activism of such groups even when solidarity organizers were not 
directly involved. 
In the next chapter, I follow up on the latter point, exploring how the Gandhamur Action 
Council performed their role as "the people" of people's struggle. I also continue to attend to 
scale, examining the scalar work required to make a small number of specific people stand in for 
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the universal collective actor of "the people." My analysis focuses on the ways the Action 
Council made use of events in public roads to accomplish this feat, and I adopt the metaphor of 
"the thoroughfare" to re-examine democratic publicity from the vantage point of people's 
struggle. In doing so, I carry forward my concern with entanglements of ethics and politics, 
exploring how physical force and evaluation in presentations of the people that are both 
embodied and mass-mediated at once. 
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Chapter 4: Public Roads 
4.1 Thoroughfare 
"I have a doubt..." Sunil said to me as we walked back to our bicycle. 
"A doubt?" 
"Yes a doubt...Did the fish die, or did they kill the fish?" 
Out of the corner of my eye, I noticed an old man standing in the shadow of a shop's 
metal awning, only a few yards away. He had turned his head to look at us—that's what had 
caught my attention. He met my gaze, grinning as if he knew me. 
"Oh!" I said loudly, "Is that how you feel?" 
As we pedaled away, I admonished Sunil, my research assistant, to be more careful about 
when, where, and how loudly he expresses his doubts. Once our bicycle, a tandem, was moving 
quickly, I asked him if he had seen the man, but he had not. For my part, I had no idea who the 
man was, or what his position with regard to the campaign against the gelatin factory might be. 
He could have been anyone. 
Sunil was not the only one with doubts about who had killed the fish. We had just come 
from a provision shop where we had been audience to a lively debate about precisely this topic. 
The shopkeeper, known to be the husband of an employee in the gelatin factory, had claimed that 
the discovery of fish bodies floating in an irrigation canal that morning was nothing more than a 
publicity stunt by the factory's opponents. He said the fish could not have died from pollution 
because only big fish were dying, but pollution would have killed smaller fish as well. The 
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protestors, he said, must have bought some dead fish and dumped them in. Several of his 
customers had contested this, including one man who said he had just come from the canal and 
had seen many small fish floating to the surface. Such was the talk all along the road that 
morning. Nonetheless, I was worried about the man who had overheard us. How could we be 
sure, I asked Sunil, that this man would not relay his doubts right back to the struggle 
participants? In the road, one has to be careful. 
Conducting participant observation on the campaign to shut down the gelatin factory in 
Gandhamur, Sunil and I, like the campaign participants, spent most of our time in roads. 
Speeches, marches, rallies, and fasts were conducted in or at the edge of the village's main roads. 
That morning's fish kill might have happened in the canal behind the factory, but it would be 
watched from a bridge over the canal. The children of protestors would lay the larger fish in a 
row atop the short wall of the bridge and a crowd would form and spread along that section of 
road. TV and newspaper reporters would interview campaign leaders in the road and take 
footage of the crowd. Passersby would post their own videos to Facebook or YouTube. In the 
road, dead fish became a public controversy. Thus, to garner media attention and win popular 
support, the campaign against the gelatin factory, like campaigns and protests throughout Kerala, 
went to the roads.  
The everyday conduct of politics in roads offers one way of rethinking a normative 
concept that has haunted scholarship on political culture in India for several decades: the liberal 
public sphere. Scholars seeking to understand Indian democratic culture have searched for the 
practices of disinterested deliberation that supposedly occur within this sphere, forming the 
beating heart of public life in Western democracies. While some have hailed pre-colonial 
traditions of argumentation and debate as India's own analogues of the public sphere (Bayly, 
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2009; Sen, 2005), others have claimed that the concept simply does not apply to Indian politics, 
which they say proceeds through patronage and symbolism, not rational public discourse 
(Banerjee, 2008; Ruud, 2011). Acknowledging that both debate and patronage do happen in 
India, some have seen fit to describe Indian politics as dichotomous, "split" between public 
sphere-like communicative practices and the politics of crowds, interest groups, and propaganda 
(Bayly, 2009; Chatterjee, 2004; Harriss, 2011). But sorting actual Indian politics into these two 
categories has proven as empirically problematic as the notion of the public sphere itself. 
Whether one looks at mass media (Jeffrey, 2009), electoral politics (Banerjee, 2007), or coffee 
shop conversations (Cody, 2011a), it is difficult to see where one could even draw a boundary 
between the desired practices of the public sphere and the illiberal remainder. 
The road-based politics of the Gandhamur campaign suggests a new theory of publicity 
that avoids re-inscribing the defining contrasts of the public sphere. The publicity of the public 
sphere is predicated on a separation between the interested relations of families, markets, or party 
politics and the disinterested relations of rational deliberation (Offe, 2014). But the road is public 
in a different way. The road is a thoroughfare, a space through which bodies of all sorts pass, and 
thus a public space insofar as it mixes friends and enemies, kin and strangers—not to mention 
dead fish, reporters, politicians, and researchers. The thoroughfare mixes the social categories 
that separate people in other spaces—to get to the temple, the mosque, or the church, one walks 
through the same roads. Of course, one does not encounter everyone in the road, but one might 
encounter anyone. As evident in the anxiety I expressed to Sunil above, what makes 
communication in the road public is not disinterested, universalist speech, but the difficulty of 
knowing who might be listening. Where the public sphere closes off a communicative space in 
which one should speak as if everyone is listening, the road exposes the speaker to the 
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uncertainty that anyone could be listening. By examining how participants in the Gandhamur 
campaign navigate this uncertainty, we can construct a new account of public action in India. 
In a recent article, Francis Cody argues against the tendency to view Indian public life as 
a "deviation, failed replication, or even crisis" from the perspective of the norms of the liberal 
public sphere, and recommends that scholars instead ask how "postcolonial publicity" can 
improve our understanding of actual politics and, even, suggest alternative normative visions for  
democracy (Cody, 2015, p. 52). Cody is particularly concerned with challenging the 
disembodied, socially unmarked anonymity of participation in the public sphere, which he 
follows others in arguing allows a privileged elite to "speak for humanity in general" (Cody, 
2015, p. 51; Fraser, 1992; Warner, 2002). He makes an initial effort at challenging this account 
of publicity empirically, presenting three cases in which the politics of (embodied) crowds and 
(mass-mediated) newspaper publishers and readers are tightly intertwined. However, the 
difficulty with this line of argument, as Cody himself acknowledges, is that such examples might 
well be taken to merely confirm that Indian democracy is "immature and lacking in universal 
norms" (2015, p. 62). Moreover, Cody cautions that any attempt to depict a distinct 
ethnopolitical model of Indian political norms is only likely to exacerbate this problem, 
projecting Indian public life as an exotic other to liberalism. What he calls for instead is a search 
for "a new language of massification that does not presume a world of disembodied strangers" 
(Cody, 2015, p. 63). I take this chapter to be an attempt at answering this call, albeit with Cody's 
caution against airtight models of uniquely Indian publicity well in mind. 
In various guises, the communicative theory that underpins the public sphere concept has 
long been central to the promise of democracy. Kant made public discourse a precondition for 
enlightnment and a fundamental principle for moral judgement (Davis, 1992; Kant, 1996a, 
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1996b). Building on this normative vision, John Dewey argued that "the problem of the public" 
is how to improve "the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion" (1984, p. 
365). Against Walter Lippman's (1925) argument that public opinion can only coalesce in vague, 
emotional impulses, Dewey argued that public discourse (especially, face-to-face conversation) 
could provide the basis for "securing diffused and seminal intelligence" (1984, p. 371). Dialogue 
and debate were to be tools for making public opinion rational. Habermas (1984; 1989) took up 
this argument and carried it further, making discussion in magazines and coffee shops the central 
historical mechanism for the generation of an approximately ideal public sphere in 18th century 
Europe, and developing a normative theory of language with public rationality as its teleological 
endpoint. Both Habermas' historiography and his normative vision have been the subject of 
much debate. Nonetheless, the notion that public discourse can give rise to rational moral 
judgments remains a crucial tenet of liberal language ideology.  
Readers of the burgeoning literature on publics and the public sphere in anthropology33 
will recognize that, as metaphor, roads are not new to this debate. Habermas famously contrasted 
the rational discussion taking place in London coffee shops with the "pressure of the street" 
outside; shutting out the road was the very act of enclosure that made liberal publicity possible 
(J. Habermas, 1989, p. 132; Laurier & Philo, 2007; Montag, 2000). But this defining contrast 
only makes the campaign in Gandhamur a better site for re-examining "the street" as something 
more than an "other" to the public sphere. After all, Gandhamur has active tea shop 
conversations, complete with newspapers, but the tea shops have no doors. Like most other small 
shops in Kerala, they are open to the road and caught up in the mix and flow of the thoroughfare. 
Thus, far from an analysis of an alternative non-liberal publicity that is already overdetermined 
                                                 
33 See Cody (2011b) for a recent review of this literature. 
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by the dichotomies of liberalism, the Gandhamur campaign is an opportunity to re-examine the 
logic of separation that underwrites the public sphere idea and explore ethnographically the 
actual entanglement of bylines and bodies; kin, crowds, and cable news; deliberation and dead 
fish. In doing so, I take aim not only at the problem of the Indian public sphere, but at the 
theorization of public rationality generally. 
4.2 Events in the Road 
When Sunil and I joined the crowd on the bridge that morning, we knew that we were 
attending a repeat event. Several months before, after over a year of relative stagnancy, another 
fish kill had reinvigorated the campaign. I had not been in Kerala then, but Sunil and I had seen 
photos on online news sites of Vijayan and other campaign leaders carrying a huge branch 
through the middle of the road, strung with dozens of gaping fish. That fish kill had brought new 
attention to the campaign from around Kerala and new support from among the network of 
"solidarity organizers" associated with Kēraḷīyam magazine. In the following two months, 
campaign participants held a continuous fast in their tent outside the factory's gate and conducted 
nightly torchlit marches through the village. They set a deadline for the government to remove 
the effluent pipe from the factory to the river. As the days passed, regional newspapers reported 
regularly on the fasting, meetings with officials, and the approaching deadline. 
The deadline came and passed. One day shortly after I arrived, about two thousand 
people, both Gandhamur residents and solidarity organizers, gathered to remove the pipe 
themselves. Although this did not take place, the conflict came to a head when protesters refused 
to disperse from in front of the factory gates. The police beat them back with their wooden 
batons, chasing many all the way into their homes and destroying their belongings. Images of the 
violence were on every news channel that evening and in every newspaper the next day and for 
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several days thereafter. There were proclamations of support from politicians and civil society 
figures. There were daily marches, daily speeches by dignitaries, daily sit-ins and arrests in front 
of the factory gate. The effluent pipe was broken and flooded a paddy field with factory's waste. 
There were tours of the pollution for government officials and clashes with workers and police. 
For more than four months, this wave of activity kept newspaper and television reporters flowing 
through Gandhamur. 
But by the time of the next fish kill—the one Sunil and I rode to see—media attention 
had begun to wane. There may have been several reasons for this, including a decline in support 
from solidarity organizers that I discussed in Chapter 2. Regardless of the reasons, however, the 
wave of activity had passed. Local leaders recognized that in order to draw reporters to 
Gandhamur, something new had to happen. The flooded paddy field, the fights with workers, the 
speeches by mid-level politicians—none of that was new anymore. Thus, when the fish floated to 
the surface of the canal that morning, the Action Council pounced. Vijayan called all of his 
media contacts. Campaign participants told each other to come down to the bridge and form a 
crowd. Boys went down to the river to bring up fish and display them on the bridge wall.  
For most of Kerala, this is how people's struggles are known; they appear as intermittent 
reports of fish kills, confrontations with police, broken pipes, leaders arrested for fasting "until 
death," and speeches by persons of renown—strings of events on TV screens and the pages of 
newspapers. But this is also, to a large extent, how the campaign in Gandhamur was understood 
from the inside, by those who conducted such events. The work of the Action Council was 
closely attuned to coverage in the media, especially on Kerala's dozen Malayalam language news 
channels. Participants watched the news closely, celebrated increases in coverage, and 
strategized to bring TV reporters back to the village. Thus, dead fish could not be left floating in 
  139 
 
the water; they had to be dangled from a branch that could be carried through the road. They had 
to be lined up on the bridge wall. To a large extent, Action Council members saw the events of 
their own campaign as through the lens of a video camera. 
Given this orientation to uptake by mass media, to what extent were events in the road 
brought about by the Action Council's own initiative? Some version of Sunil's doubt ("Did the 
fish die? Or did they kill the fish"?) was often on my mind, and not only because the Action 
Council's opponents often made accusations of this sort. Campaign participants staked their 
hopes on the influence of such events on public opinion. In their own view, they needed to keep 
TV-worthy things happening in the village. And some events were clearly orchestrated by 
participants. For example, after the effluent pipe broke, factory workers succeeded in diverting 
the flow of waste into an irrigation canal and back into the river. But Vijayan led several men in 
building a dike to channel the flow in a different direction, back into the factory's intake pipe. 
Ostensibly, the aim of this engineering project was to interfere with the factory's production 
process, but Vijayan called the TV reporters as well and one channel came out to interview him 
in front of the newly completed waterworks. Thus, this too became a media event. 
In other cases, however, the Action Council's role in orchestrating events was less clear. 
In the case of the broken pipe, this ambiguity was intentional. Action Council participants 
generally referred to the event in the intransitive (pipe poṭṭi, "the pipe broke"), but I did note the 
tendency of one particularly garrulous participant to use the transitive first, then correct himself. 
When I asked a solidarity organizer point blank whether the Action Council had broken the pipe, 
he smiled wryly and replied "could be.” 
In the case of several key events, however, it was clear that Action Council members 
could only have had a limited role in bringing them about. In the case of the police baton charge, 
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for example, they might have provoked the police, but they could not have known that the police 
would respond as they did. And it was only because the brutality of the police response was so 
rare in contemporary Kerala that it received so much media attention. Thus, both the police 
violence and its effects on the campaign were largely out of the Action Council's control. 
Even when the Action Council was not in control of events in the road, it was still active. 
When events were slowing, there were efforts to orchestrate or capitulate them. When something 
happened, there was the work of displaying it to visitors and the mass media. Vijayan, the lead 
organizer of the Action Council, was nearly always riding around on his motorbike, always 
visiting someone, always on the phone. When he was not in the thick of a crowd, or giving an 
interview, or supervising some mischievous engineering project, he was meeting with other 
leaders to plot the next move. He slept only a few hours a night, and his health deteriorated 
significantly during the time I was studying the campaign. Some solidarity organizers criticized 
this way of running things, saying that the campaign lacked longer-term strategy. But even his 
critics recognized that Vijayan had a gift for mobilizing people; when he called, a crowd would 
come. 
Throughout the ups and downs of events in the road, the struggle tent offered an element 
of continuity. The tent was built like a stage—a raised platform with three walls, opening onto 
the road—and it served as a stage for speeches, visits from supporters, or hunger strikes. People 
said it was built on Vijayan's ancestral property, which happened to lie just adjacent to the 
factory, but its platform and awning reached far out into the road itself. When a famous politician 
or civil society figure came, a podium was set up on the platform with two rows of chairs behind 
it. Chairs for the audience were set up in in front of the tent and on the far side of the road, and 
often a crowd would grow around these chairs, blocking the road entirely. Most such programs 
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would begin with a short procession to the gate of the factory, where slogans and demands for 
justice could be addressed directly to the closed gates. The managers never came to the gate to 
hear these demands, and no one expected they would; the audience that mattered was in the road. 
But even when there were no official events, the tent was still a stage. Sitting together on 
the tent's platform was considered an important way of making protest visible. This notion was 
described in the idiom of Gandhian satyāgraha, a practice of continuously occupying a place, 
often while fasting, as a way of publicly asserting opposition to an injustice. When the Action 
Council conducted relay fasts, it was essential that the fasting person should always remain in the 
tent. But even when fasts were not going on, it was considered better to keep the tent occupied at 
all times as a sign that the struggle persisted. On most nights, at least one or two unmarried men 
would sleep there, and in the daytime elderly men would sit out in chairs in front of the platform 
and chat. The tent was a gathering place, especially in the evenings after dinner, when wives, 
mothers, and children would join the men. During the times when struggle events were most 
frequent, these gatherings were also more regular and better attended.  
The tent was a place for putting the campaign on display, but it was also a place for 
observing. Whether during long, lazy afternoons or evening gatherings, it was common to see 
cell phones being passed around, as people shared photos, video, and commentary about the 
campaign from Facebook, YouTube, or news sites. If a magazine had covered the campaign, 
someone would eventually bring it to the tent; there were small stacks of them on a table on one 
side of the platform. Newspaper coverage was passed around as well, and media coverage of the 
campaign was one of the most common topics of conversation in the tent. Thus, if the tent was a 
place for the campaign to be seen, it was also a place to watch the campaign—to see how it was 
being seen. 
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As with the publicity of the road generally, occupying the tent was public in the sense 
that one might be seen by anyone. The road in front of the factory was the most traveled road in 
the village, and anyone might pass by. Thus, if one chose to sit in the tent, one was also more or 
less choosing to be known as a participant in the campaign. People in Gandhamur talked like 
this: if asked whether so and so was a member of the Action Council, people would often say 
whether they had seen so-and-so in the tent, or in the tent recently. For this reason, the tent held 
risk. One might, for example, be seen by a relative who was opposed to the campaign. I met 
several people who said they supported the campaign but were not interested in going to the tent 
because they had family members who worked for the factory. 
There was another reason to occupy the tent continuously; some struggle participants 
worried that if it was left unwatched the factory workers or the police would destroy it. Indeed, 
on the day the police beat the protesters, they also demolished the tent entirely. Thus, just as with 
the Action Council's diversion of polluted water into the factory's intake pipe, the presentation of 
the campaign for public display was always an embodied effort, the success of which was always 
contingent upon the balance of physical forces. The relations between semiotic mediation and 
immediate physicality were complex and the dependencies bidirectional. Sitting in front of the 
gate was a way of displaying defiance to the TV cameras, but it was also a physical obstacle to 
the entry of trucks. A broken pipe slowed the production process in the factory, but it also 
released smells and blackish gunk that were useful for persuading visiting government officials 
(see Chapter 7). Breaking the pipe was a mechanism for mediatizing the impacts of the factory's 
waste, but keeping the broken pipe flowing required scuffles with factory workers who wanted to 
seal it up.  
Thus, the tactics of the Gandhamur campaign take us far afield from the supposedly 
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disembodied deliberation of the public sphere. In the road, public display is always the display of 
particular bodies, whether they be human bodies, water bodies, or the putrid bodies of dead fish. 
And this should not be surprising, given that all media are material things, and human semiosis is 
a necessarily physical and embodied process (Keane, 2005). Indeed, if embodiment and 
materiality are incompatible with the normative vision for discourse in the public sphere, they 
are nonetheless central to the bourgeois public sphere as a historical occurrence, even by 
Habermas' own account. Thus, in and of itself, the physicality of politics in the road only places 
us outside of the liberal imaginary to the extent that the latter is, in fact, imaginary. 
What distinguishes the publicity of the road from that of the public sphere is not the mere 
fact of materiality, however, but the possibility that physical force may impinge upon the force 
of reason. As Cody notes, fear of the irrational violence of crowds has long served as a foil for 
utopic visions of public discourse extricated from bodies (Cody, 2015, p. 55; Tarde, 1969). As 
we have seen, some forms of violence were crucial to events in the road. Violence might be 
required to protect the tent or keep the broken pipe open. It might also elicit a police baton 
charge that could, in turn, garner widespread popular support. Such tactics may seem to 
exemplify the insidious "pressure of the street" of which Habermas warned.  
Just as the Gandhamur campaign's tactics of public display cannot be carried out without 
bodies, however, so violent tactics were always dependent upon the persuasive potential of mass 
mediation. This was not the irrational violence of a mob. Force—especially the use of violence, 
but also of other forms of physical force, such as property destruction—was a calculated risk, 
and the chief calculation concerned whether or not an act could be represented as just force. In 
the final analysis, the road was a site of ethical evaluation, and the logic of force as campaign 
strategy was subordinate to a logic of accountability. However, to fully appreciate the interplay 
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of force and display in the campaign, it will help to first look more closely at the evaluative 
mechanisms of the public to which the campaign rendered itself accountable. 
4.3 Channeling Publicity 
There are four tea shops in Gandhamur, but the busiest by far is Sujit's. Sujit has been 
running the tea shop for over thirty years now, and his mother and father ran it together before 
him. Every morning at seven or so, he puts that day's newspaper on the table, lifts the big metal 
shutter facing the road, and men begin to trickle in. Older, retired men arrive first, a small cohort 
of regulars, the same every day. By eight, the middle-aged men begin to arrive—carpenters, 
laborers, and clerks mostly, with the occasional business owner or doctor. They come singly, not 
in pairs or threes, and take their seats on the benches that line either side of the long, narrow 
room. Dosa's are available, but most men take only tea, made the usual way with lots of milk and 
sugar, in the little glasses that one finds at every tea shop. Sometimes Sujit serves the tea himself, 
but usually there is someone to help him—a task exchanged for the morning's cup of tea. 
The newspaper is divided into sections, which circulate around the room individually. 
Newspaper reading is a dominant activity in the shop, but no one is in a hurry about it. There is 
no calling dibs, and men only rarely ask about the availability of a particular section. Those who 
read are generally content to read whatever is available, even if it is only the classifieds. The 
pace of conversation is similarly relaxed. A man might comment on the weather, an upcoming 
festival, or news of a lottery win in a nearby village. Usually, such conversation starters are taken 
up for a few turns at most, and that with the men seated beside the first speaker. Conversation 
that crosses the room to the other bench is rarer, sometimes only a few times per hour. But if a 
man comes to the tea shop looking for such conversation he will surely get it. And there are 
certain men who regularly do just that. 
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Biju, the one member of the Action Council who regularly visits the tea shop, is this sort 
of man; he talks loudly and enjoys getting others talking loudly as well. When he is around, there 
will probably be some discussion of recent events in the conflict between the Action Council and 
the factory, or even debate about whether the factory should be closed. But when he is not there, 
these topics rarely come up. If there is an article about the factory in a newspaper, someone 
might point out that it is there, but most likely there will be no discussion of what the article 
says, how it represents the factory or the campaign, or what the implications might be for the 
ongoing conflict. No discussion, that is, of the sort that happens in the struggle tent. When I try 
to raise these topics in the shop, they receive only weak replies. When I asked about the best road 
to a nearby town, I heard about the history of road building over the last fifty years. But my best 
conversations about the factory were out on the front stoop, sharing a cigarette, or back in the 
kitchen with Sujit, not in the shop itself. 
Sujit himself is a strong supporter of the campaign. He used to go down to the tent now 
and then, and he still donates money regularly. But he is not a man to talk loudly about it. One 
day, when I joined him in the kitchen, he explained to me that there are both campaign 
supporters and opponents who come to his shop, so he does not talk about it much. In particular, 
two of the old men who come early every morning are factory retirees. When they are around, he 
does not talk about the factory. At first, I thought he was saying, as an auto rickshaw driver told 
me once, that it is better for businessmen to avoid getting involved in politics because one might 
lose clients. But he explained that this was not his reasoning at all. 
"They all know what my politics are when it comes to the company," he said, laughing, 
"It's just that I don't say anything. What's the point in saying anything against it? For me it's not 
so much about business. But why should I disturb them?" 
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He turned back to the stove and flipped a few dosas. 
"Did anything like that ever happen?" I asked. 
"No, no, no...maybe because we do not really talk much about politics here." 
This statement surprised me because Kerala is known for having active and abundant 
political discourse. As noted in Chapter 1, political scientists and development scholars have 
written about this, but it is also part of Malayalis' own self-imaginary. Some complain about it 
and others take it as a point of pride, but no one thinks of Kerala as a place where people do not 
participate in, let alone talk about, politics. But Sujit meant what he said in a different way.
 "Let's say we four people are all LDF or all UDF," he said, referring to the two major 
party coalitions in Kerala, "Then we'll talk politics, but if someone from the other faction is 
there, then we won't talk...[when it's just us] we'll say that guy is with them, that guy's not 
correct, but when everybody is all together, we'll act like there's no problem at all." 
Sujit flips a few more dosas, then adds, "Really that's not how it should be. People should 
just speak openly...hey?" 
He shoots me a grin, then laughs. I laugh too and tell him I am not so sure. 
"Couldn't there be problems if people speak openly?" I ask. 
"The real gentleman is someone who speaks openly, right?" He says, still laughing, "I 
know that." 
"But couldn't there be problems with that too?" 
"They can do a lot of harm, the people who talk openly. Right? Nobody likes people who 
talk about things openly..." 
His voice trailed off as he turned back to the stove. 
*** 
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Sujit's account of why he does not speak openly (tur̤annu par̤ayuka, a compound of the 
verbs "to open" (tur̤akkuka) and "to say" (par̤ayuka)) about his support for the gelatin factory 
campaign resonates with the communicative anxieties at the heart of the public sphere concept. 
This notion of speaking openly combines two senses found in Malayalam dictionaries; that of 
speaking frankly and that of speaking in the open. Sujit is not merely averse to saying what he 
really thinks. After all, the same views that he withheld when in the tea shop, he was now 
explaining to me in detail in the kitchen. Rather, Sujit did not wish to express himself frankly in 
certain communicative situations, which he elsewhere described as speaking “publicly" 
(parasyamāyiṭṭ). We might say that he did not want to speak openly in the open. 
Sujit was worried that he might lose business but, more fundamentally, he was simply 
worried about disturbing people. His relations to those who frequent his shop are complex and 
enduring; they are economic relations, but also neighborly relations, friendly relations, even kin 
relations. The factory retirees were his father's customers before they were his own. In this social 
context, openly disagreeing with someone is not just a matter of opposing one opinion to 
another. It could have consequences for all of these other relationships.  
The public sphere is meant to counter such anxieties; it is a social context in which 
opinions can be openly stated because they are not entangled with the relations of economic 
exchange, of kinship, or of state authority. In his analysis of the emergence of a public sphere in 
18th-century Britain, for example, Habermas describes coffee shop conversations in which 
differences of social status were systematically disregarded, a practice meant to create a setting 
in which "the best argument could assert itself against that of social hierarchy" (J. Habermas, 
1989, p. 36). Likewise, he argues that the circulation of opinions in literary journals effectively 
disconnected arguments from the social embeddedness of the persons who constructed and 
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debated them (J. Habermas, 1989, p. 41). This logic of disentanglement and disinterestedness 
underwrites the capacity of the public sphere to engender rational debate; by separating relations 
between arguments from other social relations, the public sphere is imagined to free the force of 
reason from countervailing forces such as authority, sentiment, economic interest, or violence. 
A key communicative principle underwriting the possibility of such disentangled 
discourse is the notion that in the public sphere, one addresses everyone. Habermas argues that 
the emerging public spheres of Britain, France, and Germany were characterized by the notion 
that everyone "had to be able to participate," even if low literacy rates made it obvious that 
everyone did not (J. Habermas, 1989, pp. 37, 38). Building on this account, Warner argues that 
public speech is in principle oriented to "indefinite strangers," regardless of whether the speaker 
actually knows her audience or not (Warner, 2002, p. 74). Participants in the public sphere take 
each other as strangers in this limited sense, addressing one another without regard to any social 
specificity—as if they could be heard by anyone. Such indeterminacy of address, as Cody notes, 
stands in for the notion that public speech is universal in concern (Cody, 2015). Insofar as 
participants in the public sphere are stripped of social specificity, their utterances are taken to be 
unencumbered by "private" interests associated with race, class, gender, or other dimensions of 
social position. For Habermas, this ideological framework affords the possibility of deliberation 
in the interest of all. 
As illustrated by the old man who listened in on my research assistant Sunil's suspicions 
about the dead fish, talking in the road also has a certain indeterminacy of address. That road in 
particular, which runs past the struggle tent and the factory gates, is the main thoroughfare in 
Gandhamur—anyone might happen by. The same is true of the shops lining the road, which, like 
Sujit's tea shop, are generally constructed with three concrete walls and a large metal shutter 
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spanning the width of the fourth, road-facing wall. Awnings stretch out over stacks of soda 
bottles or crates of vegetables, luring passersby into their shade. Just as the old man overheard 
Sunil, so we had overheard the debate in the provisions shop a few minutes before. As in the 
public sphere, there is a sense in which, in the road and its shops, one must speak as if one could 
be overheard by anyone. 
However, the indeterminacy of speaking in roads and roadside shops has nothing to do 
with stranger relations. At least, not in Gandhamur. Though not a secluded village, Gandhamur is 
a small place, and not a place that many strangers have reason to go.34 But walking, cycling, or 
driving in the road, one might run into any of these known people—there lies the indeterminacy. 
People are not stripped of their social specificity, but it becomes more difficult to address them 
in their specificity because other people are likely to overhear. As Sujit suggests in his anecdote 
about the LDF and UDF party members, such mixedness does prompt people to adjust their 
speech, but these adjustments do not include disregard for social position. On the contrary, Sujit 
describes people—including himself—avoiding controversial topics altogether in mixed 
company. 
Nonetheless, debate does occur. When the shopowner declared that there were no small 
fish floating to the surface, his customers challenged him. Biju, the outspoken campaign 
participant that frequented Sujit's tea shop, always found plenty of other patrons ready to take 
him on—his own uncle first among them. Indeed, in Gandhamur, these are arguably the spaces 
in which such debates are most likely to occur. The mixed sociality of these spaces makes such 
                                                 
34 Am important exception are the migrants who come from Tamil Nadu, Bihar, and other states 
to work in the village's two brickmaking factories. But the migrants are strangers of a very 
different sort than Warner and others associate with the public sphere. They do not speak 
Malayalam, and they generally keep to themselves. If it is true that the other residents of 
Gandhamur address migrants as strangers, what is truer is that they rarely address them at all. 
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debate possible. But this same mixing of kin and customers, friends and foes, young and old, also 
makes openly disagreeing with others potentially risky. 
The risk of voicing his opinions was not, according to Sujit, the risk of being found out. 
In describing his aversion to "speaking openly" (tur̤annu par̤ayuka), Sujit also employs the 
adverb "publicly" (parasyamāyiṭṭ), one antonym of which is "secretly" (rahasyamāyiṭṭ). And yet, 
he makes clear that his aversion to speaking publicly is not about keeping secrets. Sujit was 
certain that everyone already knew that he opposed the factory, even if he never voiced this 
opinion in their presence. Thus, his concern about disturbing the factory retirees was not a matter 
of whether or not they knew his opinion. Rather, it was a question of whether they heard his 
opinion from his own lips or, alternatively, via some other communicative channel. 
Sujit's belief that everyone knew his views was consistent with the claims of many others 
in Gandhamur. Both supporters and opponents of the factory professed that they knew with 
certainty where everyone else stood with regard to the campaign to shut it down. In my own 
experience, people's knowledge of others' opinions (at least, as those opinions were expressed to 
me) was often less complete than they believed. Nonetheless, those who spoke to me "secretly" 
often only shared what was widely known. Numerous times during my research, I was pulled 
aside by someone in the road and taken to their house, where this person regaled me with the 
"real" story behind the factory and the campaign against it. In every instance, I later found out 
that this person's secret story was well known to the campaign participants, who offered their 
own counter-story when necessary, complete with details relevant to the trustworthiness of the 
storyteller. It would be too much to say that there were no secrets in Gandhamur. But there were 
definitely an abundance of public secrets. 
Likewise, there were many who supported the factory but were not willing to be seen 
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marching through the roads or sitting in the struggle tent. Chief among these were campaign 
supporters whose kin were employed in the factory. But this was not, generally, because they 
understood their views to be secret. Rather, it was a question of openly displaying those views in 
the road. 
Even campaign participants, who did choose to voice their views in the open, often spoke 
of the challenges they faced in doing so. For example, Sunitha described how her family 
members initially argued with her for getting involved with the campaign. Many of them also felt 
strongly about the pollution from the factory, but they did not think she should be marching in 
the street about it, particularly because a couple of her kin were factory employees. Likewise, 
Biju's outspokenness was, by his own account, a source of embarrassment to his family. Though 
his uncle Jacob laughed off his challenges, the two of them were not on good terms. Jacob knew 
there were others in the family who were in favor of the campaign, but none who confronted him 
so directly. 
Ideologies in Gandhamur about speaking openly stand in stark contrast to the speech 
situation supposedly facilitated by the indeterminacy of the public sphere. The more a social 
setting is "open" to a wide variety of people, the less "openly" people talk. Thus, in the tea shop 
and the road, most people exercise great care in how they speak, often avoiding disagreement, let 
alone criticism of one another's views. At the same time, in the language ideology of Sujit and 
other Gandhamur residents, keeping quiet is not necessarily understood to be a barrier to the flow 
of information and opinions. Word gets around without getting out in the open. Thus, discussion 
in Sujit's tea shop is not a mere reversal of that in the coffee shops of Habermas. 
The notion that reticence in public settings does not hinder the flow of information and 
opinions is underpinned, pragmatically, by the entanglement of social relations I described 
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above. Multiple and various relations between people in Gandhamur facilitate many points of 
communicative contact, or channels, along which knowledge of others' activities and opinions 
can travel. Thus, although the gelatin factory itself was separated from the road on all sides by a 
high concrete wall, developments inside the factory were almost immediately known to 
campaign participants. Despite their differences, those who supported the campaign openly were 
friends and kin with at least some workers. They were also linked to those inside the factory by 
the many who supported the campaign less openly. Thus, the dense web of relatedness in the 
village made the flow of information and opinions difficult to control, giving a sense that any 
communication held at least some indeterminacy of address.  
In this limited sense, then, all communication in Gandhamur was partially "public." What 
was not said in the road could be expected, nonetheless, to make it way to a "general" audience 
anyway. Given this expectation of indeterminacy, the road and the tea shop stand out as marked 
instances of a general condition. A high degree of indeterminacy in all communication is 
presumed by the expectation that opinions will be known regardless of whether they are uttered 
in roads or tea shops. Nonetheless, in these settings the ideological presumption of indeterminacy 
is more salient. Sujit feels he can tell me his opinions frankly in the kitchen, but not in the tea 
shop, even though he knows that those opinions will make there way into the shop eventually—
and, indeed, he assumes they already have. But in the kitchen, his speech is nonetheless not in 
risk of causing disturbance. 
To speak publicly (parasyamāyiṭṭ), then, is not so much a matter of indeterminate address 
as such, but rather a matter of which settings are ideologically marked as indeterminate. Without 
question, the selection of the road as a public space is afforded in part by a relatively high degree 
of possibility for words to travel in unanticipated ways. This is not only a matter of the actual 
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mixing of people in the road, but also the possibility of remediation. Thus, what worried me 
about the man who overheard Sunil's comments was not that he was unknown to me, but rather 
that I could not be sure whether he would serve as a channel back to the campaign. Indeed, that 
he seemed to express some acquaintance with me made me suspect that I might have met him in 
connection with the campaign. That the road and its shops are places where such uncertainties 
prevail no doubt motivates the selection of these places as particularly risky for "speaking 
frankly." 
It is important to understand that this selection of roads as "public" is in no way 
motivated, let alone determined, by the very fact of roads. Rather, the road as a public 
thoroughfare must be understood as a complex social fact composed of historically specific 
routines of social practice in the road, zoning laws, and architectural patterns. In Kerala, some of 
the first struggles in the roads were struggles for the roads. In the late nineteenth century, the 
practice of caste unapproachability—in which those from lower castes were forbidden to come 
within a certain distance, or sometimes even within sight, of members of higher castes—was 
widespread in Kerala (Namboodiri, 1999). Those of the lowest castes, who were prohibited from 
allowing themselves to be seen by the highest castes, could only travel roads with great 
difficulty, calling ahead of themselves continually to warn any who might be coming the other 
way. Thus, even when they did travel the roads, the narrow linearity of the thoroughfare did not 
bring these bodies together. Instead, lower castes would step down from the road to let higher 
castes pass. When the lower castes began organize in opposition of caste discrimination in the 
early twentieth century, it is not surprising that marches were central to their politics; claiming 
the road was itself one of the most powerful assertions of rebellion (Lemercinier, 1984, p. 208). 
It is possible to see the arrival of publicness in the road more negatively, however, as a 
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story of walling off, rather than opening up. This was brought home to me when an older 
environmental activist and I were walking back to his home for an interview. On the way, he 
complained that the road was inaccessible in places because of ongoing construction to expand 
and pave it. But he complained even more that we had to use the road at all. When he was 
younger, he said, one could simply walk through people's yards. He spoke fondly of how one 
would greet and chat with one's neighbors as one went; in this way, he said, walking was 
productive of community. But now, he pointed out, nearly all of the yards in his neighborhood 
have walls or fences around them, barring passage, setting property off as private. This is true in 
Gandhamur as well. More affluent homes often had walls high enough to obstruct visibility from 
the road, but even smaller homes usually had stone walls, or at least a hedge or barbed wire 
fence. Like the old environmentalist, anyone over twenty could remember a time when such 
walls were uncommon, but few expressed such nostalgia—building a wall was considered 
essential to building a house, a powerful marker of social status (see Chapter 6). Thus, the 
indeterminate addressivity described here may still be argued to depend upon a certain logic of 
enclosure, but here we have the enclosure of domestic spaces against the mixing of the road, 
rather than enclosure of a public sphere against the heterogenous and interested relations that 
prevail elsewhere. 
The indeterminate addressivity of talk in the road can, then, be understood as both an 
architectural and ideological channeling of the more general condition of indeterminacy into 
certain communicative scenes. In this respect, the ideological mechanism is clearly the more 
potent. For while the road might be said to accomplish some mixing of nearly everyone in 
Gandhamur—and thus be a space in which anyone might overhear, the same cannot be said for 
the tea shop. After all, though Sujit considered his tea shop "public" (parasyam), it was not really 
  155 
 
so heterogenous as the road itself. In practice, those who enter the shop are only a small subset of 
those whom one might encounter in the road. In Gandhamur as elsewhere, women very rarely 
take their tea in tea shops, which are busiest in the morning hours when women are expected to 
be at occupied with domestic tasks. While male customers hold nearly the full range of class 
positions in Gandhamur, there are certainly far fewer representatives from upper tiers, who 
prefer to take tea at home. The youngest regulars are in their thirties, and the large majority are 
old enough to complain that the new generation only cares for beer. Thus, while opinion 
regarding the factory may be as diverse as anywhere, the range of people who might overhear 
these opinions is far from unbounded, at least in a demographic sense. Thus, as in Habermas' 
public sphere, the marking of certain communication indeterminate in addressivity did not 
require that communicative contact actually be unbounded.  
In Gandhamur, what I have called the publicity of the thoroughfare disconnects the flow 
of information and opinions from the notion of "speaking openly." Certain scenes of 
communicative contact are selected as public, but indeterminacy is everywhere, and information 
and opinion are understood to flow more freely through non-public channels than through  public 
speech. This is surely in part because it is in public settings—which are regarded as both 
ideologically and practically more open—that people are understood to be most reticent about 
their views. This reticence may be motivated in part by a desire to keep opinions from being 
known—as in the case of Sunil and I—but more often it is a matter of not disturbing social 
relations. As Sujit says, "Nobody likes people who talk about things openly."  
The staging of events in the road, described in the previous section,appears to run directly 
counter to this discourse of the dos and don'ts of publicity. Such events are explicitly designed as 
displays of "speaking openly in the open." To understand why the Action Council undertakes 
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this type of display, we need to look more closely at how campaign participants maneuvered to 
manipulate the multiple interested mediations of publicity in the road. 
4.4 Staging the people 
When Sunil and I arrived at the roadbridge, we were told that we had missed everything. 
The fish were still there on the bridge wall, short and long laid side-by-side in the midday sun, 
and they were putting out a cloud of raw stench. A crowd of around thirty people was there as 
well, not counting the many boys scampering down to the canal and back, shuttling more 
evidence up into the open light. It was Sunday, so the kids can stick around as long as they like, 
and no one was in too much of a hurry to slow their car for a look, and a whiff, as they passed. 
But everyone said the real action was over. Earlier, there had been TV crews from several major 
stations, and a couple of newspaper reporters to boot, but now they had all gone. Vijayan had 
been there as well, giving interviews, but he left when the reporters had what they needed. And 
government officials were not likely to come out on a Sunday. So, we were told, nothing more 
was likely to happen. 
But it was not long before another TV crew pulled up, and the whole scene surged with 
renewed energy. As soon as the cameraman and reporter stepped out onto the bridge, Rahul 
began to curse at them, telling them to pack up and go home; their channel never tells the truth 
about the gelatin factory anyway, Rahul said, so what was the point of even coming down here? 
The cameraman quietly went about his business, avoiding eye contact, but the reporter with him 
was not so unflappable. I never heard what he said, but in only seconds everyone standing 
around had converged in a ring around him, cinching him in. Those closest were shouting, while 
others elbowed in to get a view. Several smartphones hovered above it all, angled down at the 
action. 
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The reporter would not back down. He was from Kerala TV, which is owned by a news 
corporation that many in Gandhamur believed had not covered the campaign fairly. In answer to 
these accusations, he retorted that he had covered many people's struggles, but none where the 
people acted so badly. He accused the campaign participants of acting like hired ruffians 
(goondas). The more he spoke, the more the ring around him thickened and tightened.  
Vijayan arrived on his motorbike and forced his way through the crowd. Jaison, the 
politician from downstream village whose shifting role I described in Chapter 2, was close 
behind. At first it seemed that they were trying to restrain Rahul and quiet the crowd, but then 
they took up the quarrel themselves, accusing the reporter in much the same language as others 
had. The two men took turns holding one another back even as each performed ever greater 
heights of outrage. 
"Do you know who I am?" Jaison shouted, his huge white-clad form towering over the 
increasingly small-looking reporter 
"Do you know who I am?" snapped back the adamant man. 
Then, with no warning, Jaison spun around in fury. 
"Turn off that camera!” he shouted, and the ring of bodies broke as he charged through, 
one massive hand cocked to strike. He went right for Sunil, who stumbled backward, stuttering 
apologies and trying to hide the hand that still held our video camera. 
"I told you to stop sneaking around filming things!" 
Sunil was quiet as we pedaled home that day. I could find little to say myself. I was the 
one who had told him to film the argument on the bridge, but how could I have expected Jaison 
to take such offense? We were in the road, after all. There had been several people recording the 
action with their phones, as there so often were. Even the reporter's cameraman had had his 
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camera on his shoulder the whole time—I was sure he was getting everything. But I knew none 
of that would console Sunil. We went to bed that evening without discussing it and, the next 
morning, Sunil told me he did not want to go with me to Gandhamur anymore. 
But while I was preparing to set out alone, Vijayan called. He wanted to know if we still 
had any footage from the day before, particularly any footage of him and Jaison quarreling with 
the reporter from Kerala TV. I hedged, telling him that we still had some, but that we were 
planning to delete that footage because of Jaison's reaction. To my surprise, he asked me, 
instead, if we could make a copy for him. He told me that the Kerala TV reporter was spreading 
lies about how the struggle participants had attacked him, and they wanted to use the footage to 
prove that it was the reporter that had been in the wrong. Under Vijayan's guidance, Sunil made a 
CD with a selection of footage that was to the reporter's disadvantage, which was delivered to 
management at Kerala TV later that day. In the weeks that followed, Sunil and I were thanked 
countless times for recording the fight in the road that day. Jaison sung our praises loudest of all, 
telling everyone that if it was not for our video that reporter might have turned all the media 
against them. Thereafter, we were often asked to take video of important struggle events. Jaison, 
especially, had us record many of his speeches, which he would post to his personal website. 
For the Gandhamur struggle, the road is a site of both opportunity and risk. It offers space 
enough for a crowd to gather, but, more importantly, it is a space where a crowd can be seen. A 
primary audience for events in the road can be drawn from passing traffic, but there are also 
many secondary audiences. When TV crews came to Gandhamur, they tended to stay in the 
roads; they drove in, shot what they could, and drove back. Moreover, photos and videos of what 
happened in the road inevitably made their way to Facebook and YouTube, courtesy of the 
smartphones that were rapidly becoming ubiquitous among Gandhamur's youth. These 
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opportunities for mediatization—particularly by the TV news channels—accounted for most of 
the purpose of events in the road as far as many campaign participants were concerned. The real 
event was not the dead fish, nor the crowd, but the footage of both. 
Not all TV crews were alike; some could be expected to broadcast sympathetic displays 
while others were seen as corrupted by the influence of the company that owned the gelatin 
factory. Vijayan and Jaison often made phone calls to request coverage from their favorite 
journalists, but a dead fish in the sun will attract flies of all kinds. The Action Council put much 
of its energy into being seen, and a visit from a TV channel was generally seen as a victory. But 
displays were not only meant to attract attention; they were meant to attract evaluation. If the 
events in the road were not represented in the desired way—whether via newspapers, TV news, 
or social media—then mediatization had as much potential to harm the campaign as to benefit it. 
Thus, concern that the campaign should be seen positively led Rahul and others to attempt to 
drive the Kerala TV reporter away.  
Just as the publicity of the road is not merely a function of indeterminate addressivity, so 
the opportunities presented by the road are not only a matter of reaching a large audience. The 
road, as a public space, offered an opportunity for a particular kind of display. If the road was 
ideologically marked as a primary channel for indeterminate address, so displays in the road 
were also marked as displays aimed at an indeterminate audience—i.e., at the general public. The 
road, then, was a proper site for the performance of public appeals. It was, specifically, a site for 
the performance of a desire to address anyone who might hear. 
What makes the indeterminate addressivity of displays in the road powerful for the 
campaign is also what makes this addressivity dangerous for most other evaluative 
communication. Like Sujit, most people are cautious about making evaluative statements "in the 
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open," where anyone might hear. Open disagreement about controversial topics like the gelatin 
factory can disturb social relations. It is more prudent, most of the time, to avoid such topics, 
especially since one's opinions are able to move along other channels without the same social 
friction. But these high relational stakes also mark marches, roadside speeches, or displays of 
dead fish as communicative events of great import. They exhibit a willingness to disregard the 
risks of not tailoring one's words to one's audience. The campaign participants, we must infer, 
care so much about their message that they are willing to take those risks. They are willing to 
speak openly in the open. 
In other words, events in the road perform a certain brand of disinterestedness. Earlier I 
noted that speech in the road, as in the tea shop, is not by any means disinterested. Though 
addressivity may be highly indeterminate in these settings, actors respond to this indeterminacy 
by carefully managing their speech, or even becoming silent, not by speaking as if they do not 
care who hears. As should be clear from the vignette above, the same is true for events in the 
road. Campaign participants do care who their audience is, and who mediates their displays 
before that audience, and they do their best to manage whatever aspects of the mediatization 
process come within their grasp. Thus, at one moment Jaison wanted no more video, and at the 
next he could not seem to get enough. Nonetheless, the point of this management is to project an 
image of disinterested display—in this case, an image of outrage at the injustice of dead fish in 
the canal, an injustice that must be exposed for all to see. 
This performance of indeterminacy bears some resemblance to the indeterminate address 
of Habermasian publicity. When campaign participants take to the road, they enter a zone where, 
according to local language ideology, anyone might hear. By seeking out this exposure, they 
place themselves in the position of those who want everyone to hear—that is, they become those 
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who speak universally, not on the basis of ties to kin, friends, or neighbors, but simply on the 
basis of the justice of their cause. In other words, as in the public sphere, it is supposedly the 
very fact of exposure to an indeterminate audience that makes the speakers shed their own social 
particularity and present their cause in a universal way. They stand before the TV cameras not as 
particular people with particular social ties, but simply as "the people." 
Of course, as should be clear by now, the participants in the Gandhamur campaign are 
not disinterested, universal subjects. But the road affords them an opportunity to present 
themselves in this way. Laclau has pointed out that portrayals of the people are always 
misrepresentations; any collective actor, no matter how numerous its constituents, is always only 
some portion of the people, never the people as a whole (Laclau, 2005, pp. 71, 72). Rancière, 
reasoning along similar lines, argues that identification with the whole of the people could only 
be made by those "who have no part" (Rancière, 1999, p. 9). The people, he argues, are defined 
not be their particularity, but only "in the name of the wrong done them by the other parties" 
(Rancière, 1999, p. 9). Likewise, the Gandhamur campaign participants attempt to stand for the 
people not by virtue of large numbers but by stripping their appeal of particularity, presenting 
themselves exclusively as those wronged by the factory, by the state, or by certain news 
corporations. The place-based notion of "the people" described in Chapter 2 follows this logic; 
people's struggles are not identified with any particular party, identity group, or other particular 
interest, but as the political action of all those belonging to a particular place. And, following 
Rancière, they are those wronged by pollution, displacement—that is by the impact of some 
party upon the unmarked inhabitants of a place. 
To clarify this point, it may help to contrast the Gandhamur Action Council's events in 
the road with the road politics of Kerala's major political parties, which are capable of 
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orchestrating marches, rallies, and road blocks at a far vaster scale. Despite the involvement of 
large numbers in such events—sometimes flooding the roads of whole cities with bodies or 
calling a hartal to close shops and stop vehicular traffic across the state—they were often 
derided as the machinations of the party itself, as opposed to the actions of the people. Parties 
were widely reported to pay people to come to their marches. Likewise, those who enforced 
hartals were sometimes said to be hired goondas, or, alternatively, to simply be young party 
workers forcing the will of the party on the people. Whether one considered any particular party's 
demonstrations to be representative of the people's interests was largely dependent upon one's 
own party affiliation. But as noted in Chapter 1, everyone recognized a distinction between 
"struggles," (samaraṅṅaḷ), which connoted the road politics of parties, and "people's struggles" 
janakīya samaraṅṅaḷ. The prior were widely denounced as a nuisance for the people (janaṅṅaḷ), 
who needed to go places, while the latter were considered an exception—a use of road politics 
on the people's behalf, rather than at their expense.  
However, while "people's struggles" as a category are identified with the people by 
definition, any particular campaign must continually work to make this identification its own. In 
attempting to do so, the Gandhamur campaign faced accusations that mirrored criticism of party 
politics. The reporter for Kerala TV accused Rahul and others of acting like goondas, not as a 
people's struggle should act. Likewise, local opponents of the campaign also claimed that the 
Action Council were goondas and argued that all of the funding for the campaign was coming 
from outside the village, often from overseas. And, as discussed in Chapter 2, the company that 
owned the gelatin factory had argued that the violence by police was instigated by Maoists from 
outside the village. In each of these challenges to the campaign's authenticity as a people's 
struggle, an attempt is made to identify the Action Council with some group that is definitively 
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opposed to the people. In line with Ranciere's analysis, this is done by arguing that campaign 
participants are motivated not by the wrongs of the factory, but by some more particular interest, 
usually greed or vengeance. 
The notion that people's struggles do not represent any particular interest group—that 
they have the empty, unmarked subjectivity of the people as a whole—is, of course, what draws 
Sunny, Adarsh, and other Kēraḷīyam associates to work in solidarity with these campaigns. As 
noted in Chapter 1, Kerala's alternative leftist tradition has long turned to "people's politics" as a 
recourse from the party politics that dominates the state. For activists who define themselves not 
primarily by a particular ideology but, on the contrary, by a rejection of ideological dogmatism 
and the interests of organized groups, "the people" is arguably the only collective broad and 
empty enough to undertake positive social change. Thus, as shown in Chapter 3, Kēraḷīyam 
strips campaign participants of their partiality, rendering them only identifiable as those who 
belong to a place. At its heart, this conception of the people is founded on what I call an 
immediation ideology; a belief that certain semiotic processes happen without mediation 
(Mazzarella, 2006). The people respond spontaneously to their direct experience of oppression 
and rise up to lay claim to justice (for further discussion, see Chapter 7). For this reason, the only 
work remaining for activists like those associated with Kēraḷīyam is that of solidarity. 
And yet, inasmuch as an action council was really only ever a small group of particular 
people, not the people as a whole, solidarity organizers always found themselves working to 
ensure the immediate and disinterested response to injustice that could identify the part with the 
whole. In the interventions described in Chapter 3, solidarity organizers take themselves to be 
doing this work. As described in Chapter 2, it was the failure of the Gandhamur Action Council 
to adequately cooperate in this process that led some solidarity organizers to abandon the 
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campaign and question its authenticity as a people's struggle. 
With our analysis of politics in the road, we see that the Gandhamur Action Council, 
though it rejected many of the solidarity organizers' interventions, was still very much concerned 
to identify with "the people." However, unlike the immediacy and spontaneity of the imagined 
people, the Action Council was continually engaged in manipulating the multiple mediations 
required to display its authentic image as people's struggle before the public gaze. Staging the 
people on the roadbridge meant gathering a crowd and laying dead fish in the sun, it meant 
courting some journalists and cursing others, it meant shutting off a video camera one day and 
editing footage the next. At other times, it meant sitting in a tent, breaking a pipe, or even beating 
factory workers with sticks. But most of all, it meant ensuring that public displays of outrage at 
injustice must never appeared staged. Rather, what was said in the open must always appear to 
be said openly. 
4.5 Talking openly, talking in the open 
It is possible to view road politics in Gandhamur as simply another example of failed 
Indian democracy. Not only is the public sphere not set apart from the "pressure of the street," 
but the Action Council is apparently using that pressure (and, indeed, whatever pressure it can) 
to present itself as something it is not. More generally, the approach to publicity outlined by Sujit 
is arguably an excellent example of the insincere, interested communication liberalism wishes to 
expunge. Even Sujit acknowledges that this is not how "real gentlemen" talk.  
Be that as it may, if the publicity of the road is not the publicity of the public sphere, I 
would argue that this is not because public life in Gandhamur is unlike public life in Europe, but 
rather because the disembodied, socially unmarked, and purely disinterested discourse of the 
imagined public sphere is unlike actual public life anywhere. Indeed, in tracing out the 
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mechanisms behind the particular uses of roads practiced by the Action Council, I have aimed to 
suggest that the basic workings of indeterminate addressivity, if not the relevant ideologies, are 
much the same as elsewhere. My impulse to be careful about how I, or Sunil, talked in the road 
was not motivated by my appreciation of local practices, but simply by an intuitive sense of how 
things could go wrong. I would likewise suggest that we should not expect that indeterminate 
addressivity will spur people to speak openly. Surely, in a world where there are no absolutely 
anonymous and disconnected spheres of discourse, we would more likely expect people to be 
careful about what they say in public. 
But this is not to say that all public speech is disingenuous speech. Such a conclusion 
would not do justice to the dilemmas faced by participants in the Gandhamur campaign. The 
Action Council members believed in their cause. While taking the role of the oppressed people 
often required careful imagework, this is not to say that their attempts to do so were insincere. 
My use of theatrical metaphors here is not intended to suggest that they were simply pretending. 
Indeed, every indication during my years of studying this campaign was that those involved took 
themselves to be "the people," and self-evidently so. But communicating this to others, 
paradoxically, required them to at times hide certain things or present things as other than they 
were. 
The best illustration of this tension is surely Vijayan's own approach to the campaign. 
Counter to Sujit's view of Malayali culture, Vijayan frequently declared to me that, for himself 
and for the Action Council, everything was said openly (tur̤annu par̤ayuka). And he performed 
this openness in various ways as well. The day I arrived in Gandhamur for dissertation 
fieldwork, shortly after the police violence, there was a demonstration in front of the factory 
gates. Dozens of police were there, and I knew I was being watched closely. But Vijayan insisted 
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in putting me on the back of his bike and driving me to his new house. As we went, I asked if he 
was not concerned this would hurt the campaign's image. But he shrugged this off, saying that 
people would say what they were going to say. It did not matter what they said, he declared, 
because everyone knew the truth about the factory's pollution. 
And yet, as noted in Chapter 2, Vijayan and other leaders in the campaign did their 
strategizing behind closed doors. Even in the road, in the midst of an event, they could often be 
seen to step aside and speak in low voices. I remember one day not long after that first bike ride, 
when I convinced Vijayan to let me follow him continuously for an entire day. Up to midday, I 
got to ride behind him as zipped around on his bike and made one phone call after another. Then, 
without warning, he set me down at the struggle tent and rode away. When he returned, I teased 
him about ditching me. Not laughing, he told me, "for us, mind and speech are one.35" But in the 
evening, he tried to slip away again. When I convinced him to let me join him, he made me 
promise not to write about what we did. It was nothing very scandalous, but it was not meant for 
public display. 
Critiques of Vijayan as precisely not what he claimed to be—of avowing open speech in 
order to further his ruse—were internal to the politics of the Gandhamur campaign. Such 
accusations were the main stuff of my interviews with factory workers, but they were also given 
voice by some members of the Action Council. Solidarity organizers, after the split described in 
Chapter 2, commonly impugned Vijayan's sincerity, though they always maintained that there 
was a remainder in the village, the people, who were truly oppressed and would inevitably rise to 
challenge their oppression, even if the current campaign leadership was corrupt. Even Adarsh, 
                                                 
35 “nammukk manassum samsāravum onn āṇṇ” 
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who never went so far as to accuse Vijayan of deceit, nonetheless often said that his speech was 
like that of a politician. He knew how to craft words that suited his purposes, saying what 
sounded grand and leaving other things unsaid. 
Our analysis of politics in the road offers insight into the stakes in these concerns about 
instrumental speech, without taking us down the rabbit hole of accusations and counter-
accusations internal to the campaign's struggle to be seen as authentic. In their pursuit of the 
support of public opinion, the Action Council members were confronted with two imperatives 
that, although aligned in theory, often came into conflict in practice. The first was the imperative 
of the cause itself. Campaign participants were absolutely convinced that the gelatin factory's 
pollution was poisoning them and their children. They had long sought to stop the pollution and, 
by the time of my dissertation research, were committed to shutting down the factory altogether. 
The second imperative was that they represent themselves as "the people." They had to represent 
themselves to the whole community (i.e., the indeterminate public) as the whole community (i.e., 
as those defined not by caste, class, or organizational affiliation, but only by the harm caused 
them by the factory). As indicated in the previous section, the latter imperative meant talking 
openly in the open. 
However, as we have seen, the public thoroughfare is not a neutral space where the 
Action Council displays its oppression before a disinterested and impartial gaze. Rather, it is 
replete with particular, interested evaluations. The road does not sever the interested relations of 
everyday life, it only mixes them up with one another. The resulting indeterminate addressivity 
invites not candor, but careful management. And such management becomes all the more urgent, 
all the more careful, for Vijayan and the members of the Action Council, who understand 
themselves to have so much to lose. As Vijayan suggests, the campaign participants are 
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confident that, if all were fully transparent, there would be question about the justice of their 
cause. But all is not transparent. The mediations that make up the public are not neutral 
mediations. Therefore, though everything is done openly in theory, everything is not done openly 
in actuality. 
In short, the imperative of winning this particular people's struggle comes into conflict 
with the imperative of performing people's struggle authentically. At the same time, however, the 
former imperative can be taken to justify this contradiction. Conviction about the injustice of the 
harm done by the factory to the residents of Gandhamur is, at bottom, reason to break pipes, 
hound journalists away, or even—should it be necessary—to take up wooden sticks of their own. 
If the Action Council must take such steps to stage "the people," they justify this by the 
conviction that they are the people. Thus, Vijayan could at once claim that the campaign had no 
desire but to expose everything and also work, with great fervor, to manage the campaign's 
exposure. This included working to manage exposure to my own research, which, from the 
perspective of campaign participants, was a channel to addressees arguably more unknown than 
any others. 
In his challenge to what he considers the inherently oppressive communicative norms of 
the public sphere, Cody recommends further exploration of "the people" as an embodied 
alternative to the "unmarked citizen" of liberal democratic theory (Cody, 2015, p. 52). However, 
as analyzed in the context of road politics in Kerala, the production of the people, though very 
much embodied, shares with the public sphere theory many of the features of collective self-
abstraction that Cody and others find politically objectionable. Like the public sphere, the people 
is very much an "ideology that allows some people to speak for humanity in general" (Cody, 
2015, p. 51). Or, if the concept of humanity seems out of place here, we can say that the staging 
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of the people in people's struggle substitutes part for whole, particular for universal. Moreover, 
this misrepresentation is tied to a folk theory about indeterminate addressivity that, though more 
realistic than that of Habermas, nonetheless grounds the notion that to speak openly in the open 
is to shed one's concern for social ties. As Laclau (2005) suggests, such a bracketing, if not 
erasure, of caste, class, or other social particularities appears to be inherent to identification with 
the people. For the purposes of public appeal, the bodies that make up the people in the road may 
not be any more socially marked than the rational arguments that make up the citizen in the 
public sphere. 
What we have with the publicity of the thoroughfare, then, is not a coherent alternative 
program to that of liberalism and its public sphere ideal. Such a radical departure from the liberal 
imaginary could only be argued, I suspect, according to values that are radically 
incommensurable with those that inspire that imaginary. Our analysis of road politics in 
Gandhamur, to the contrary, raises many concerns—the difficulty of speaking openly in the 
open, the misrepresentation of a part as the whole—that are in line with those that motivate both 
Habermas' thinking and that of his critics. However, the thoroughfare metaphor, as elaborated in 
our analysis of people's struggle, treats some of these concerns from a different angle that both 
complements and corrects for some of the failures of liberal democratic norms. Chief among the 
corrections is a setting aside of the hope that the public sphere holds out for a segregation of 
reason from social embeddedness, candor from performance, ethics from politics. Publicity is not 
enclosure, but exposure, and public rationality must be sorted out in the mix of things. 
In this chapter, as in Chapters 2 and 3, I have introduced divergent but complementary 
approaches to conducting people's struggles, describing each as a pursuit in which ethics and 
politics were closely intertwined. In both cases, people's struggle provided inspiration and 
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opportunities for transforming oneself. Thus, Sunny became one who "stands apart and sees 
differently" and Vijayan became a leader of the people. But people's struggle was also a way of 
changing others, whether it was focused on promoting a broad framework for understanding and 
evaluating campaigns and protests or on gaining public support for shutting down a particular 
factory.  
In the next three chapters, I build upon this analysis to explore how the ethical 
dimensions of the activist ethics associated with people's struggles can contribute to a better 
understanding of ethics as a part of social life. I focus more closely on particular aspects of 
contention over ethical evaluation, asking how an evaluative acts carry force that can shape the 
actions and opinions of selves and their others. I begin, in the next chapter, with an analysis of 
what might at first seem a small matter—a negative evaluation of cookie eating by one activist. I 
describe how this evaluation exerts force not only on those who are inclined to accept it but, even 
moreso, by those who resist. In the mechanisms that make this evaluation of cookies persist, I 
argue, we can find clues to what makes ethics distinctive as a kind of evaluation. 
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Chapter 5: Sticky Ethics 
5.1 On the Road to Environmental Change 
It was late on the morning of the first day of the Dialogue Journey, a fifty-day trek 
through the foothills of Kerala, India's Western Ghats to raise awareness about environmental 
degradation. There were about forty of us, stretched out along the side of the road in twos and 
threes, keeping up steady conversation as we walked. Some of the younger participants stopped 
to buy snacks at a little shop beside the road. Soon, the twos and threes were drawing together as 
foil packages of cookies were passed from hand to hand.  
"Hey! One second!" Ali called out, coming back from the front of the march. He clapped 
his hands several times. Everyone stopped and turned toward him. As he made his way to the 
rear, a ring formed around him, blocking the road. Looking from one person to another, Ali said 
that the cookie eating needed to stop. He stammered a bit as he spoke, but no one cut in; there 
was no more chatter, no laughter, no crinkling foil. 
"I have seen many people here, even in environmentalist camps, saying all kinds of 
things about avoiding this kind of food. You've told me yourselves!!!...And yet you, all along 
this road, you are eating this stuff, eating sweets and walking along like this. All that has got to 
stop right now!" 
"Okay, okay." murmured Nishant, but Ali kept on. 
"It's because they see you doing it that the kids are doing it! Now these kids that never 
used to eat this stuff are starting up! So don't you make these kids bad! Us adults already don't 
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have good habits anyway; we're hopeless. So it's for the children! What we are doing here is 
trying to bring the little children along in a certain way. So if this is how we act, how is that 
right? If we lead them down that road? If you stop all this right now, that will be good." 
"Okay, okay, okay, okay," said Nishant, wobbling his head affirmatively as Ali returned 
to the front of the group. 
"There are plenty of cashew apples around," Ali called back over his shoulder, "Go ahead 
and eat those!" 
"Okay, okay." 
"They are just children, aren't they?" offered one mother with a small laugh. 
"It's not the kids—it's you!" Ali cried, loud enough for all to hear, "It's not right to scold 
children!" 
And with that, the journey began again. The bulk of the group moved ahead and 
gradually stretched out along the edge of the road. But some hung back for another bite. The 
remaining packages of cookies drifted toward the very rear of the group.  
*** 
What had just happened to cookie eating? During fieldwork, Sunil and I were often on 
alert for moments like these, in which seemingly trivial aspects of social life were suddenly made 
to matter in new ways. We paid attention partly because this is what the pursuit of environmental 
justice seemed to be about; activists were perpetually engaged in denying values held by those 
around them while also asserting the goodness or badness of things, like baked goods, that were 
not usually evaluated in such ways. This was the explicit mission of the Dialogue Journey—to 
use techniques of conversation to reorient the values of farmers in Kerala's ecologically fragile 
rainforests. But Sunil and I also paid attention for a more prosaic reason: we were anxious not to 
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get caught. The activists' concern with contesting the boundaries between the ethical and the 
nonethical made it difficult to know what might, in any given interaction, be invested with great 
moral import. Thus, we watched closely so as to watch our step, struggling to keep abreast of 
what had become an ethical matter and what was still just a snack.  
How do we know ethics when we see it? This is not only a problem for studies of activist 
ethics. As others have noted, clarifying the boundaries of the moral domain has been a challenge 
for the anthropology of ethics as well (Cassaniti & Hickman, 2014). In recent years, 
anthropologists have turned up all sorts of new moral and ethical things—not only values and 
codes, but moods and emotions, existential breakdowns, experiences, narratives, freedoms, and 
epochs. "Moral" and "ethical" have become very productive qualifiers, but what is it that makes 
all of these moral and ethical things deserving of the name? Responding to this problem, some 
have argued that stricter analytic boundaries must be drawn, so as to prevent ethics from 
encompassing everything (Beldo, 2014; Shweder & Menon, 2014). Others have argued that such 
approaches are likely to be overly narrow and have suggested that ethics is there to be found in 
every social act (Lambek, 2010; Merlan, 2010; Zigon & Throop, 2014). As with environmental 
activists, so among anthropologists the boundaries of the moral domain are contentious and 
uncertain. 
In the analysis that follows, I examine what happened to cookies on the first day of the 
Dialogue Journey in order to explore how anthropologists can clarify what we mean by ethics. 
Not, of course, because cookies are inherently ethical things—for most people in Kerala, most of 
the time, cookies can be better or worse in terms of taste or healthiness, or as a marker of social 
status, but they are not taken as good or bad in an ethical way. Rather, what makes the cookie 
controversy a good ethnographic puzzle is that cookies were not obviously ethical or nonethical 
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at the time. To be sure, I knew that "bakery items" could have negative valences for some 
Malayali environmentalists, and shortly before Ali's speech, another journeyer had complained 
aloud about cookie eating. But no one had paid her much attention at the time, and the snacking 
had carried on. What made Ali's speech notable was the shift it brought about—a slight shift, I 
felt, in the moral terrain. But then, how could I be sure?  
Was Ali's speech a "moralization" of cookie eating (Lempert, 2013) which effectively 
attributed ethical import to acts that, a kilometer up the road, had not mattered in that way? The 
difficulty of strictly labeling Ali's speech a moralization is symptomatic of a more general 
indeterminacy in pinpointing when ethical evaluation is happening. Nonetheless, the cookie 
controversy suggests one way to partially overcome such indeterminacy: attempts by some to 
deny or resist Ali's seeming ethical evaluation of cookies actually made the stakes in the cookie 
controversy more recognizably ethical. I describe this as a stickiness—a tendency of those who 
disobeyed Ali to evaluate themselves with reference to Ali's evaluation even though they 
disagreed with that evaluation. Such stickiness of accountability may be one sign that 
moralization is happening. Moreover, a close analysis of the processes that rendered Ali's 
evaluation sticky can also bring empirical clarity to key terms in existing proposals for how to 
define ethics. 
5.2 How to Spot a Moral Happening 
One of anthropology's long-standing contributions to the study of ethics has been the 
documentation of diversity in human values. Anthropologists have challenged unifying accounts 
of ethics in philosophy and psychology by presenting ethnographic examples that defy ethical 
categories that seem intuitive to Western scholars (e.g., Benedict, 1934; Douglas, 1966; Mauss, 
1967; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1985). Indeed, within anthropology, the basic intuition is 
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arguably that anything can be made a matter of ethical concern. Some have taken this great 
diversity to be evidence of the arbitrariness of ethical values, while others have continued to 
insist on moral realism or objectivity. Regardless of their positions with regard to debates about 
"moral relativism," however, anthropologists have often been at pains to avoid overly narrow 
definitions of the moral domain. Most often, the refrain has been: "this too is ethics." 
Ironically, this insistence on expanding the range of the ethical has been central to recent 
accusations that the old "Durkheimian" anthropology of morality conflated the moral domain 
with social life as such. On the one hand, earlier anthropologists have been criticized for 
following Durkheim in seeing morality in everything, thus allowing it to dissolve out of view 
(Cassaniti & Hickman, 2014; Laidlaw, 2014b; Robbins, 2007; Zigon, 2008). On the other hand, 
the basis of this problem has been described as an overly narrow focus on obligations (Laidlaw, 
2002, 2014b) and moral codes (Zigon, 2008). Thus, proposals for overcoming the so-called 
"Durkheimian collapse" (Cassaniti & Hickman, 2014) have sought to scout out new moral 
territory, paradoxically countering the alleged tendency to see ethics everywhere by uncovering 
it in an ever wider range of social phenomena. 
Unfortunately, major proposals for the new anthropology of ethics appear to reintroduce 
problems that are analogous to those that they criticize in Durkheim. For example, Laidlaw has 
proposed a Foucauldian/neo-Aristotelian anthropology of ethics as practices of freedom, which 
would make self-cultivation (rather than Durkheimian social coercion) central to ethical life. But 
even though Laidlaw insists that he employs freedom in a culturally-situated way (Laidlaw, 
2014a), others have taken issue with his placement of a core Western value at center stage 
(Keane, 2014; Robbins, 2009). Similarly, while Zigon's anthropology of morality is ostensibly an 
expansive project, he also makes Heideggerian existential comfort central to his conception of 
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ethics, describing it as the fundamental aim of all ethical life (Zigon, 2010; Zigon & Throop, 
2014). Certainly, both of these approaches have drawn attention to previously neglected aspects 
of ethics. But by making certain values or concerns fundamental to the very definition of the 
moral domain, these proposals prematurely constrict our view as well.  
Some anthropologists attempt to tackle this problem with definitions that specify the 
minimal formal features of ethical evaluation while allowing for maximal diversity of values. 
Thus, Shweder and Menon argue that reference to objective standards is a defining feature of 
moral judgment that sets it apart from other varieties of evaluation (Beldo, 2014; Shweder et al., 
1985; Shweder & Menon, 2014). A distinct but related proposal is that moral values are "goods 
in their own right," valued without reference to any further value as justification (Keane, 2016). 
Unlike the proposals above, both of these ways of delimiting ethics are agnostic with respect to 
the content of ethical principles and the range of concerns that can be related to these principles. 
One could conceivably take anything to be objectively good/bad, or good/bad in its own right. 
Moreover, both definitions build on key concepts from Western moral philosophy and are 
intuitive (if contested) from this point of view; they resonate with what "we" mean when we talk 
about ethics. In short, these definitions cover the kinds of diversity with which anthropology has 
been concerned while also distinguishing ethics from other evaluative domains. 
Difficulties arise, however, when trying to use these formal definitions to determine 
whether a particular evaluative act is "ethics." For example, it is difficult to determine whether 
Ali and others take cookies to be objectively bad or, alternatively, whether they consider cookies 
"bad in their own right." Part of the problem is that both of these definitions focus on the kinds of 
reasons invoked by a particular evaluation, leading us to ask, for example, whether Ali justifies 
his claim in terms of objective standards. But Ali is not very explicit about the reasons that 
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cookie eating is bad. His talk of wanting to "bring the children along in a certain way" may feel 
intuitively ethical, but he does not elaborate on why this "certain way" is good. The ambiguity 
here raises the question of how an analyst knows what reasons are being invoked in an 
evaluation and whether or not those reasons qualify as ethical. What would we have to hear in 
Ali's words or see in the reactions of those gathered around to recognize this as an invocation of 
an objective standard or an absolute good? Of course, one might argue that the ambiguity of Ali's 
reasons is a problem for our example, not for these definitions. But to limit ethical evaluation to 
the utterance of reasons having a particular logical form would be a narrow circumscription of 
ethics indeed; surely, this is not what the proponents of these definitions have in mind.  
The analysis presented here takes a related but somewhat different approach, inspired by 
Michael Lempert's insistence on the centrality of reflexive processes of "moralization" to the 
ethnographic study of ethics. By tracking processes of moralization, we can take ethics as an 
object of study without assuming where we will find it or what it will look like. Like the 
definitions tying ethics to "objective goods" and "goods in their own right," this approach 
circumscribes ethics formally without privileging particular topics or values as inherently ethical. 
But here, we are watching for a sort of social process or event, rather than a sort of reason. 
What sort of process should we be looking for? One way to approach this question is to 
take a close look at what seems (if only intuitively) to be an ethicalization and work backwards, 
asking what it is that makes this seem ethical. Through a close analysis of fieldnotes, audio, and 
video of interaction before, during, and after Ali's condemnation of cookie eating, I describe the 
contentious process by which the ethicalization of cookie eating was achieved, resisted, and 
overcome. I interpret this process in light of two years of ethnographic research among this 
group of environmental and social activists. The logic of such an account is limited; an analysis 
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of what makes the cookie controversy seem to be a moral happening cannot produce a claim 
about what is necessary and sufficient to ethics as such. Indeed, such an account is inherently 
dependent upon our pre-existing notions of what ethics is all about. Nonetheless, by indicating 
how key features of the cookie controversy speak to the notions of "objective standards" and 
"goods in their own right," this analysis helps to clarify what we might mean by "ethical import" 
and what the attribution of ethical import looks like in interaction. 
5.3 Was that Ethics? Authority and Reasons in Evaluation 
When we started out on the Dialogue Journey that morning, no one was talking about 
cookies—in moralizing ways or otherwise. No one seemed very concerned about food at all. We 
left without breakfast, trying to get a head start in a race against the sun. By around eleven 
o'clock, it would be too hot to continue on. The plan was to wait to eat until then, and at first this 
did not seem like such a problem. My body felt lean and light after a brief night's rest on a hard 
floor. But as we charged up and down the hills, the lightness in my stomach became more of an 
emptiness. Eleven seemed a long way away. 
Coming around one bend, I spotted a dozen of the younger walkers exiting a tea shop. 
They were mostly teenagers and twenty-somethings, accompanied by Benny (in his thirties, but 
still a bachelor), and Paulson, who was older. I was handed a piece of murukku, then a second, 
then a few fried chick peas.36  
"On this trip, using beedis37 or cigarettes or those kinds of things is not allowed, you 
hear?" Malik said to Rohit, wagging a scolding index finger in his face. Rohit grinned and broke 
open another packet of chickpeas. 
                                                 
36 Murukku is a crunchy fried snack. 
37 A beedi is a hand-rolled cigarette. 
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We hurried to catch up with the others, who had gotten far ahead while the young people 
were shopping. In addition to the chickpeas and peanuts, which people ate immediately, some 
had also purchased rolls of cookies wrapped in shiny foil. As we rejoined the group, these were 
broken open and distributed. Soon about half of the group was munching them, and many had a 
second cookie ready in hand. But as I came up alongside Jenny, I heard her complaining to her 
neighbor about all of these cookies being passed around.  
"What kind of Dialogue Journey is this?" she said, turning to address me and then turning 
again to those behind me. "We have only just begun and everyone has started eating cookies!" 
She raised her voice to complain to those around her. She said that cookies should not be 
eaten on a journey like this. Not only that, she said, but there are children in the group who do 
not even eat cookies at home, and now those that have purchased the cookies have gotten these 
children eating them as well. The people around her listened quietly, but no one said anything in 
reply. Foil crinkled as one man reached for another cookie. Jenny turned and made her way up 
toward the front of the group. The offers and acceptances of cookies began again in full force.  
"These aren't corporate cookies," said Benny, squinting at the fine print on the back, 
"These are our own indigenous stuff!" 
"Made in India!" a girl affirmed. 
"This really ought to be avoided completely, no?" said Manu. 
Laughter rippled through the group. 
"He says that as he takes a cookie!" 
"Avoid it!" commanded Benny. 
People pressed their lips to hold back the crumbs as they laughed. 
Moments later, however, Ali returned down the same path along which Jenny had 
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departed, cutting his way quickly back into the middle of the cookie eaters.  
"Hey! One second!" he called out, raising a hand in the air. 
*** 
If Ali's speech was an act of ethicalization, it was certainly not an isolated act. 
Considered in light of prior events, it is clear that Ali took up an evaluative position that was 
prepared for him by others. For example, his statement about the influence of cookie eating on 
children can now be seen to echo Jenny's complaint that people have given cookies to children 
who do not eat them at home. In this way, the events leading up to Ali's speech offer clues to 
understanding what the cookie controversy was about and whether it is well described as a moral 
happening or not. But the evidence here is not all on one side. On the one hand, utterances by 
Jenny and others link cookies to broader categories and principles that seem to support the notion 
that recognizably ethical reasons are in play. On the other hand, if Jenny invoked the same 
reasons as Ali but without effect, then to what extent is this event really about reasons, 
categories, or principles at all? Perhaps what is really at stake is Ali's authority in the group. If 
so, to what extent should we see this event as an ethicalization of cookie eating? The events 
preceding Ali's speech suggest these two possible interpretations of the impact of his speech and 
raise questions about the relation between authority and reasons in our conceptualization of 
ethical evaluation. 
The tension between these two interpretations was reinforced by interviews I conducted 
during subsequent days of the Dialogue Journey. When I asked journey participants what had 
happened and what it was all about, I received strong but conflicting opinions about whether the 
controversy had anything to do with ethics. For example, Bashir sharply distinguished Ali's 
opposition to cookies from the rule against smoking on the trip; the latter was about "values" 
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(mūlyaṅṅaḷ), he said, not like cookies. He said that he really had no idea why Ali had been 
opposed to cookies, but since Ali was the official "captain" of the march, that was reason enough 
to do what he said. On the other hand, Nishant—who had responded with "okay, okay" to Ali, 
but had also been among those to fall back and continue eating—stated quite explicitly that Ali's 
point was about "morality" (dhārmmikata),38 whereas he said his own refusal to stop eating 
cookies was about having missed breakfast. Such discrepancies in interview responses suggest 
that there was no uniform understanding of what the cookie controversy was all about. At the 
same time, these responses also indicate that a contrast between deference to authority and 
acceptance of moral reasons was important to how people interpreted Ali's actions and responded 
to them. 
More generally, a contrast between authority and moral reasoning was central to journey 
participants' ideals about how activism ought to be done. The Dialogue Journey was premised on 
the notion that environmental values could and should be promoted through a specific speech 
genre of "dialogue" (samvādam) that was defined by an opposition to authoritative speech (cf. 
Freire, 1974). In trainings leading up to the journey, organizers explicitly juxtaposed their vision 
for the event with another awareness-raising trek in the same region twenty-five years before. 
The Save the Western Ghats Journey, an inaugural event in the early history of Kerala's 
environmental movement, sought to raise awareness with speeches and poetry readings. In the 
Dialogue Journey, by contrast, activists would cultivate awareness by listening and asking 
questions. The motto of the journey became "the ear is our tool, not the mouth." This vision for 
                                                 
38 Nishant's use of this term was somewhat remarkable, in that dhārmmikata was most often 
used by environmentalists to talk of religious values (usually negatively), whereas they most 
often used Bashir's language of "values" (mūlyaṅṅaḷ) to speak of their own evaluative positions 
(see Chapter 1).  
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change through dialogue presupposed that ethical evaluation could be purified of certain kinds of 
authoritative influence. The Dialogue Journey aimed to help mountain residents come to see the 
importance of environmental conservation for themselves.  
The contrast between deference to authority and assent to moral reasons is a familiar one 
in Western thought and resonates with recent concern about the importance of freedom and 
reflection in ethics (Faubion, 2001; Laidlaw, 2002, 2014b; Zigon, 2008). Within the literature on 
defining ethics, we can find a related contrast in the argument that ethical evaluation is 
"objective" (Beldo, 2014; Shweder & Menon, 2014). Elaborating on this notion, Shweder and 
Menon argue that moral judgements are by definition, "impersonal/impartial," and tie their 
proposal to Henry Sidgwick's argument that to claim something is morally right is to claim that 
"it cannot, without error, be disapproved by another mind" (Shweder & Menon, 2014, p. 363, 
citing Sidgwick 1884, 27-35). In other words, the force of a moral claim is not, in principle, 
reducible to the authority of the claim maker. While not all subscribe to this view, the stakes in 
the study of ethics have had to do with giving greater emphasis to human concern with the right 
and good as opposed to "analyses that emphasize structure, power, and interest" (Lambek, 2010, 
p. 1). Anthropologists agree that the study of ethics cannot be purified of these other aspects of 
social life, but the latter terms have nonetheless continued to provide defining points of contrast. 
In examining a related tension between authority and reasons in the cookie controversy, my aim 
is not to disentangle ethics from these "others," but to trace their entanglements more precisely. 
The force of authority is not hard to see in the cookie controversy: people stopped eating 
cookies when Ali told them to and not when Jenny did, even though she had also pointed to 
impacts on children. But where does this difference in authority rest? Ali is older than Jenny, he 
is a man, and he bore the official title of "captain," as Bashir pointed out. All of these could be 
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important to why Ali's words were more effective. It is worth noting, however, that Bashir's 
interview was one of the rare occasions when I heard someone refer to Ali as "captain" without 
irony. He never used the title himself. Similarly, with regard to age, recall Ali's comment that his 
words were meant for adults because "it's wrong to scold children," a position that directly 
contradicts the usual intergenerational hierarchy in Kerala. Just as they resisted speaking 
authoritatively to those they sought to persuade, environmental activists also conscientiously 
sought to conduct their relations with one another in ways that resisted many commonplace 
hierarchies. This does not mean such hierarchies were not operant (just as a vision for ridding 
dialogue of authority does not mean that such dialogue ever happened on our journey), but it 
does pose a challenge to any straightforward account of social location in the force of evaluation. 
To understand Ali's authority, we might do well to look past the title of captain and ask 
how he became captain in the first place. Ali was not, technically, one of the organizers of the 
Dialogue Journey. He was asked by the organizers to act as captain because he was a renowned 
wildlife photographer and environmental essayist. Ali's role in the trainings leading up to the 
journey is telling. He took trainees on a walk into the forest. He had us take off our shoes and 
walk barefoot, the way he does on his own treks. He led us away from the path and had us sit on 
boulders in a dry stream bed, close our eyes, and listen to the forest. And he explained that 
because he has the forest, he does not need a church, a mosque, or a temple. In short, Ali was 
asked to be captain because his relation to the environment, and especially the forest, was an 
example to other participants. The social location that gave his evaluations force was, at least in 
part, his position as an exemplar with respect to the environmental values that the Dialogue 
Journey was meant to enact. 
Thus, while deference to authority may be part of the story here, the efficacy of that 
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authority was grounded in a recognition of values. Such value-based authority should not be seen 
as strictly separable, however, from other aspects of social location. With regard to 
intergenerational hierarchies, for example, Ali explicitly described his own leadership in the 
journey in connection with his age vis-à-vis many other participants. Although many adults 
participated in the journey, and the lead organizers were middle-aged or older, it was officially 
promoted as an action by and for youth. Ali told me his motivation in accepting the position of 
captain was a desire to cultivate the next generation of environmental activists. Indeed, he 
described this as the whole point for him; he never even bothered stopping at houses along the 
way because, he said, he was more interested in influencing young activists than local residents. 
But Ali's ability to wield influence was structured by his own ideologies about intergenerational 
authority ("it is wrong to scold children") and, relatedly, dependent upon the regard in which he 
was held.  
If Ali's authority was rooted in already salient values, might these values be the key to 
distinguishing what is ethical from what is not? Are there a set of principles or categories that are 
the ultimate arbiter both of who can assert ethical evaluations authoritatively and of whether 
cookie eating (or any other particular act or thing) is a viable object of such evaluations? If so, 
then we might interpret the badness of cookies to be a "moral badness" simply because cookies, 
or even food generally, are known to belong to a larger category of ethically important things. 
Even given the difference between responses to Jenny's and Ali's opposition to cookies, 
there are signs that, for some, cookies were already associated with a category of things 
prohibited on the Dialogue Journey. Malik referenced such a category when he warned Rohit 
about "beedis or cigarettes or those kinds of things." Notwithstanding the opinions of Bashir and 
others I interviewed that beedis, cigarettes, and cookies are not all of a kind, talk about the toxic 
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effects of "bakery items," refined sugar, white flour, tea, GMOs, or other comestibles was 
common in this circle of environmental activists. Moreover, to call these things toxins is not 
simply to say that they are bad for bodily health. Among the Dialogue Journey participants, some 
were practitioners of "natural life," prakṛti jīvitam, which takes the elimination of unnatural 
toxins, both in one's own body and in the wider world, as a mechanism for social transformation 
(see Chapter 6). A connection with natural life could itself be heard as echoing much longer 
histories of ethical concern with food, most proximally in Gandhi's experiments with diet (Alter, 
2000; Gandhi, 1954) and more broadly in the importance given to dietary distinctions in caste 
hierarchy (Dumont, 1970; Marriott, 1968; Srinivas, 1966). With regard to the latter, most 
activists were vociferously opposed to "Brahminical" notions of morally superior diet. And yet, 
one might argue that even when they repudiated dietary casteism, environmentalists reproduced 
an ethical concern with comestibles, only flipping what counted as good or bad. 
Despite all these seeming links with local ethical categories, ambiguities in the cookie 
controversy complicate this interpretation in two ways. First, even if there are echoes of 
Brahminism, Gandhianism, and natural life here, it is far from clear that this is what the cookie 
controversy is primarily about. There is no obvious connection between these themes and Jenny 
or Ali's arguments. As indicated by later interviews, this ambiguity was not mine alone. The 
conflicting interpretations I received from Bashir, Nishant, and others suggest that there may 
have been no uniform understanding of what had been at stake in the cookie controversy. And 
this points to a second, more basic problem: if the reason not to eat cookies was not simply a 
matter of taste or health, but has to do instead with caste status, or purity, or projects of social 
transformation, what is it that makes these ethical reasons? Thus, a turn to locally-defined ethical 
reasons, categories, or topics brings us back to the question with which we began: how do we 
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know ethics when we see it? 
But this does not mean that we are right back where we started. For one thing, we have 
established that even if authority is important in evaluation (as it clearly is here), this need not 
indicate either that a particular evaluation is not ethics, nor that ethical evaluation can be 
adequately described in terms of "structure, power, and interest" (Lambek, 2010, p. 1). 
Additionally, while we could not tie cookies to any stable local category of ethics, conflicting 
construals of the cookie controversy demonstrate that the participants in the Dialogue Journey 
did construct such categories and make such distinctions. For example, Bashir may not have 
thought that cookies had anything to do with values, but he made this point by contrasting 
cookies with cigarettes, which he said were definitely about values. The boundaries of ethics 
may have been contentious, but people did draw boundaries.  
The interview responses produced another insight as well. In analyzing transcripts, I 
found that it was often impossible to pull apart whether someone was talking about what they 
thought had happened, or what they thought should have happened. For example, reviewing 
Bashir's words closely, it was ambiguous whether he was saying that Ali had not attributed 
values to cookies, or whether he was simply saying that he himself does not think cookies are 
about values. Similarly, some interview respondents said that Ali had not made a moral claim 
because Ali, who is not known as a proponent of natural life, would not have said something like 
that. Again, these could be heard as opinions about what Ali should have said. Opinions about 
whether cookies had been ethicalized shaded into new assertions of the presence or lack of 
ethical import in cookie eating. Descriptions of what had happened were also continuations of 
the controversy.  
This points to a different approach to analyzing when ethicalization is happening. On the 
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one hand, the "about" of Ali' speech is fundamentally indeterminate because each new construal 
of the initial evaluation of cookies also had some limited power to reframe that evaluation as an 
ethicalization or not. On the other hand, this very process of reframing offers new opportunities 
for exploring what ethicalization looks like. Rather than asking about the authority of the person 
doing the evaluating, the values invoked, or the reasons given, we may do better to examine the 
effects an evaluation has on further interaction. In order to understand whether Ali's speech was 
an ethicalization, and what might make it recognizably so, we may have better luck exploring 
what happened afterward than what happened beforehand. 
5.4 Sticky Ethics 
In one sense, the efficacy of Ali's demand to stop eating cookies was extremely limited. 
Only moments after he turned his back, the crackling of foil could be heard again. To be sure, 
most of the group turned and followed him. But a small contingent of five or six hung back a bit, 
drifting to the rear and letting a gap open up between themselves and the rest of the group. When 
the others were at a safe distance, they began to share the cookies again, joking with each other 
about the scolding they had received. I was shooting video, while my research assistant Sunil 
was taking notes. 
"Open it! Open it!" said Nishant, "After this we won't want to buy any more." 
Laughter. 
"Let's just finish eating all of this," Raman agreed, "That's all I can say." 
"Hey look!" said Benny, pointing at Sunil, "He's writing names! He's writing down the 
names of everyone who is eating cookies!" 
Lots more laughter.  
"He's writing the names of everyone who's eating cookies!" repeated Ajeesh. 
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"Heh-heh!" Sunil replied, "And then I'm going to hand it over up there!" 
Ajeesh handed Sunil a biscuit. 
"Thank you." 
"From now on, only write your own name!" 
Thus, the cookie eating carried on, but not quite in the same way as it had before. There 
was a new zest in the sharing of cookies now, a new enthusiasm. Now the cookies were eaten 
with loud praise of their taste and complaints of dire hunger. The jokes were new too; they all 
played on the prohibition of cookie eating and the fear of being caught. Mock fear, perhaps...but 
then, why was everyone keeping so far behind? 
"Better if you go slowly!" said Benny to Paulson, who had just come up from behind 
with a packet of cookies under his arm. Benny handed him a cookie from his own pack, and 
pointed his thumb up the road, "As far as cookie eating goes, it's all swearing and yelling around 
here!" 
But Paulson appeared unconcerned. He was a generation older than Benny—older than 
Jenny and probably Ali as well. Already, in the few hours we had been walking, he had 
positioned himself as a bit of a maverick, stopping to visit nearly every house along the way 
while the others hurried on. Now, he laughed and opened up his own cookie package. He loudly 
invited the others to have some, and ignored their pleas to be quieter about it. Soon, he was at the 
center of the small group, handing out cookies as he walked.  
"These are arrowroot cookies," said Benny, "So it's okay. They aren't any of that 
corporate stuff." 
"So we can eat them, eh?" said someone else. 
More laughter. 
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"Hey! Hey!" said Benny over the laughter, "This approach, all of this promoting 
corporations, it is not right!" 
"Just eat them up, buddy!" replied Ajeesh, "Eat them up!" 
"Just for that, we're not giving any more to Benny!" said Raman. 
"However you like, eat them up!" said Benny, "When your stomach is totally empty, 
there are no corporations! No schmorporations either! Heh, heh!" 
*** 
At first blush, the continued cookie eating by this small group might seem to indicate that 
the force of Ali's words was felt more as a practical problem than an ethical one. Those who 
hung back and ate deferred to Ali's authority within the group, but they also disagreed with his 
evaluation of cookies. Perhaps Ali had not persuaded them to stop eating, but only that they 
would do best to stop eating in his sight. According to this interpretation, it might seem that the 
impact of Ali's evalution of cookies is wholly reducible to his own authority in the group; once 
they are out of Ali's group, the cookie eaters are also beyond the reach of his words. 
And yet, in their jokes, in their keeping quiet and hanging back, and in their talk about 
hunger and corporations, one can hear another impact of Ali's words. Ali's speech did not stop 
these few from eating, but it did change the way they ate. Even if they had split away from the 
larger group spatially, the cookie eaters' words and gestures were constantly positioning them in 
relation to that group. They were not merely "out of Ali's group" since maintaining a distance, by 
walking slowly and talking quietly, was a constant point of concern. Likewise, their jokes and 
invocations of hunger marked the separation between themselves and the others, especially Ali. 
In these ways, the cookie eaters linked themselves back to the rest of the group, reproducing the 
disapproval of their actions in the performance of distanciation.  
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There were two key ways in which the cookie eaters' discourse recalled Ali's words. First, 
the jokes and mimicry figured Ali's speech as a command to which they could be held 
accountable. Consider, for example, the jokes about Sunil writing all of their names in his book. 
Now, all of those present were aware that Sunil and I were conducting research, and even if they 
had only little understanding of our fieldwork methods, it was unlikely that they seriously 
thought Sunil was making a list of culprits. Nonetheless, the joke implied (even if only 
ironically) that cookie eaters could be held to account. Likewise, Benny's warning to Paulson to 
slow down, or the others' pleas to speak quietly—these all implied that Ali had drawn a line that 
was not to be crossed. The mechanism for the enforcement of this prohibition was unclear, other 
than Benny's warning about swearing and yelling, but the reluctance to walk with the larger 
group anticipated some enforcement. 
The second way Ali's words were recalled clarifies the sort of prohibition we are dealing 
with. With their talk of just finishing up the last cookies, being driven by hunger, and not eating 
"corporate stuff," the cookie eaters variously justified their eating to themselves. Pragmatically, 
justifications are often responses—they are second-pair parts of what conversation analysts call 
adjacency pairs, in which one turn at talk provokes the next (Keane, 2016; Sidnell, 2010). 
Accusations provoke justifications, and justifications recall the accusations that provoke them. 
Thus, in the ways that the cookie eaters justified their actions, we can perceive a sort of mirror-
image of the ways in which they took themselves to be accused. The image is clearest in Benny's 
multiple references to corporations, especially his statement that "promoting corporations is not 
right," which was closely followed by his equally blunt statement that "there are no corporations" 
when one's stomach is empty. In these two seemingly conflicting statements, he reproduced the 
accusation-justification pair whole, evoking the prohibition of cookie eating as a matter of 
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opposition to corporations. Less explicitly, we might see in Nishant's assurance that "we won't 
want to buy any more," the implication that at issue was the buying of cookies more than the 
eating. Or, from the appeals to hunger, we might infer that whatever the problem with cookie 
eating, it was taken to be reasonably excused by the need for sustenance. 
A quick glance at the transcript above reveals that Ali never mentioned corporations, nor 
hunger, nor did he say anything to distinguish buying from eating. However, the point here is not 
that the cookie eaters' justifications tell us anything about what accusations Ali actually made, 
but that they reveal how the cookie eaters took themselves to be accused. And the most crucial 
thing, for our purposes, is not to ascertain precisely the terms of these imagined, mirror-image 
accusations. Rather, the crucial point is simply that the cookie eaters took their actions to need 
justification at all. 
Why did they justify their cookie eating? As noted above, accusations provoke 
justifications, but here all apparent accusers—not only Ali and Jenny, but all those who seemed 
to have assented to the prohibition of cookie eating—were no longer present to hear the reply. 
Instead, the cookie eaters justified themselves to one another. In doing so, they not only recalled 
the accusation, as suggested above, but also implied that they themselves accepted the force of 
the accusation; they accepted that a justification was needed. One might say that they 
internalized the accusation. This is not a statement about their psychology. Instead, we can 
perceive how the accusation had become internal to their interaction, to their dialogue with one 
another, if not to their inner dialogue.  
The cookie eaters did not assent to Ali's evaluation in the same sense as those who 
followed Ali apparently did. They made clear that they believed their actions were justifiable. 
And yet, in the collaborative accomplishment of this justification, they also implicitly admitted 
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that cookie eating is the sort of thing that requires justification. Even when all enforcement of 
Ali's demand to stop eating cookies seemed to be in abeyance, the evaluative import of that 
injunction persisted. The cookie eaters projected Ali's speech as a counterforce—something that 
they disobeyed with their eating, undermined with their joking, and refuted with their 
justifications. But all of these ways of undoing the badness of cookies also revealed that there 
was something there to be undone. Something that stuck. And this stickiness made the 
ethicalization of cookies more apparent.  
To see what I mean, it will help to compare two short interactions, one that occurred only 
shortly after the vignette above and another that happened ten or fifteen minutes later. In the first 
interaction, a young woman was doling out cookies to those around her. Among them was 
Salman, Jenny's preteen son, who hung back with the cookie eaters but did not partake.  
 "Salman, [have a] cookie," she said, reaching the package out toward him. 
"I don't want any." 
"Huh? Come on, have a cookie." She said, reaching the cookies a bit closer to his face. 
"I don't like them." 
The others laughed and joined in urging him to take the cookie. 
"Come on, take a cookie," Benny said, "Your mom will not even know about it. She is 
not going to say anything." 
More laughter. 
"It's not my mother!" retorted Salman, "I just don't like that kind. That's all." 
Here, Benny's comment once again projected a prohibition of cookie eating into the 
interaction, interpreting Salman's refusal of the cookie offer as motivated by fear of being held 
accountable to that prohibition. The laughter and insistence of the others, moreover, singled 
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Salman out as deviant for not eating. 
Compare this to a brief exchange ten or fifteen minutes later. At that point, the cookies 
had been finished, and those who had fallen back to eat them together had split up. I found 
myself walking near Salman, who was alone, when Nazriya—who, like Paulson had been absent 
for the entire cookie controversy thus far—caught up with us from behind. The torn top of a 
cookie package glittered from her hip pocket. As she came up beside Salman, she pulled it out 
and put one in her mouth. 
"Want any cookies?" She asked Salman, who was walking beside her. Besides myself, no 
one else was close enough to hear. 
"What kind are they?" 
She held the package out to him with the label toward his face. 
"No, I don't want any. I don't like that kind." 
Nazriya took another cookie herself, and we walked on. 
This second interaction very likely would not have caught my attention if it had not been 
for all of the earlier cookie talk. As it was, however, I was watching closely for any signs of 
evaluation or judgement—anything that recalled the prohibition of cookie eating, as Benny had 
in his comment to Salman above. But I could not perceive even the slightest sign that any such 
judgement had taken place. This does not mean, of course, that neither Nazriya nor Salman were 
evaluating one another mentally; given Salman's earlier conversation with the cookie eaters, we 
have good reason to think that he, at least, anticipated some evaluation when he turned down 
Nazriya's offer. Perhaps his quickness to specify, "I don't like that kind," echoing his words to 
Benny earlier, was meant to preempt such an evaluation. But other than this, I caught no 
perceptible sign, in speech or gesture, that tied Nazriya's cookies to Ali's prohibition of cookie 
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eating or any of the ensuing evaluative position-taking. And since Salman and Nazriya must also 
rely on perceptible signs for any evaluating to transpire between them, I can well suppose that 
such evaluative positions were not part of this interaction. Eating cookies simply did not matter 
in that way. 
The contrast between these two cookie-sharing interactions brings ethicalization into 
relief. In both cases, cookie eating was an ongoing activity, but in the first case it mattered in a 
way that it did not in the second. To me, at least, it seemed to matter in an ethical way. Even 
though in the first case cookie eating was encouraged, the very act of encouraging Salman to eat 
reiterated the prohibition it purported to flout. Indeed, a sort of reversal occurred, in which 
Salman ended up justifying himself to the others for not eating cookies. In the other interaction, 
by contrast, it seems awkward to even speak of flouting anything, since cookie eating was never 
considered in light of any prohibition. In the second interaction cookie eating was nonethical in a 
sense that—despite open and enthusiastic enjoyment of cookies—was never true for the cookie 
eaters who split off from the larger group. 
Those who split off never achieved such nonethical snacking. None of their jokes, their 
displays of enjoyment, nor their justifications would allow them to eat cookies in the manner of 
Salman and Nazriya, in which cookie eating did not require any justification. Rather, as 
suggested above, their efforts to undo Ali's ethicalization of cookie eating actually made this 
ethicalization more perceptible and certain. In trying to remove cookie eating from ethical 
evaluation, they confirmed that cookies had been made objects of such evaluation, at least for the 
time being. They also revealed just how persistent such evaluation can be. We will consider the 
reasons for this persistence below. For now, the point is that efforts to undo ethicalization, and 
the stickiness that resists such efforts, are helpful indicators of where ethical evaluation is taking 
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place. In other words, they are part of the answer to the question of how we can know ethics 
when we see it. 
5.5 What Makes Ethicalizations Persist? 
One way to recognize ethicalization is by its peculiar stickiness—its tendency to persist 
in further interaction despite attempts to deny or resist a particular ethical evaluation. We can see 
similar examples of sticky ethical value in ethnographic accounts of moral transgression, such as 
London sex workers' attempts to resist "whore stigma" (Day, 2010), or in accounts of moral 
transformation, such as the struggle of the Urapmin to put aside ethical demands that conflict 
with their recently adopted Christian worldview (Robbins, 2004). In these cases, as in the cookie 
controversy, ethical import seems to confound resistance. Indeed, ethical import may be made 
more obvious by such resistance because—as we have seen in the case of the soft-speaking, 
slow-walking cookie eaters—stickiness is most apparent among those who struggle to get 
unstuck. The wriggling fly reveals the strength of the web.  
But what is this stickiness? In the cookie controversy, what persisted was accountability. 
Following Ali's speech, cookie eating was treated as an act to which one could be held to 
account. Building on Butler's (2005) work, Keane describes account giving as an act of ethical 
self-awareness most often brought about by the demand of an authority (2016, pp. 77-79). As he 
notes, however, ethics is not limited to such explicit, self-aware acts. Likewise, here the 
stickiness of accountability was perpetuated via semiotic processes that were neither fully 
explicit nor dependent upon the psychological states of those involved. 
To understand how accountability was made sticky, it will help to look again at the 
contrast between Jenny's original complaints about cookie eating and Ali's speech shortly 
thereafter. In initiating his scolding, Ali clapped his hands first and called out "Hey! One 
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second." The group, which had been strung out along the edge of the road, gathered to form a 
circle around him. Jenny, by contrast, spoke as she walked, turning to address those nearby 
without stopping them and gathering them together. The key difference here is not between 
Jenny and Ali's gesture and bodily positioning, but between the resulting orientations of attention 
in the group. Ali gathered the attention of the group, assuring that everyone heard and that 
everyone could see that everyone else was listening. In this way, Ali and those present co-
constructed a framework in which everyone was held accountable to Ali's evaluation in a way 
that was never true of Jenny's. Ali's evaluation was publicly ratified, constituting those who 
attended as accountable to the evaluation of cookies.39 
Although Ali gathered attention before he spoke about cookies, public ratification was 
not so much a precondition for ethicalization as a key aspect of how it was accomplished. The 
enrollment of those accountable to Ali's evaluation unfolded through an extended interplay of 
assertions and reactions. The formation of a circle, the silence while Ali spoke, Nishant's 
nodding and okaying—all of this constituted an attentional community of those whom Ali 
addressed and who conceded to be evaluated. Likewise, the care the cookie eaters took to 
maintain a distance from the rest of the group marked them as transgressors. Thus, even though 
their own evaluative utterances seemed to set them apart as a kind of counter-public, the cookie 
eaters were still internal to the public of Ali's scolding. Insofar as they hid their opposition to 
Ali's evaluation of cookie eating from the others, they affirmed that they could be held to 
account. 
                                                 
39 Warner (2002, p. 61) notes that, "Because a public exists only by virtue of address, it must 
predicate some degree of attention, however notional, from its members." My usage follows such 
Habermasian conceptualizations of publics (Cody, 2011b) in this key respect, but differs in that 
bodily positioning and other nonlinguistic signs are clearly important here while stranger 
sociality is not. 
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This connection between concealment and the stickiness of accountability can be seen in 
other contexts as well. The organizers of the Dialogue Journey, for example, had forbidden 
smoking. But many participants, including some of the organizers, were regular smokers. During 
the journey, they could often be found smoking around the corner of a house, behind a tree, or 
just outside a gate—always out of view. It was not that people did not know they were smoking; 
rather, keeping smoking out of view was a way of marking it as "unattended." We might think of 
this as the opposite of Ali's clapping. Heywood (2015) describes a similar situation in his 
account of Italian "double morality," a concept that condones transgressions of the Catholic 
moral code so long as those transgressions are "properly hidden." The notion of public 
ratification helps us to see why the Catholic Church is willing to look the other way. The 
withdrawal of transgression from public view can have the same ratifying force as explicit 
affirmation of an evaluation (cf. Warner, 1999). People might not obey the code, but the code 
sticks. 
Reactions to an evaluation can contribute to public ratification regardless of whether 
those reactions are motivated by reasoning, deference to authority, or even by accident or 
neglect. For example, given his later actions, we might suspect that Nishant's okaying was 
insincere; he may never have agreed with Ali. Yet, in public view, he conceded. Likewise, the 
cookie eaters may have fallen back in order to avoid the disapproval of others (e.g., out of 
shame) or in order to blunt inner disapproval, or guilt. As noted above, the ways they justified 
themselves made the prohibition on cookie eating internal to their interaction, but that does not 
necessarily mean that it had a particular psychological effect. For our purposes, the effects that 
matter—the effects described above as stickiness—are the material signs by which 
accountability was made perceptible. Public ratification operated at this level regardless of how it 
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was felt by those involved. 
The disconnect between public ratification and reasons points to what taking something 
as "good in its own right" might look like in interaction. The fact of ratification makes further 
questions about the reasons for an evaluation beside the point. To say that everyone assented to 
be accountable to the injunction against cookie eating is also to say that no one required further 
reasons for this injunction. Not that no further reasons could be stated, but, for the time being, no 
one asked for them. Cookie eating was accepted to be bad in its own right. 
A second mechanism contributing to stickiness, by contrast, brought reasons back into 
the picture. The cookie eaters did not just hide their transgressive acts; they justified their 
transgression to each other while they were hiding. In doing so, the cookie eaters showed that 
giving adequate reasons for cookie eating was important even when they were not at risk of 
social sanction by Ali or others. The cookie eaters were trying to "get away" with cookie eating, 
but they also cared about getting away with it for the right reasons. As such, they gave the cookie 
controversy new stakes. If the ethicalization of cookie eating was initially a matter of 
accountability to Ali, it was now a matter of accountability to reasons. 
Note that what was perpetuated by the cookie eaters' justifying was not the badness of 
cookies, but merely that eating cookies required justification. When they teased Salman for not 
partaking, they seemed to have succeeded in making bad into good and good into bad, but they 
still played the moral game. This is different from what Robbins (2004) describes among the 
Urapmin, whose Christian conversion made old taboos sinful, but who still felt the need to 
justify themselves to the deities who had established these taboos. The badness of taboo acts, 
even when denied, still stuck. The stickiness of cookie eating is more like what Day (2010) 
describes among UK sex workers who, in seeking to justify their occupation, employed the same 
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ethical distinctions between love and money that had been used to condemn them. Such 
justifying moves may succeed in challenging dominant evaluative positions while still 
perpetuating the notion that sex, or eating cookies, are fundamentally ethical acts. 
The justifying utterances of the cookie eaters offer a new perspective on the notion of 
ethical values as "objective." Those who shirked Ali's demand construed cookie eating as 
objectively important in the sense that it required an account even when Ali was not around. We 
have no recourse here to an explicit local theory of objective value of the sort Shweder and 
Menon claim is widespread. But by making justification internal to their dialogue with one 
another, the cookie eaters implicitly attributed the goodness or badness of cookies to a logical 
relationship between reasons, rather than a relationship between people. Reasons were taken to 
have an authority of their own. 
Taking public ratification and justification together, we have a description of stickiness 
that incorporates much of what notions of "goods in their own right" and "objective values" 
convey. Despite ambiguity of reasons, public ratification rendered cookie eating bad for the 
participants of the Dialogue Journey. At the same time, the justifying utterances of the cookie 
eaters rendered the moral import of cookies "objective," in the sense that they took themselves to 
be accountable to the authority of reasons and not only to the authority of persons. Ali's 
evaluation of cookie eating was not taken to need justification, but it did demand justification 
from those who ate. This made the cookie controversy seem important in a specifically ethical 
way. 
5.6 A Barbed Affordance 
Two weeks later, some of the younger participants in the Dialogue Journey stopped to 
rest in the shade of a large bodhi tree. Milo, about fifteen but tall for his age, came across the 
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road with a yellow package of cookies gleaming in his hands. He tore open the package and 
asked if anyone wanted any. Immediately, he was pounced upon from all sides, small hands 
reaching up on skinny arms to accept the next cookie in the roll.  
"Hey! We should not be eating cookies!" 
This was Benny, once again one of the oldest in the group. He wagged a scolding finger 
high over his head. 
"That's a corporate thing!" he said, "In there is white flour, sugar..."  
And he began counting off all of the bad ingredients on his fingers. For a moment, things 
seemed uncertain. The childrens' hands still reached, vying for position, but many of their faces 
were turned toward Benny. 
"You shut up!" shouted Fathima, who was only a little younger than Benny, and she 
cocked her arm to smack him as she took the next cookie from Milo's hand. Benny launched into 
a rant about how the cookies were going to rot all of their stomachs, but Fathima would have 
none of it. 
"Don't give any to Benny!" she cried. Benny, still scolding, made a grab for the cookies, 
and Fathima threw herself in his way. A short scuffle ensued, and much laughter. At last, Benny 
got his cookie. He whisked it through the air and snorted on it with one nostril, as if performing 
magic over it. 
"That will remove all the badness in the cookie!" he cried and, still laughing, popped it in 
his mouth. 
*** 
Had Benny at last removed the badness of the cookie? Perhaps. Certainly Benny's 
invocation of the cookie prohibition had a different tone, and very different effects, than Ali's 
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earlier scolding, or even the jokes made among the cookie eaters just after that scolding. What is 
most interesting, however, is that it was Benny who repeated the prohibition, even in mimicry. 
For Benny, the prohibition was still publicly present—still available to be troped on. His warning 
about rotting stomachs even echoed some of the phrasing Jenny had used. But it was not clear 
that anyone but Benny caught this interdiscursive link. Many of those beneath the bodhi tree had 
not been present on that first day. Among those who had been there, no one else indicated any 
recognition of a connection between the two events. The public life of the ethicalization of 
cookies seemed to have withered away. But the incident still seemed to stick with the one person 
who had always been most keen to resist it. 
There is nothing deterministic about this stickiness. Even the recognition of Ali's 
concerns as ethical was contingent upon uptake thereafter. Nonetheless, the ethicalization of 
cookies, once set in motion, took on a kind of force of its own—not a sui generis force, but a 
momentum sustained by the demand to account for oneself. As an affordance, one might think of 
the ethicalization of cookies as barbed—though never determining uptake, it had a way of 
catching hold and continuing to be consequential in further interaction. Like a porcupine quill, 
the more one worried it, the further it worked its way in.  
In this sense, what we have called stickiness could also be seen as an expansive tendency. 
While I have used the term "public" to describe a set of people taken to be accountable to an 
evaluation, some philosophers have argued that properly ethical claims hold not just for some 
people or some situations, but for anyone at any time (Kant, 1998; cf. Williams, 1985). 
Habermas (1989) uses the term public to describe a social group that is potentially unbounded, or 
universal, even if always limited in actuality. In our analysis, the public reach of the 
ethicalization of cookies was limited in the first instance to those addressed by Ali and, 
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thereafter, to those who positioned themselves as requiring justification for their cookie eating. 
Nonetheless, the ethicalization could be extended and, as we have seen, once extended had a 
tendency to persist. Thus, a potential universality might be found not so much in the a priori 
applicability of an evaluation to all possible actors, but in the openness of extension to new 
actors and the difficulty of retracting an ethicalization once it gets its hooks in. 
Describing ethics in terms of freedom or unfreedom would miss important aspects of how 
the sticky force of ethicalization works. After all, eating or not eating cookies might be seen as 
an exercise of freedom in the case of Ali, who condemned; Bashir who obeyed; Johnson, who 
shirked unabashedly; or even Benny, who shirked in hiding. But as suggested by the metaphor of 
stickiness, the ethicalization of cookie eating is also a story about unfreedom because it 
demonstrates the limits we have in choosing our values even when we choose our actions. For 
my research assistant Sunil and I, such unfreedom was often palpable in our interactions with 
environmental activists, many of whom described their work for moral transformation as an 
exercise of freedom. More often than not, Sunil and I were the shirkers. All along the Dialogue 
journey, we looked for opportunities to slip away for a cold soda or dine in an AC restaurant. 
And even when we were not spotted and were firm in our convictions that a soda was not a bad 
thing, we felt that we were never really free. Regardless of the freedom of our choices, the terms 
of accountability were not our own. 
Stickiness offers one approach to the problem of how anthropologists can know ethics 
when they see it. Tracking processes of public ratification and justification can help us to identify 
how certain evaluations define the terms of accountability while others do not. "Stickiness" of 
accountability is not a defining feature of a new analytic, on par with "objectivity" or "goods in 
their own right." Rather, stickiness is one way in which these existing notions of what is specific 
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to ethics can be recognized in social interaction. Watching for stickiness can aid anthropologists 
in tracing ethicalization and de-ethicalization as contentious, open-ended processes. It can also 
help us to better describe how ethical evaluations can be compelling even when those involved 
would seem to prefer otherwise. 
In this chapter, I have zeroed in on one moment of evaluation and traced its consequences 
in order to minutely explore what gives force to ethical evaluation. In the next chapter, I examine 
explore how evaluative force shapes the social relations of activists who seek to wield it in 
pursuit of social change. As I have described earlier, for activists associated with Kēraḷīyam, 
adopting and enacting radically "alternative" ethical positions on aspects of everyday life is 
understood to be a primary mechanism for making social change. We have already explored 
some of the consequences of this scaling of activism, which renders every campaign an 
equivalent instance of "people's struggle" (Chapters 2 and 3), every relationship an opportunity 
to challenge social hierarchy (Chapter 3), and every trip to the vegetable shop (Chapter 1) or 
snack shop (this chapter) a moment of moral choice. In the coming chapter, we will examine the 
effects of such activism on the lives of individual activists and explore the resulting dilemma, 
which I argue is fundamental to what it means to be an activist. At the same time, by highlighting 
tensions between ethical positioning and other aspects of social relations, this chapter helps to 
describe the place of ethics within social life. 
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Chapter 6: Consistency and Compromise 
6.1 Out of Place 
One Sunday night in December, Sunny invited Adarsh, Faiza, and me out for a movie. I 
say "invited," but when Adarsh finally arrived, looking haggard and grim, he told me that he had 
not really been given any choice. As usual, that month's Kēraḷīyam magazine was way behind 
schedule and Adarsh, the magazine's assistant editor and only paid staff member, had wanted to 
work through the night. But Sunny was managing editor, and tonight he had insisted that we all 
go out. After a heavy dinner of chicken curry and buttermilk, we walked to a nearby theater. 
As soon as we came into the lobby, a strange smile lit up Adarsh's face. The fatigue 
around his eyes was replaced by an eager curiosity. He walked up and down, gazing around as if 
he had entered a new world. Watching the people crowding in for the next show—mostly 
teenagers in jeans and t-shirts—he told me that, here, it was as if he too was an anthropologist. 
"It's really a whole different culture," he said. 
This was his first visit to a "cinema complex," Adarsh told me; otherwise he had only 
been to " sādhāraṇa theaters.” To be honest, I am not entirely sure how this theater was all that 
different from the one in our town, which Adarsh and Faiza went to regularly; that was smaller 
and older, but it also had air conditioning for at least one of its two screens. But this term, 
sādhāraṇa, "common" or "ordinary," stuck out for me because Adarsh and other environmental 
organizers often use a related term to distinguish themselves, pravarttakar (“activists,” see 
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Chapter 1), from the common people, or sādhāraṇakkār.40  Indeed, here again, Adarsh was 
making such a distinction, marking his difference from the others in the theater lobby, but this 
time sadharana was on his side of the fence. Or was it? Because he had only been to ordinary 
theaters, Adarsh seemed to be saying, he was not ordinary here; he was out of place. 
Adarsh roamed around the lobby with his little daughter in his arms. He held her up to 
touch the ornaments on a huge plastic Christmas tree, and they took terms batting at the 
inflatable Santa that stood beside it. He seemed to be having fun. But he also said he was 
uncomfortable—that it was too cold—and after a little while he began holding his handkerchief 
over his mouth. He looked over at the large snack counter, with its huge glass case and neon 
lights, and asked aloud whether they might have tea there. 
"No, they only have these corporate drinks, like Coca-Cola and Pepsi," said Sunny's wife 
Maya, "It's very bad." 
*** 
Living with Faiza and Adarsh, I was often aware of the many ways they found 
themselves out of place. In some sense, this was simply a part of what they were up to as 
organizers (pravarttakar); they set out to be different from those around them, changing 
themselves as one way of changing their world. It was not simply class or social background that 
made Adarsh a stranger at the movie theater. He was not simply uncomfortable because he had 
                                                 
40 The term sādhāraṇakkār was used by pravarttakar in two ways, both of which marked a 
contrast between these two terms. On the one hand, sādhāraṇakkār was used interchangeably 
with janaṅṅaḷ, the "people," who were understood to be oppressed by corporations and the state, 
and on whose behalf these pravarttakar took themselves to be working. On the other hand, 
sādhāraṇakkār was also used to mean specifically the middle classes, who lived the kind of 
"ordinary" life that these pravarttakar saw as perpetuating social inequality and environmental 
destruction. Note that the contrast between these two meanings of sādhāraṇakkār mirrors the 
tension described in this chapter between working among others and setting oneself apart. 
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never been in air conditioning. He and Faiza avoided these kinds of places because they did not 
like them, and they did not like them because they were against air conditioning, against giant 
huge concrete theaters and malls, and against "corporate drinks.” They and other environmental 
organizers I studied often avoid air-conditioned spaces, just as they avoid using Western 
medicine, eating white sugar, or building lavish houses. As we will see below, some avoid not 
only Pepsi and Coca-Cola, but even tea, regarding it also as too corporate to drink. All of these 
practices set organizers apart from those around them, making them out of place in many of the 
settings of everyday life. And from this standpoint, it may seem that those comfortable in these 
settings, the sādhāraṇakkār, have a whole different culture. 
Or do they? The alterity Adarsh experiences in the theater lobby is certainly not the 
product of an encounter with an entirely unknown social world, the sort of encounter that was 
once taken to be the starting point for anthropological research. Adarsh is different from those in 
the theater lobby not because he has never been to such a place before, but because of the ways 
that he has distinguished himself from these sorts of people by, for example, avoiding places like 
this. One might say that Adarsh is out of place not because he is from another place, but because 
of the ways he enacts his opposition to this place. Below, I will return to the question of how the 
act of evaluating some object (e.g., opposing a theater or a corporate drink) can have 
consequences for one's "placement" with respect to others, a problem that has been described by 
language researchers as alignment or disalignment of evaluative stance (DuBois 2007). For the 
moment, however, it is enough to observe that, for Adarsh and other environmental organizers, 
opposition to such things as theaters, air conditioning, or Pepsi is often experienced as far more 
than a mere difference of opinion; it may be taken as the foundation for the bounding of social 
worlds. 
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The explicit, principled positions that Adarsh and other organizers adopt on relatively 
ordinary aspects of everyday life draw attention to how the ways one "places oneself" ethically 
may come into conflict with other ways of relating. Often, these are activities or aspects of life 
that most Malayalis do not take to matter in ethical ways at all; they may be part of the 
background to ethical considerations, but are not of any concern in and of themselves. But for 
those who desire major social transformation, the very ubiquity of some practice or thing may 
make it an apt target for strong opposition, a lever by which to unsettle ordinary life at its very 
roots. Thus, the "different culture" of organizers like Adarsh can make them not only out of 
place, but also chronically at odds with those around them. This is a problem for organizers 
working on projects of social change because it can distance them from the very people they 
hope to organize. In short, the uncommon positions environmental organizers take on common 
aspects of their social worlds can make it difficult for them to live in common with others. They 
become out of place in the very worlds in which they hope to be effective agents.  
This chapter argues that organizers, in attempting to change common things, encounter 
conflicts between setting themselves apart and sustaining relations to common people. On the 
one hand, they seek to make themselves different from those around them. On the other, they 
cannot change others if they cut themselves off from them entirely. I compare stories from the 
lives of two environmental organizers who approach this tension differently: Adarsh, who tends 
to compromise, and Hari, who tends to stand fast. In the first section, I analyze the logic by 
which Hari and Adarsh come to take tea drinking—one of the most common accompaniments of 
face-to-face interaction in Kerala—to be ethically unacceptable. I then explore why such 
opposition to ordinary things produces a dilemma between amiable relations with others and 
consistency with oneself. In the second section, I describe Hari's and Adarsh's contrasting 
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responses to this dilemma. Hari's cosmological approach attempts to reorganize the world to 
maximize consistency with his values, whereas Adarsh's approach compromises consistency in 
favor of sustaining relations with others. Ultimately, both organizers are forced to give 
something up in the process—either lose friends and kin, or live inconsistently. 
6.2 VapoRub to Tea: Radical Living and the Ethical Evaluation of Ordinary Things 
It was, I expected, my last chance to interview Adarsh. We had lived together for over a 
year and had talked daily about Kēraḷīyam magazine, where he was editor, about the ongoing 
protest against the gelatin factory in Gandhamur, about the history of the concept of "people's 
struggle"—about all of the things my imagined dissertation was supposed to be about. And yet, 
perhaps because we talked so much of those things, there were still many things—more personal, 
everyday things—that remained unasked. There was, for example, the matter of Vicks VapoRub. 
I knew that Adarsh thought VapoRub was bad because he had told me not to use it, and yet he 
seemed to constantly be rubbing it into his temples and forehead. Why? My question made him 
grin. He sniffed once and told me frankly that he could not manage to stop. But then, it was not 
VapoRub he started talking about, but tea. 
"It's not a problem of stance," he said, "It's because I cannot manage to do it. It's like 
people say about the matter of tea. Should we drink tea? Or should we just say no to discussion? 
It came up in Mohandas' program, didn't it? We have a political stance about that, but I cannot 
manage to do it." 
The way Adarsh put this surprised me, and it stuck with me. What I found striking was, 
first, that Adarsh even recalled this brief part of a discussion at Mohandas' One World University 
ten months before. I remembered it too, but mostly because at the time I had remarked on how 
quickly Hari's denunciation of tea, which Adarsh paraphrased now, had been set aside. No one 
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seemed to think it a big deal then, and yet, when asked to evaluate his own actions, Adarsh had 
immediately brought it to mind. I had not even asked about tea.  
But, as Adarsh continued talking, I found something else even more striking: though he 
admitted tea drinking was wrong, he made no attempt to justify his habit in terms of some higher 
value, nor excuse himself from responsibility.  
"What Jyothi wrote is correct," he told me, talking about an article calling for an end to 
tea drinking, which he had published in Kēraḷīyam, "But I cannot manage to do it. I don't have 
that much...what to say? I don't have the determination. I don't have enough power to say no." 
*** 
In this section, I analyze how certain actions that are ethically neutral for most Malayalis, 
like using VapoRub or drinking tea, are made ethically problematic by environmental organizers 
such as Hari and Adarsh. Delving further into the problem of tea drinking specifically, I 
investigate how this quintessentially ordinary part of Kerala social life becomes ethically "bad" 
for both Hari, who renounces it, and Adarsh, who practices it frequently. To do so, I go back to 
the discussion of tea Adarsh references above and consider Adarsh's description of his own tea 
drinking problem in light of Hari's speech. I describe a particular vision for social and 
environmental transformation in which changing the world is taken to require changing oneself. 
Approaching change in this way, I argue, collapses scales of social action such that in each cup 
of tea there is both an opportunity and an obligation to challenge injustices that pervade the 
social order as a whole. This example illustrates how otherwise ordinary things become targets 
of principled opposition for environmental organizers, making them "out of place" with respect 
to others and setting the stage for the tension between consistency and compromise explored in 
greater detail in the remainder of the chapter. 
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6.3 Making Tea Drinking Bad 
Hari's denunciation of tea drinking happened about ten months before my interview with 
Adarsh, and it happened, fittingly, just after we had all returned from a tea break. It was the first 
day of the first session of the One World University, a series of seminars on philosophy, values, 
and social transformation organized by Mohandas. Since early morning, Mohandas had been 
explicating the concept of alienation, illustrated on a nearby chalkboard by a circular diagram of 
the dual division of humanity from nature and man from woman, complemented by a short list of 
institutions that perpetuate alienation: capitalist politics, family, religion, and modern science. As 
Mohandas explained at our arrival the evening before, those gathered here were selected because 
they had already reached a certain level of "awareness" (bōdham) of the problems with such 
institutions and are active in challenging them; thus, they are ready to appreciate his own call for 
re-integrating the social into one world.41  Nonetheless, as the morning wore on, eyes began to 
wander and heads began to nod. Everyone seemed relieved when, at last, the call for tea break 
came from the dining hall. And over little glass cups of sweet, milky tea, talk became more lively 
again. By the time we returned, Mohandas and Salim had to clap to get people to quiet down. 
Everyone seemed to have had enough of lecture, but they were eager to get on with discussion. 
Mohandas asked Hari to start things off. 
  
                                                 
41 For a more thorough discussion of the concept of bōdham among the organizers described 
here, as well as the related practice of bōdhavalkaraṇam, or "raising awareness," see Chapter 2. 
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Figure 7: Photo and sketch of Mohandas' analysis of alienation 
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After a short silence, Hari began a speech that, at first, seemed to begin exactly where 
Mohandas left off. With his first words, he stated that we could expect those gathered here to 
have an awareness with regard to "all of this," verbally pointing back to all that Mohandas had 
said before, all of the stuff on the chalkboard. He stated simply that, since everyone was clear on 
what these larger problems were, the real question was "what should be done.” And for this 
question he immediately proposed an answer. Social change calls for "internal transformation," 
he declared, saying, "There is the question of whether we, each and every individual, are ready. 
That question is there for me too! The issue is: 'How much can someone do?'" 
And then Hari gave an example that made this point far more pointed. He gave the 
example of taking a tea break during a discussion about social transformation. As soon as he 
uttered the word "tea," there was tittering around the room, but Hari pressed on. 
"At one recent camp42—at the camp I went to last week, they were also doing just that. A 
whole lot of this sort of discussion. Very minutely, we would discuss all about changing each 
and every one of ourselves. But without having a drink of tea, our condition was that we could 
not continue with the discussion!"  
Looks cut across the edges of the circle and grins broke out all around. But Hari only 
seemed to grow more insistent in response, speaking obliquely about the "perspective among 
some" that such things as tea are "insignificant," while for others with a more "detailed 
perspective," tea drinking is a very big teṯṯ, a word that can sometimes mean something like 
                                                 
42 "Camps" or "gatherings," (kūṭṭāymakal) are an organizing tool with roots in the early literacy 
and "people's science" movements of the 1960s, later adopted by environmental organizers 
beginning in the mid-1970s. See Chapter 3 for discussion of the centrality of camps in the 
organizing work of Kēraḷīyam. The One World University, though not specifically organized by 
Adarsh and Sunny, was linked to Kēraḷīyam in an informal way, growing out of Mohandas' close 
relationship with the magazine. 
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"error," but other times can be more like "sin."43 He went on to make the case for understanding 
tea as a teṯṯ, tying tea plantations to capitalist exploitation of labor and environmental 
destruction. He declared that it was insupportable to believe that one can bring about real social 
transformation while drinking tea. And though he avoided the first-person plural and the second 
person throughout this portion of his speech, its accusatory implications were unavoidable.  
During the remainder of that morning's discussion, the need to do something about tea 
drinking was affirmed by others several times, though never quite so unequivocally. In his 
closing speech, Mohandas explained that he did request "jappi," a concoction of local herbs 
invented by Kerala environmentalists as an alternative to coffee and tea, but it was unavailable. 
Not long after, as we stood in line in the dining hall, I overheard Adarsh and Nithin teasing 
Mohandas for "getting in trouble." Mohandas only smiled and shuffled down the buffet table. 
6.4 Integration, Personalization, and Inconsistency 
In analyzing Hari's denunciation of tea drinking, it is important to understand that tea is 
in multiple respects uncontroversially bad for most, if not all, of the attendees of the One World 
University. Though only some of those present were environmental organizers, Hari was surely 
right in presuming that all of them possess "awareness" with regard to the socio-political analysis 
diagrammed on the chalkboard. And the very existence of jāppi (not to mention Mohandas' 
excuse for not providing it) indicates that Hari is not alone in his understanding of how tea fits 
into this analysis. When Hari enjoined the group to cease tea drinking, he pointed to the badness 
                                                 
43 For example, this word can be used for a grammatical error but also for what one confesses to 
a Catholic priest. This contrasts with the narrower semantic range of terms like pāpam and 
tinma, both of which denote ethical wrongs exclusively and are more often heard in religious 
contexts. I never heard either of the latter terms used among activists associated with Kēraḷīyam, 
except in jest. Activists' usage of mūlyaṅṅaḷ ("values"), described in Chapter 1, parallels this 
pattern of selecting broader, more ambiguous, and more secular moral language. 
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of tea, but his speech focused on the question of, as he put it, "what should be done.” Even if tea 
is an exploitative, environmentally destructive product, after all, that does not necessarily mean 
that one should stop drinking it. It is the further connection between awareness and action that 
Hari was at pains to make, and it was his insistence on this that elicited laughter from the others. 
Below I describe how Hari made the case that abstaining from tea drinking is not only important 
to combating the evils of tea, but also necessary for overcoming the broader social and 
environmental problems Mohandas attributes to "alienation.” Hari's statement of this argument is 
relatively extreme, as the laughter suggests, but its logic is not idiosyncratic. Rather, as Adarsh's 
invocation of this argument months later suggests, Hari's reasons for opposing tea drinking 
display a logic that environmentalists apply to many other "ordinary things" as well, such as 
VapoRub. Understanding the logic of Hari's denunciation of tea drinking, then, will help us to 
understand how everyday life comes to be full of ethical problems.  
Before examining Hari's move from bad tea to bad tea drinking, however, let us review 
some of the reasons tea is considered uncontroversially bad, which may be less obvious to the 
reader than to the attendees of the One World University. In his speech, Hari points to two 
reasons: capitalist exploitation of the labor of farmworkers and environmentally destructive 
practices of monoculture farming. Within Kerala, tea is grown in large plantations in the Western 
Ghats mountain range, which were founded by British corporations during colonial rule. Not all 
tea consumed in Kerala is produced in these plantations, but when local environmentalists talk 
about the problems with tea, they talk about forest land cleared in these mountains, legacies of 
colonial exploitation of Indian resources, low wages and poor living conditions among resident 
laborers, fertilizers and pesticides, lost biodiversity, and corporate greed. Tea's badness is 
derivative of these broader social and environmental problems, all of which are taken to be 
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integrally connected with the political analysis Mohandas had been presenting all morning, to 
which we will return below. 
The key to the link Hari drew between tea as an ethical problem and tea drinking as an 
unacceptable practice lies in his proposal of "internal transformation" (āntarikamāya 
parivarttanam) as the answer to the question of what should be done about the social problems 
described by Mohandas. Hari argued that in order to change these larger social problems, those 
present must begin by changing themselves. He raised the issue of tea drinking as an example of 
a failure of this process of internal transformation. In his example of the tea break at the camp 
the week before, he described how attendees talked a great deal about the same problems 
discussed at the One World University, but nonetheless continued to drink tea. For Hari, this was 
an unacceptable contradiction because the transformation of the self and the transformation of 
the world are one and the same.  
The consequences of Hari's conceptualization of the unity of self-transformation and 
social transformation are suggested by an unusual use of pronouns in his speech. When Hari 
called for those present to do something, he tended to address them with first-person distributive 
pronomial phrases, which I gloss here as "we, each and every one" (Asher & Kumari, 1997, pp. 
262, 366). As illustrated in Figure 8, Hari used these phrases frequently as subjects, and ten out 
of twelve (83%) uses of these distributive subjects took "can" or "should" verbs. For example, in 
introducing the question of "what should be done," Hari immediately rephrased this question as 
"what we, each and every individual, can do.” In short, Hari's call for social change focused on 
individual action even as it addressed his audience, and himself, collectively. As a program for 
social change, "internal transformation" is depicted as a process that all must undertake, but it is 
also a process that each must undertake individually. Like drinking, or not drinking, a cup of tea. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of subjects of debitive ("should") or potential ("can") 
verbs in Hari’s speech 
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And even if the audience laughed when Hari made his appeal for internal transformation 
in this way, it is clear that that appeal was not without effect. Recall how quickly Adarsh made 
the leap from my question about VapoRub back—over ten months back—to tea. Just as it helps 
explain Hari's link between tea and tea drinking, this emphasis on action upon oneself as a 
mechanism of social transformation now also helps us understand this connection. VapoRub, like 
tea, is a corporate product produced by an exploitative capitalist economy. More importantly, 
however, it is also something that one takes into one's own body. Thus both drinking tea and 
applying VapoRub are actions located precisely at the nexus between the social order and the 
individual body, the external and the internal. In other words, they are the sort of actions in 
which Hari sees an opportunity to effect social change or, conversely, where commitment to 
social change becomes a matter of personal responsibility.  
Moreover, the logic of Hari's argument for the unity of self-transformation and social 
transformation should also be understood against the background of the contrast Mohandas made 
between "alienation," as the root of modern social problems, and "integration" as their solution. 
Returning to Mohandas' chalkboard, capitalist politics, family, religion, modern science, gender 
divisions, and separation from nature are all presented as manifestations of alienation. In future 
seminars, Mohandas would go on to elaborate a theory of "integration" as a counter to alienation. 
Part of the strength of Hari's proposal for "internal transformation" is that it shares this 
integrating logic, refusing any rigid division between the internal and the external. Indeed, 
although the division between the self and the social does not appear anywhere on Mohandas' 
chalkboard, this was central to the concept of alienation he elaborated at the One World 
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University.44  
Indeed, even if many in the room found Hari's indictment of tea drinking comical, the 
integrating logic of this indictment was surely intuitive, an offshoot of a shared genealogy of 
claims about the unity of body and world, self-transformation and social transformation. In 
particular, while few present would have claimed to be disciples of Gandhi, his politics of 
swarāj, or "self-rule," nonetheless looms large in the "awareness" that qualifies one for 
participation in the One World University. In Gandhi's ideal of swarāj, power over the body and 
power over the nation were inseparable; without the development of the former, India could 
never attain true independence (Alter, 2000; Fox, 1989; Gandhi, 2009). Moreover, Gandhi's 
integration of struggle with the British and struggle with the body itself has roots in broadly 
South Asian understandings of personhood, in which the self participates in the social and 
material world through the exchange or avoidance of substances such as food, bodily fluids, or 
soil (Alter, 2000; Marriott, 1968, 1976). As anthropologists have long argued, the passage of 
substances into, out of, and between bodies confounds any rigid boundary between South Asian 
understandings of person and environment, or of self and society (Daniel, 1984; Marriott, 1976). 
It is no coincidence, then, that Gandhi's experiments with truth were largely dietary, nor that Hari 
and Adarsh see political struggle in tea and VapoRub. 
  However, in constrast with most accounts of South Asian substance exchange, Gandhi 
and Hari both pursue the incorporation or non-incorporation of substances as a mechanism for 
radical social transformation, making the integration of internal and external the basis for a claim 
about the responsibility of the self to a cause. Thus, the "porousness" (K. Smith, 2012) between 
                                                 
44 One reason this distinction may have gone unnoted on the chalkboard is that it is already 
taken to be implicit in the notion of "alienation" (anyavalkaraṇam), a term with etymological 
roots in translations of Marxist texts into Malayalam.  
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the self and the social becomes a conduit not only for substances, but also for demands on one's 
own body and one's own action. Scales of social action and responsibility are collapsed, and the 
body becomes suffused with opportunities and obligations of far-reaching import. Everyday life 
proliferates with the imperatives of building a free and strong nation, in Gandhi's case, or of 
confronting economic and environmental injustices, in Hari's.  
This story could also be told in an entirely different way. Just as Hari and Adarsh's 
concern with tea drinking has many of the markings of a specifically Gandhian pedigree of South 
Asian personhood, it is also an unmistakable instance of a global type.45  Hari's claim about tea 
drinking shares much with appeals by locavores, vegetarians, and proponents of fair trade and 
organic products in other parts of the world. Indeed, the reasons he gives for avoiding tea—
exploitation of labor and destruction of the environment—resemble the reasoning of these global 
"ethical consumption" movements more than the anthropological theories about substance and 
personhood cited above (Barnett, Cloke, Clarke, & Malpass, 2010; Carrier, 2007; Lewis & 
Potter, 2011). And this resemblance is not spurious; the attendees of the One World University 
are well aware of these movements and familiar with the ideologies that underwrite them. Like 
Gandhi's "self-rule," the ideology of ethical consumption collapses scales of social action, 
framing the market as an engagement between the self and the social and framing particular acts 
of purchasing as opportunities and obligations with respect to a greater cause (Barnett, Cloke, 
Clarke, & Malpass, 2005).46  Thus, it is quite possible for Hari to simultaneously invoke both 
                                                 
45 Thanks to Michael Silverstein for suggesting this point. 
46 Some scholars have argued that the link between acts of purchasing and social transformation 
in ethical consumption is illusory, however, inasmuch as it reduces politics to consumption alone 
(Carrier, 2008; Dolan, 2007). This argument could also be made with respect to the focus on 
self-transformation among the organizers described here. Indeed, the description of Hari's choice 
of ethical consistency over compromise might be taken to exemplify the problems with excessive 
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specifically South Asian models of personhood and globally salient notions of ethical 
consumption at once. The move from bad tea to bad tea drinking is bolstered by the confluence 
of these two ideologies, both of which translate commitment to radical social change into the acts 
of "each and every one of us.”    
But if Hari's denunciation of tea drinking is grounded in understandings and 
commitments that attendees of the One World University share, why do they laugh at him? The 
humor here, I would argue, lies not in the logic of Hari's appeal but in the practical difficulties of 
carrying it out. Such difficulties are suggested by Adarsh's admission that he shares Hari's 
position on tea drinking but simply "can't manage to do it.” They are also suggested by Hari's 
own story of the seminar participants who, similarly, could not carry on their discussion of social 
transformation without a tea break. To better understand these difficulties, we turn now from the 
problem of how ethical evaluation proliferates in the lives of organizers to the ways in which this 
proliferation is experienced as a problem for social relations. 
6.5 Inconsistent or Out of Place: Problems with Alignment 
Adarsh drinks more tea than anyone I know, and he drinks it double strong. In the 
fourteen months that we lived together, he would occasionally tell me that he wanted to cut back, 
but it never happened. As noted above, he recognized that drinking tea was inconsistent with his 
own political views. When he published an article in Kēraḷīyam making a case against tea 
drinking similar to Hari's argument, others pointed this inconsistency out to him. And this made 
him uncomfortable. But he could not manage to stop. For Adarsh, as for many Malayalis, 
drinking tea was an integral part of everyday routines of face-to-face interaction; he drank a lot 
                                                 
focus on self-transformation in efforts at social change. However, this topic is beyond the scope 
of this chapter.  
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of tea primarily because he engaged in a lot of interaction. Whenever someone stopped by the 
magazine office, it would not be long before a trip to the nearby tea shop was proposed. And few 
proposals went unaccepted. 
To some extent, we might attribute Adarsh's tea habit to the addictive properties of 
caffeine, or to mere inertia. We cannot rule out these factors. However, here I want to suggest 
another possibility: that refusing tea, the most ubiquitous social drink in India, was difficult 
because of the consequences it would have had for Adarsh's relations to others. I explore this 
possibility as an instance of the more general problem, introduced above, of how opposition to 
ordinary things can make someone "out of place.” Why should a person's evaluation of some 
object as ethically wrong have consequences for their relations to others? Keeping with the 
example of tea drinking just a bit longer, I turn to literature on evaluation and ethics for resources 
to answer this question. 
In Chapter 3, I introduced the concept of stance to describe the ways in which iconicity 
between multiple subjects’ evaluations of an object can entail relations of alignment. The stance 
triangle (see Figure 5, pg. 109) provides a framework for describing how evaluation could be 
understood as a way of relating to others, but it is not enough to explain the kind of social 
separation I have described above as being "out of place.” Alignment and disalignment, in and of 
themselves, are only descriptions of relations between evaluative positions of discursive subjects; 
they say nothing about the consequences of evaluation for other aspects of how social relations 
are experienced, such as felt solidarity or antagonism. Although conversation analysts have 
demonstrated a statistical "preference" for alignment of stance, this does not mean there is any 
psychological or sociocultural preference for agreement (Sidnell, 2010). Moreover, it is clear that 
the social consequences of alignment differ for different contexts and kinds of evaluation. For 
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example, because of a caffeine sensitivity, I often did not drink tea with Adarsh and others even 
when I went to the tea shop with them. Clearly, this disaligned me with them as far as tea was 
concerned; they liked it, I did not. But this never seemed to interfere with my ability to sit and 
chat with them. I did not feel out of place—at least no more out of place than usual. Certainly, if 
this kind of disalignment was all that was at stake for Adarsh in quitting tea, it is hard to see how 
relations to others had anything to do with the difficulty of quitting.  
The crucial difference between Adarsh's stance with respect to tea and mine, however, is 
that while my stance has only to do with tea's effects upon my own body, Adarsh's stance is 
grounded in a program for social transformation. My stance has to do with what is important for 
me, specifically, while Adarsh's stance has to do with what he believes is important for India, or 
even for the world. As such, Adarsh's stance not only positions him with respect to tea drinking, 
but also implies that others ought to position themselves in the same way.47  And this makes 
alignment and disalignment potentially far more consequential in Adarsh's case than mine. 
In an analysis of evaluation that shares much with the notion of "stance," Adam Smith 
observed that alignment or disalignment with another person's evaluations can, itself, entail a 
second-level evaluation of the other person's evaluation (2002, p. 21).48  This is obviously the 
case in Hari's appeal to stop tea drinking, which is not only an evaluation of tea drinking, but 
also an evaluation of the positions of others with respect to tea drinking. And we can now see 
how, if Adarsh refrained from drinking tea in the company of friends, even if he made no explicit 
                                                 
47 What makes Adarsh's stance ethical is, in part, that it implies a claim about the stance one 
ought to take, but this claim need not be universal, as some theories of ethics propose. For more 
detailed explication of this point, see the discussion of the definition of ethics in Chapter 5.  
48 Smith takes this to be a much more general feature of evaluation than I do here, however, 
arguing that it holds for all contexts and types of evaluation.  
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appeal to them to stop drinking as well, this would imply a similar evaluation of their positions.49  
Thus, we find that for certain kinds of stance, disalignment with another subject implies 
opposition to that subject's position. 
For the organizers described here, the proliferation of ethical concerns in everyday life 
entails a potential proliferation of such oppositions. This is how they find themselves socially 
distant, or "out of place.” With this understanding of what evaluation does to social relations, we 
can also understand why an organizer, in particular, might find it difficult to accept this social 
distancing. As described in Chapter 3, Adarsh's work as assistant editor of Kēraḷīyam is 
primarily about connecting people, assembling a network of organizers who participate in a 
particular form of political action. Taking tea breaks with people who stop by the office is a 
crucial part of this work. Avoiding tea breaks probably would not affect Adarsh's ability to 
publish the magazine, but it would surely hinder his efforts to connect people—that is, his efforts 
to organize. Moreover, based on the analysis above, we can expect that this organizing work 
would be hindered all the more if Adarsh were to avoid tea breaks as a matter of principle, as 
Hari does. 
Given this difficulty, why not just take radical stances more opportunistically? For 
example, why not just avoid tea when it is convenient, and drink tea when avoiding it would 
strain relationships? As we will see, this is the approach that Adarsh pursues with many of his 
                                                 
49 In the literature on South Asian personhood described above, people manage their exchange 
or non-exchange of substances in order to create solidarity or social distance with respect to 
others. Marriott (1968) argues that the caste system is sustained precisely through the social 
effects of such exchanges. In such cases, group solidarity and distinction are the values that 
determine the desirability of exchange. In this case, however, environmental organizers 
(following Gandhi) take up similar practices for a different purpose, and the goodness or badness 
of incorporating a substance is determined by its relation to this purpose (i.e. social and 
environmental transformation). Nonetheless, they experience the social effects of exchanging or 
avoiding substances as an inevitable outcome of the mechanisms of evaluation described here.  
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more radical stances. But as we have already observed with respect to tea drinking, this kind of 
inconsistency can also be uncomfortable, and the stance triangle suggests why. Note that 
alignment and disalignment are relations between subjects of particular acts of stancetaking, not 
a relation of persons. Thus, across multiple instances of stancetaking, the same person can 
occupy subject positions that are disaligned with one another. The same could be said of 
evaluation more generally. Such is the case, Hari argues, with those who take tea breaks while 
plotting to change the world. This is the problem of inconsistency. And for the same reasons that 
disalignment with others may strain social relations, disalignment between one's subject 
positions (particularly with respect to ethical evaluation) may, as Hari suggests, trouble one's 
relation to oneself. 
But one cannot always have it both ways. The more that ordinary things become objects 
of ethical evaluation, the more one is faced with a choice between alignment between one's 
positions and alignment with others. Such dilemmas are a central problem for all of the 
organizers described here, but different people respond to them in very different ways. Below, I 
analyze Hari's and Adarsh's responses to different versions of this problem, arising from the 
radical positions they take with respect to allopathic medicine and houses, respectively. In both 
cases, these responses involve a tradeoff between consistency and compromise. 
6.6 Standing Fast 
At the end of second gathering of the One World University, Hari announced that he 
would not be returning for any more. There was too much discussion, he said, and not enough 
action. And after that, I did not see him again at any Kēraḷīyam-related events for a long time. I 
heard about him from time to time, especially from a close friend of his, Salim, with whom Hari 
had been trying to establish an organic farming commune. It was Salim who had first introduced 
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me to Hari several years before, when I was studying Malayalam. Back then, the two used to talk 
like one of those superhero teams on TV—always in lock-step, finishing each other's 
sentences—which was fitting, I guess, because they were also always talking about how to save 
the world, though usually turning to farming and dietary regimens, rather than fighting crime. It 
was through their visits that I first became familiar with many of the ideas represented on 
Mohandas' chalkboard—the critical analysis of modern science, capitalism, and the family—and 
it was with them that I had my first cup of jāppi. But more recently, Salim talked with concern 
about Hari—he had taken the dieting too far, Salim felt, and his body had become thin and weak. 
He was too confident in his own conviction that eating only fruits would heal all of his ailments, 
and he would not listen to anyone else's advice. Then, the organic farming commune disbanded, 
and Salim told me that he and Hari did not speak much anymore. 
There are many ways to tell this story. Adarsh suggested that Hari may have simply 
become more involved in a different social circle, a network of post-Gandhian environmentalists 
focused more on diet. The failure of the commune itself is a complicated story, with multiple 
actors, multiple accusations, and multiple reasons to part ways. But here, I want to focus on a 
story that Hari himself told when, wanting to know what had become of him, I went to visit him 
at his parents' home near the end of my fieldwork. I focus on this story because I think it brings 
out important aspects of how Hari's approach to radical ethical evaluation had changed during 
the time I had known him. As Hari tells it, it is the story of a conflict between consistency and 
community, between truth and friendship.  
The story begins about a year before the first session of the One World University, during 
a time when Hari was nearly constantly traveling, attending environmentalist camps focused on 
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"nature cure" as a way of life.50  Unlike the One World University, these natural lifestyle camps 
had no clear connection to Kēraḷīyam magazine, though during this time many of those in the 
Kēraḷīyam crowd were also into natural health and medicine. These social circles would become 
more distinguished from one another during the period of my fieldwork. At the time, however, 
Hari moved in both of these circles and was very active. Indeed, this was a time of intense 
inquiry and experimentation for Hari—I remember meeting him at one point during this period 
and being impressed with the sheer energy and zeal with which he spoke about his new way of 
life and about the potential of nature cure to heal, enlighten, and change the world. 
Hari also met a young woman named Sunathi at one of these nature cure camps, and they 
attended many together, beginning a romantic relationship. A few months after they met, a small 
but persistent sore appeared on her lower leg, near her ankle. Hari advised her to eat a simpler 
diet and to eat only fruit for one meal per day. Sunathi, trusting the advice from the nature cure 
camps as well as Hari's own expertise, followed these instructions carefully. The sore grew and 
became two. Hari advised making two meals only fruit. The sores continued to multiply and 
grow, until she had one long, oozing wound from her ankle to her thigh. By this time, she had 
been eating fruit exclusively for about a month. Hari advised that she rest, and stick to her 
dietary regimen, and Sunathi followed his advice. 
                                                 
50 In Kerala, nature cure (prakṛti cikilsa) is a practice with roots in Gandhi's integration of 
German and American nature cure (also known as naturopathy) with Indian healing traditions 
including Ayurveda and Siddha. The central tenet of naturopathy, that the body will heal itself 
provided that the right internal balance is maintained, has clear convergences with the "substance 
exchange" theories of the body and personhood discussed above. Hari's own medical beliefs and 
practices, described below, are more closely related to orthopathy (known in the US as "natural 
hygiene"), a version of naturopathy of nineteenth-century American origin that is especially 
focused on diet. 
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"Finally the wound reached up the whole leg. It was all bluish and seeping," Hari told 
me, "This wound, if anyone saw it, they would have said that because it had not been treated it 
had gotten infected, and that the infection had spread to the whole leg. Any average person, who 
doesn't understand, they would not say it is not healing. Not only that. When you only eat fruits, 
your body gets very thin. You lose weight. So people would say your health is declining." 
As far as Hari was concerned, however, the seeping wound was not a problem; on the 
contrary, it was a sign that Sunathi's body was expelling whatever toxins were causing her 
sickness. There was, however, what he called a "social problem." 
"The problem is you can't do this in this society. Because if they see a wound that's been 
seeping for one or two months, they will make some big problem over it, and make her go to an 
allopathy hospital and diagnose it." 
Hari arranged for Sunathi to be taken to a naturopathy hospital, where she continued her 
regimen of fruit and rest. But the problems did not stop there. Some of Hari's friends, particularly 
in the Kēraḷīyam circle, also opposed Sunathi's treatment. He began to receive phone calls urging 
him to take Sunathi to a Western hospital. 
"So these people—all of them, even Salim—all of these people misunderstood and said 
that it would be some big disaster...Everyone, even Sunny called me. But I had complete faith. 
But mentally, I had a lot of conflict because everyone was together against me. That was the 
state of things." 
In the end, after almost five months of fruit and bed rest, the wound healed. Not only that, 
but Hari reported that Sunathi's asthma had disappeared, and a chronic skin problem had cleared 
up as well. But despite the apparent success of his treatment, Hari's social problems lingered. 
Soon after Sunathi got better, Hari attended Sunny's wedding. There, he says, people made fun of 
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him and made jokes about how he only eats fruit. Not only at that event, but at camps he 
attended thereafter, even camps about nature cure, people would tease him and make comments 
about him.  
"I hear these kind of jokes a lot," he said, "But they're not just jokes. They're another way 
of saying, "what you are doing is a teṯṯ.”  
Here is that ambiguous word again: teṯṯ. Only this time it is not Hari directing it at others, 
but Hari voicing others directing it at himself. And note that a related ambiguity is present in the 
whole of Hari's story. One might say that it is a story about medicine—about conflicting answers 
to purely factual questions about how the body works, what causes disease, or how best to treat a 
wound. But, here, medicine is a profoundly moral matter—not only because Western medicine is 
generally held to be morally corrupt by environmentalists in Kerala, but because Sunathi's leg, 
and perhaps more, hangs in the balance. Salim and Sunny held Hari responsible for Sunathi's 
treatment because she had been following his directions, and even when those directions worked, 
a stigma remained. Hari believed that Sunathi had been healed because he had refused to be 
swayed from his stance. But it was for this same reason that he found himself increasingly alone. 
"I told them precisely and tried to make them understand," he said, "And I stood, and 
stood, and stood, and at last the wound dried up." 
A similar story could be told about the farming commune. According to Salim, the 
collaboration had failed primarily because of a disagreement about farming methods. Hari had 
insisted that the farm not only be organic, but also "natural," meaning that no fertilizer, not even 
cow manure, should be added to the soil. And, of course, we have already examined Hari's 
condemnation of tea. In each story, Hari has insisted on following through on his ethical views. 
Indeed, in Sunathi's case, while he clearly anticipated that "an average person" would have 
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opposed his treatment, he seemed surprised by the reaction of those who otherwise shared many 
of his radical positions. These were people who had attended camps with him, and who knew the 
evils of Western medicine. Yet, they did not want him to follow through. 
6.7 Consistency and Cosmology 
Before returning to the social consequences of Hari's consistency—to the problem of 
being "out of place"—I want to more closely examine how, exactly, Hari sustains such radical 
stances. Although he spoke of simply, "standing, standing, and standing," in response to criticism 
of his treatment of Sunathi, Hari's ability to remain unmoved by such criticism required a great 
deal of ideological labor—that is, a great deal of justification. In our interview, his telling of the 
story was larded with such justifications, and he continued to elaborate on the larger reasons that 
justified his decisions about Sunathi even when the story itself had been fully told, happy ending 
and all.  
As mentioned above, the time of Sunathi's illness was also a time of intense inquiry and 
learning for Hari. Even as his social world was troubled by conflict, Hari was constructing a 
cosmology in which all of the pieces fit harmoniously. He had told me the story about Sunathi, in 
part, as one illustration of this ideological construct. As an example of the power of nature cure, 
Sunathi's healing also demonstrated the power of the theory of nature (prakṛti) on which nature 
cure was based. This broader theory not only justified Hari's own actions in the story; it denied 
any reason for uncertainty or doubt with regard to his decisions whatsoever. It was a total 
justification. 
"But weren't you ever afraid at all?” I asked Hari when he described how all his friends 
had turned against him, "Weren't you afraid that it might not work out?" 
"No. I was never afraid," he replied immediately. "No, no, no. Because what I believe is 
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that, yes, the body has limits. If illness reaches too severe a stage, then it is hard to come back. 
For example, if someone has lived a very unnatural life or something like that. But humans have 
never discovered any medicinal intervention that can cross the body's own limits—of that much I 
am sure. So yes, the body has limits, but it is also not possible for humans to discover anything 
that will cross those limits. So maybe the body would not have been able to heal [Sunathi's] 
wound, but then there isn't any medicine in the world that could have healed her. There is no 
such thing." 
In this interview, and in further discussion the following day, Hari elaborated a 
conception of nature (prakṛti) as a complete integration of the physical and social world, in 
which the practices of science, politics, and spirituality are all subsumed within a larger balanced 
ecology, and health and ethics are indistinguishable. In this cosmology, nature is perfectly 
balanced and complete unto itself, and only the introduction of something foreign or unnatural 
could disturb this balance. Thus, for example, the etiology of disease is always some toxin 
introduced by unnatural human practices—the presence of microorganisms is only a byproduct 
of the imbalance engendered by the toxin.51  Just as medicine was about allowing the body to 
restore balance, Hari argued, politics, spirituality, and other practices oriented by ethical values 
must be harmonized in alignment with the ecological balance of the natural world. Hari's ideas 
share much with Mohandas' emphasis on the centrality of the reintegration of humanity and 
nature in addressing social problems. Indeed, the central themes of integration and ecological 
balance resonated with ideas I had heard from others in the Kēraḷīyam crowd. Here, however, the 
                                                 
51 This view is traceable to a mid-twentieth-century appropriation of Antoine Béchamp's dispute 
with Louis Pasteur during the period of the early development of germ theory, commonly 
referenced by proponents of naturopathy (E. D. Hume, 1923; Manchester, 2001). Hari had 
studied Béchamp's ideas extensively on the internet, where he had found some translations of his 
work. 
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integration and balance were more comprehensively developed and systematized so as to 
eliminate contradiction.  
Ultimately, Hari's cosmology produces moral certainty. There are no ethical dilemmas 
because there are no contradictions between ethical values. There are no conflicts between 
ethical value and other sorts of value because all forms of value are aligned with the natural 
order. Thus, in the case of Sunathi's illness, what will cure her is, by definition, also the ethically 
preferred option. This is strikingly different from the ideological position of many others in the 
Kēraḷīyam network, who shared Hari's opposition to the politics of Western medicine but, 
nonetheless, often acknowledge its efficacy in a pinch. But within Hari's cosmology, what is 
ethically objectionable is also necessarily ineffective. Political goods, moral goods, the goods of 
health—all come together. 
 In some sense, then, Hari's cosmology resembles what Williams (1985) has called a 
"morality system," in which all questions of ethical value are maximally subordinated to some 
explicit, over-riding logic. Building on Williams' concept, Keane (2016) argues that the explicit 
ideological constructs of morality systems make otherwise tacit values and practices more 
available for manipulation and revision. Thus, he observes that social reformers often work to 
revise morality systems (Keane, 2016, p. 200). Certainly, we can see such revision in Hari's own 
work on cosmology. Moreover, Williams argues that morality systems work to reduce 
contradiction and uncertainty in ethical life (1985, pp. 176, 178). However, Hari's cosmology 
differs from Williams' account of morality systems in the ways that it reduces contradiction. In 
Williams' account, morality systems eliminate contradictions by giving primacy to obligations, 
which trump all other considerations of value; where there is a moral obligation, all other 
considerations must be set aside (1985, p. 195). Here, however, Hari reduces contradiction not 
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by trumping but by aligning—other sorts of value are simply taken to be inherently non-
contradictory with ethical value, since all value is part of the natural order. Dilemmas are not 
resolved, but harmonized away. 
Even as Hari's cosmology enables a high level of moral certainty, it also raises challenges 
for Hari's relations to others. Hari turned to this topic explicitly near the end of my visit, when he 
told me that he no longer attends Kēraḷīyam events because "there is no space there for [him] to 
speak.” To some extent, as Adarsh suggested, this might be understood as a shift from the 
Kēraḷīyam social circle to another group for whom natural lifestyles are more central. But note 
that Hari says he has been teased even when he attends camps about nature cure. And when I 
visited him, he described himself as no longer participating in camps much at all. He was living a 
quiet life at his parents' home, working at a nearby government agency, where he said he did not 
talk much about his radical views. His bedroom was stacked with old books and heavily-
underlined printouts of nineteenth-century writings by American "natural hygiene" theorists, 
such as Isaac Jennings and Sylvester Graham. He frequently referred back to these works, and 
the lives of their authors, as he described his own ideas and way of life. If anything, he seemed to 
have found his new community among these radical men.52 
Hari did not set out to isolate himself, but he worked to ensure consistency and 
certainty—all of his stances were made to align with one another, whether explicitly stated 
evaluations or evaluative positions implicit in his actions and in his way of life. But alignment 
                                                 
52 This is not to say that Hari's point of view on these matters was entirely unique. My 
conversations with other practitioners of orthopathy and naturopathy in Kerala revealed a similar 
familiarity with the ideas of men like Béchamp, Jennings, and Graham. Malayali prakṛti cikilsa 
was a fractious tradition, however, with many ideological splits and offshoots. This was probably 
due to the tendency of many practitioners, like Hari, to part ways based on differences of 
conviction.  
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between his own radical positions also put him out of alignment with others, and this had 
consequences for his friendships. Hari did not cut himself off from everyone. He was able to live 
in peace with his family and his coworkers, but largely because he did not talk to them much 
about his ideas about nature, health, or social change. And to that extent, these were minimal 
relations. Hari had built his whole life around these ideas, these radical positions—they were 
who he was. Thus, not only did he not talk about his opinions at work; he said he rarely talked at 
all. At home, it was a bit different. There, he told me how he slowly, gently worked to influence 
his parents' views, to somehow show them that his way of living was right. In this way, he 
sought to gradually bring these relationships into alignment with the rest of his world, a world 
that was built to support a maximally consistent self. 
6.8 Compromise and Community 
As shown by the theater example, Adarsh, like Hari, often found himself "out of place" 
because of his efforts to live consistently with his radical views. Even if he was not as consistent 
as Hari, as in the case of tea drinking, he did experience the tensions that radical positions on 
aspects of everyday life raised for his relationships, especially relationships with common people 
(sādhāraṇakkār). Indeed, one might say that this was more of a problem for Adarsh because, 
more than Hari, he valued sustaining such relationships despite disalignment with respect to 
ethical or political views. For example, at the very end of our discussion of his tea drinking habit, 
just as I began to change the subject, he interrupted me to assert that being inconsistent is not the 
worst thing one can do; far worse are those at the other extreme, who will not even talk to people 
who drink tea.  
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"I disagree with the higher puritan sort of stance53 in that. Won't talk to a person who 
drinks tea! I'm against that kind of puritanism. That's a terribly...in that there's a terrible sort of 
fascism! A prejudice is there, in saying like that." 
Thus, even as Adarsh acknowledged the badness of his lack of consistency, he also 
pointed out a badness that comes from an excess of consistency—a puritanical, fascist 
consistency that would not even allow for speaking to others who drink tea. Adarsh went on to 
talk about how Hari and people like him were not very active in the Kēraḷīyam social circle 
anymore. He said that they had mostly split off and formed their own group. As we have seen, 
Hari's story was more complicated than that. But what Adarsh keenly identified here was the 
connection between too much consistency and social isolation. For Adarsh, such isolation was 
more than an unfortunate side-effect of a radical way of life; here, at least, he placed the onus of 
responsibility on those who carry consistency too far. He described those who put consistency 
above social relations as refusing to talk to those with whom they disagree. If they become 
pariahs, that is only because they insist on being puritans.  
If Hari responds to tensions between his ethical views and other aspects of social 
relations by intensively pursuing consistency between his own positions, Adarsh's responses tend 
in the other direction, toward compromise in the interest of community. It should already be 
clear from the analysis above, of course, that this is not an absolute contrast. Just as Hari finds 
ways of getting along with his parents and coworkers, so Adarsh sometimes finds himself out of 
place among his neighbors or at odds with his father. But Adarsh also attributes value to 
                                                 
53 The Malayalam noun nilapāṭ, glossed here as "stance," tropes on the verb for physically 
standing, nilkkuka, just as the English term does. Hari and Adarsh both used this term in talking 
about their views. However, I have sought not to make too much of that connection here, as it 
should not to be taken to suggest any neat convergence between the language ideologies of 
sociolinguists and Malayali organizers. 
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compromise in a way that Hari, in our conversations, never did. And for Adarsh, the value of 
compromise often trumps consistency. Below I take a close look at such a compromise with 
regard to one of the "ordinary" matters that Adarsh feels most strongly about: his opposition to 
house and family. 
6.9 Living in Common 
Ever since I moved in with Adarsh and Faiza, our neighbor from across the street, 
Santosh, had been inviting me to join him for his morning walk. As the months passed, this 
invitation gave way to another—to come and see the new house he was building on the other 
side of town. In fact, this was still the same invitation in new garb; Santosh's daily route took 
him from his current house to the site where his new house was being constructed and back, all 
before 7am. I sincerely wanted to accept this invitation, but for me 7am was a time for sleeping 
or, given some momentous event related to the topics of my imagined dissertation, rushing to 
catch a bus to "the field.” The right day for a morning walk never seemed to arrive. At last, 
Santosh agreed to shift one walk to the evening, for me, and we set out. 
All the way there, and all the way back, we talked about houses. We talked about the 
house where Santosh currently lived with his older brother Ravindran's family, and about how 
excited he was to finally build a house for his own family (himself, his wife, and their twin 
daughters), even if it was only small. We talked about how Ravindran also planned to tear down 
his house and build a new one—a house more like those on either side of it, with a flat concrete 
roof rather than a peaked clay one—even though the current house was still in pretty good shape. 
And we talked about the houses we saw along the way, especially the ones Santosh thought 
best—huge double-story mansions with ten-foot walls and wrought iron gates. 
"Super house!" Santosh exclaimed, as we passed one of the largest of these, "What a 
  236 
 
beautiful house!" 
I had to hold back a laugh then, remembering that Adarsh had also exclaimed over this 
exact same house when we had gone for an evening walk a few months before. Only Adarsh's 
exclamation, which I had noted without recording his exact words, had been sarcastic and 
disapproving. Indeed, this house had gotten Adarsh started on a short, comical rant about 
Malayalis who build such huge structures for just a few people, and find them so beautiful when 
they destroy all of the natural beauty around. And here, Santosh was talking about much the 
same thing, only with none of the irony; these houses were as beautiful in his eyes as they were, 
supposedly, in the eyes of the owners Adarsh ridiculed. 
In Kerala, nearly every adult I met was either saving to build a new house, building a new 
house, or had just built a new house. Some, like Santosh, had to save for a very long time to 
build a very small house, but they were still saving. Buying a house that someone else had built, 
no matter how large, was not considered nearly as desirable as building one's own house 
according to one's own design. This is not to say that the design of a home was a matter of 
individual expression; rather, housing projects generally conformed carefully to current fashions 
and other projects in the neighborhood. Thus, Santosh's and Ravindran's houses would have 
concrete roofs, as was the fashion, despite their shared opinion that houses with clay tile roofs 
are cooler and more comfortable. 
This conformity to trends is understandable because, in Kerala, a family's house is the 
dominant icon of a family's status and prosperity. And as should be clear from Santosh's story, it 
is the nuclear family that matters here. The association of the house with a family's status likely 
has a deeper history in joint family habitation practices, but in contemporary Kerala, parents 
build and renovate houses for themselves and their children. For example, when I pressed 
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Ravindran on the matter, he explained that the reason he wanted to rebuild was that he did not 
want his son to feel the shame of coming home to a house with a clay roof when all the 
neighbors had flat, concrete roofs. Likewise, parents undertake renovations in preparation for the 
arrangement of their children's marriages, hoping to secure the best partner and impress the other 
family. A couple who rents, one neighbor told me, would find it impossible to marry their 
children.  
In other words, with respect to houses as with multiplex theaters, Adarsh finds himself at 
odds with the general view. Ever since he and Faiza married, they have rented, and if Adarsh had 
his way they would never stop renting. Adarsh is—as Faiza put it to me once—“ vīṭṭinetirē,” or 
"opposed to [the institution of] house.” This is an apt way of putting it because Adarsh is not 
only against owning a house himself, but against the institution of the family home, and the 
forms of social relations it represents. In Malayalam, the most common word for house, vīṭ, can 
also be used to refer to one's family. For example, the surname used by members of one's family 
is one's "house name" (vīṭṭupēr).54  As Faiza suggests, Adarsh's opposition to vīṭ is not only 
rooted in environmentalist disapproval of quarrying and the destruction of natural beauty, but 
also in his objections to prevalent Indian forms of kinship. Adarsh is against the family. He 
criticized the Indian institution of family as patriarchal, repressive of children's individuality, and 
supportive of caste inequities. Just as the house is generally taken to be iconic of the family, so 
Adarsh's opposition to the hierarchical and coercive aspects of kin relations motivated his 
opposition to homeownership.55 
                                                 
54 One's vīṭṭupēr is, specifically, the name shared by one's lineage, whether through the 
matrilineal or patrilineal line. However, people also use caste names or the names of their 
villages as surnames.  
55 For the sake of brevity, I do not discuss the details of Adarsh's many grievances with house 
and family here. Note, however, that family is one of the institutions in Mohandas' diagram that 
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And yet, as with tea, it would seem that Adarsh was not following through. First, because 
he and Faiza had begun their own nuclear family, albeit an inter-caste, inter-religious one. And 
additionally, because during the time that I was visiting he and Faiza began looking to purchase a 
house. Adarsh refused to be directly involved in this; whenever I asked about it, he said that he 
had no idea what was going on with it and had no interest in the matter. But he knew Faiza and 
her father were going to look at houses and, other than occasional grumbling and complaints, he 
made no effort to stop them. He was resigned to becoming a homeowner. 
"I really have no interest in owning a house," he said, "But for that very reason, it doesn't 
depend on my decision. If [Faiza] is interested, then maybe that isn't the sort of thing I should 
insist on. Because all of the reasons behind my decisions might be very different." 
Adarsh was not certain what Faiza's reasons were for wanting a house. He suggested that 
it might be simply that women, generally, have a different understanding of comfort. Or perhaps, 
he said, it might be because of differences in their childhood experiences of house and family. 
Either way, given the difference between their perspectives, he thought it was best for him to let 
Faiza go ahead with looking for a house. He thought it was best to compromise. 
Adarsh's relativist approach to the decision to buy a home prioritized other forms of 
relationship over alignment of ethical stance; even if he was opposed to owning a home, what 
was more important was that he must live together with Faiza. Thus, he was willing to allow for 
some inconsistency between his ethical views and his way of life in exchange for sharing his life 
with her. Here we can see a valuation of family creeping into Adarsh's own position with respect 
to homeownership, despite his opposition to vīṭ being partly rooted in criticism of the subversion 
                                                 
are understood to perpetuate alienation. Adarsh's views on family and house were broadly shared 
with others in the Kēraḷīyam network. Such views were taken to be integral to the political 
analysis described above as "awareness."   
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of individual freedom to family control. With regard to purchasing a house, his individual 
preference must be subordinated to Faiza's desire to have a house. Of course, insofar as he is the 
one deferring to Faiza, the logic of control here differs from the patriarchal hierarchy Adarsh 
criticizes. Nonetheless, in agreeing to buy a house, Adarsh is doubly compromising his 
opposition to family, both in the decision taken and in the way that decision is taken. 
But why is Adarsh willing to compromise? To answer that question, it is important to 
understand Adarsh's ambivalence about family. Again and again, he says he is opposed to 
family, to vīṭ. This was a refrain I heard often during our time living together. But in discussing 
his accession to Faiza's decision, Adarsh also noted that there is one good thing about family 
relationships: compared to friends, kin do not part ways so easily.  
"With friends, if we get in a fight for some reason, maybe that relationship will break. 
But with family, even if we fight, somehow that relationship will continue. Take me and my 
father—we are always fighting, always arguing. If he was not my father, maybe we'd just stop 
talking to each other. But maybe the reason that relation continues, even though we fight, maybe 
it's because of that blood relation...But we should have that toward everyone, hear!  But that sort 
of bond, it amazes me sometimes. Even if we have some difference of opinion, that bond still 
stays!  I only see that kind of bond in the family." 
Despite his opposition to the family, Adarsh articulates a value that he believes is best 
realized in blood relations; he describes sustaining a relationship as an end in itself.56  Once 
again, he uses a metaphor of talking to suggest that differences of opinion should not be a reason 
to avoid relationship altogether. Not only family relationships, but other bonds should be 
                                                 
56 The notion of something being an "end in itself" or "good in its own right" is also used to 
describe what is distinct about ethical value. For further discussion of this definition of ethics, 
and what it means for something to be taken as an "end in itself" in practice, see Chapter 5. 
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sustained despite different views. Thus, Adarsh is ambivalent about family, but he also suggests 
that a certain ambivalence is a good thing in relationships. Whereas for Hari social relationships 
are increasingly defined by alignment in pursuit of consistency, Adarsh envisions an expansion 
to all relationships of the sort of bonds he sees among kin, which endure regardless of evaluative 
alignment or disalignment.  
Adarsh is willing to compromise because he values forms of relation other than shared 
ethical positions, and he is willing to give up consistency for this other value. He is willing to 
own a house, despite being opposed to owning a house, because he values relationship with 
Faiza. This is not an alignment of value, not a win-win; it is a trade-off. This logic of exchange is 
fundamentally different from what we see in Hari's cosmological work above. For Hari, all forms 
of value are constructed so as to be in harmony with one another; to follow through on one's 
stance is also to be healthy, politically effective, and spiritually fulfilled. The one area in which 
Hari must make a trade-off is with regard to social relationships, and there he chooses internal 
consistency over relations to others. But for Adarsh, because relations to others are valuable in 
and of themselves, consistency must frequently be compromised. Having a wife who disagrees 
with him about homeownership translates into owning a home despite being against homes. For 
Adarsh, such compromises may still be experienced as a failure, as is suggested by his frustration 
with being unable to stop drinking tea. But these failures are accepted as necessary in order to 
sustain relationships. 
6.10 Activists Against the World, Activists in the World 
Both Hari's and Adarsh's approaches to the tension between being consistent and 
sustaining social relations can, to some extent, be seen in the stories of every activist I 
encountered in my fieldwork. Others told me stories of cutting ties with family, of being 
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strangers in their home villages, and of struggling to find companions that shared their views. 
Just as Hari and Salim's farming commune failed because of disagreements over correct 
cultivation practices, there were many stories of other collaborations, other communes, started 
with great expectation and dissolved in frustration over differences of opinion. Activists often 
talked to me about how much more they could have done if only they could have worked 
together.  
The problem, I heard again and again, was ego. However, studying stories like Hari's 
closely, we might say that ego is too easy an answer, if by ego one only means selfishness or 
pride. Rather, activists' collaborations were often predisposed to fail by the fact that they were 
made up of activists. Like Hari, these were people who had set themselves apart by choosing to 
live according to their radical evaluative positions despite the difficulties those positions created 
for relationships. When they broke with their families or their villages, they chose consistency 
with their views over continuity of relationship. That is part of what made them out of place 
among the "common people" (sādhāraṇakkār). It is what made them activists. And when they 
encountered differences of opinion in their own collaborations, they often made the same 
choice—to part ways rather than compromise.  
But Adarsh, who so often chooses compromise, faced a different sort of challenge—
inconsistency—and this was also common among other activists I met. They all compromised 
somehow. Even Hari, living at home, had to adjust somewhat to the ways of his family. He ate 
food that was not what he considered "natural.” I remember, the morning after our interview, he 
offered me a cup of tea. I declined and, a moment later, I saw him scolding his young nephew for 
drinking the cup that would have been mine. His nephew only laughed. Hari also had to find 
ways of living in common. Others owned houses or cars that they did not think were good, or ate 
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in air-conditioned restaurants, or smoked corporate cigarettes. This sometimes produced talk 
about hypocrisy, of course, just as some accused Adarsh of being a hypocrite for agreeing to 
publish an article against tea drinking. But as suggested earlier, even community among activists 
required that such demands for consistency not be carried too far. 
The specific approach to social change undertaken by many Malayali environmental 
activists, because it is situated at the intersection of South Asian understandings of personhood 
and global ethical consumption movements, makes dilemmas between consistency and 
compromise especially frequent and intensely felt. However, we can also imagine how anyone 
seeking to bring about social change would face such dilemmas. We can find this dilemma, for 
example, in the contrast between different American community organizing traditions' 
approaches to ideology. In the Alinskyite and "consensus" approaches to organizing, the 
recognition that ideology can be divisive motivates an emphasis on working together first, shared 
values and beliefs later (Alinsky, 1971; Eichler, 1995; Miller, 2015). The organizer is still 
expected to be motivated by a vision for progressive social change, but does not insist that every 
step of this process be consistent with this vision, focusing instead on identifying shared interests 
(Beck & Eichler, 2000; Pruger & Specht, 1969). In feminist organizing, by contrast, ideology is 
taken to be the defining feature of the approach to organizing, integral to every step of the 
process (Bradshaw et al., 1994; Hyde, 1996).  In each of these approaches, just as in Hari's and 
Adarsh's differing approaches to living out their beliefs, there is something to be lost and 
something to be gained. The activist who brackets ideology maximizes her ability to build 
community with a wide range of others, but may find that her organizing efforts do not produce 
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results that are, in the long run, consistent with her beliefs.57 On the other hand, the activist who 
foregrounds ideology risks alienating potential allies and, to the degree that her ideology is 
radical, may limit her range of potential influence.58 
Moreover, as in the case of Hari and Salim's farming commune, the effects of living 
consistently with one's views can threaten relations between those working for change, even 
when they ostensibly share a social justice agenda. In closing this chapter, I draw a connection to 
a very different context: radicalism among social workers in the US. Reisch and Andrews (2001) 
trace a tradition of radicalism within twentieth-century American social work that includes such 
organizations as the Bertha Capen Reynolds Society, the Radical Alliance of Social Service 
Workers, the National Welfare Rights Organization, and the Rank and File Movement. In 
introducing their study, the authors quote the National Association of Social Worker's (NASW) 
Code of Ethics and point out that the explicitly stated values in the Code seem to define "a 
radical vision for the profession" (2001, p. 2). And yet, the story they tell is one of generations of 
marginalization, of social workers who find themselves "out of place" within their own 
profession, both because of their views and because of the ways they enact those views. 
                                                 
57 For example, Alinsky grew frustrated in later years with the Back of the Yards Neighborhood 
Council's use of their coalition to resist racial integration (Connolly, 1976). As regards consensus 
organizing, its proponents have acknowledged that this method's ability to further a progressive 
agenda remains an open question (Beck & Eichler, 2000). 
58 An interesting counter example, which I do not have room to discuss in detail here, is 
Gandhi. Gandhi took radical positions on aspects of everyday life similar to those taken by Hari 
and Adarsh, and he arguably followed through more completely than either of them. In one 
sense, we can see how his dress, dietary habits, and sexual practices, for example, made him 
strange to others and "out of place."  And yet, this strangeness was also what made him a 
powerful leader, revered as a sort of organizer-saint (Fox, 1989). Certainly, Gandhi is not the 
only such example; one can identify versions of such "saintly" leaders of social change in 
contemporary India and elsewhere. In future research, it may be worth looking more closely at 
such examples of "moral exemplars" who are revered in part because of the consistency with 
which they live out their unusually radical views. What makes the difference between a Hari, as 
described here, and a Gandhi?  
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Presenting the results of a survey of contemporary heirs to this radical social work tradition, 
Reisch and Andrews state: 
Much like their professional ancestors, today's radical social workers consider themselves 
marginalized by colleagues and believe that they are often considered troublemakers because of 
their political views and activities. One respondent commented, "Many of [my colleagues] see 
me as...abrasive and I know that they would prefer I keep my mouth shut...so I tend to be on the 
fringe.” Another spoke of being "socially shunned" (2001, p. 224). 
Reisch and Andrews recount experiences that share much with Hari's description of 
struggling to make action consistent with beliefs, of being criticized and laughed at, and of 
gradually finding oneself isolated without, as Hari put it, any "space...to speak" (2001, pp. 213, 
224). Like Hari, one social worker described how his "philosophy has hardened more and more" 
as he has experienced increasing marginalization in the profession (2001, p. 221). Others 
responded in ways more akin to the compromises made by Adarsh, acting "as a radical" only 
outside of the social work profession, or self-censoring in their conversations, teaching, or 
publications (2001, pp. 220, 223). Reisch and Andrews argue that a tension between enacting 
radical views and participating in the broader social work community characterizes not only the 
personal experiences of radical social workers, but also the tradition as a whole, particularly in 
its engagement with the professionalization of American social work. On the one hand, the 
authors acknowledge that many social work radicals see radicalism and professionalism as 
fundamentally incompatible (2001, pp. 233-234). On the other hand, they question whether the 
radical tradition can survive or be effective if entirely cut off from mainstream organizations and 
institutions (2001, p. 234). As for Hari and Adarsh, it is in no way obvious which choice would 
do more to further radical social workers' efforts for social change.  
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Such dilemmas are not only faced by self-described radicals, however, whether in the US 
or India. Reisch and Andrews argue that "the test of social work's commitment to its underlying 
values lies in the willingness to struggle on an often mundane, day-to-day basis to translate 
values into deeds" (2001, p. 231). To the extent that social workers attempt to undertake such 
everyday struggles for social change, they will face dilemmas between consistency and 
compromise—because to attempt to make the world better is, inevitably, to take evaluative 
positions that make one out of place in the world as it is. Seen from the vantage point of calls for 
social justice or the prescriptions of codes of ethics, the solution to such dilemmas may seem 
obvious: following through on one's values is, by definition, the only ethically justifiable option. 
In this chapter, however, I have examined such dilemmas as deeply felt problems that pervade 
everyday life. From this vantage point, I wish to suggest, the solution is less clear. First, because 
social relations may have value in and of themselves. But additionally, because the very work of 
bringing about change must be undertaken in and through one's relationships. A person who 
compromises too much will not make a difference, but neither will an isolated person. Thus, 
those who set out to transform their social worlds must remain participants in those worlds while 
also setting themselves apart. 
In this chapter, we have explored how the efforts of activists associated with Kēraḷīyam 
to enact radically alternative ethical values can cause rifts in their relationships. Together with 
the previous chapter, this chapter demonstrates how accountability to oneself and accountability 
to others are often closely affiliated, one blurring into the other. It is by exploiting this 
relationship that creative projects of changing oneself become persuasive projects of changing 
others, and vice versa. In the next chapter, we will continue to explore the power of stance 
alignment, in particular, to drive ethical creativity and persuasion. But we will also put this force 
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into question. We will look beyond stance-taking as a relation between subjects and inquire into 
the moral powers of evaluated objects. Examining the moral realist underpinnings of evidentiary 
practices in the Gandhamur campaign, we will ask what force, if any, the sights and smells of 
pollution can exert on the ethical commitments of activists and the sympathies of those to whom 
they appeal. 
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Chapter 7: The Smell of Injustice 
7.1 Evidence, evidence everywhere 
Sometime in the night, the effluent pipe from the gelatin factory broke, and by late 
morning, the paddy field was completely flooded. The Action Council mobilized. Peters, an 
accountant and local civic luminary who was active in the campaign against the factory, stood 
knee-deep in the muck for several hours while a small forest of flags grew up around him, each 
bearing the insignia of a different political party. By noon, Peters began to pass out and had to be 
carried away, but this seemed only to lift the protestors' spirits higher. Journalists came and went, 
trying to capture the smelly blackness in the water with their video cameras, and in the afternoon, 
at last, the district collector59 arrived. As she stepped out of her little white car, the Action 
Council converged, with several prominent women in the lead. They took her from site to site, 
along the edge of the field, and down the canal to the river. The collector said very little, but 
nodded, smiled, and looked very concerned. Then, when she had seen all and was about to get 
back into her car, a reporter pointed a camera in her face and demanded some statement about 
what she had just seen. 
"In a layman's way, I can say the problem is very clearly that there is pollution. The 
                                                 
59 A district collector is a government official in charge of revenue collection and 
administration of a district (a subdivision of states, comparable to a county in the US). As 
officers of the Indian Administrative Service, collectors have a certain degree of autonomy from 
electoral politics. A collector has the power to issue "stop work" orders for businesses operating 
within the district under her charge. 
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government has to decide whether they want a technical report and what must be done."  
And with that, she slipped back into her car and left. 
Activists in the campaign against the gelatin factory in Gandhamur often found 
themselves in the paradoxical position of being inundated with evidence and having no evidence 
at all. They lived their lives immersed in pollution; they smelled it in the air, saw it floating in 
the river or the paddy field, and tasted it in their drinking water. But they struggled to produce 
the "technical" forms of evidence demanded by government officials or the courts. Campaign 
participants and supporters might be moved by smells, sights, or tastes, but the state would only 
act on science. 
For the Gandhamur Action Council, producing evidence of pollution was as much an 
ethical problem as a problem of fact. Pollution, of course, is an inherently moral concept ; to say 
that something is polluted is to say that it is not as it ought to be. In the controversy over the 
gelatin factory, evidence of pollution was never simply about discovering what was there, but 
always also about what ought to be done. For Action Council participants evidence of pollution 
was evidence of injustice. Thus, as an ethical problem, evidence was important in more than one 
way. It was a strategic problem, a matter of how to persuade others to join the cause. But it was 
also an existential problem; if there was no injustice there, there was no cause to join at all. Thus, 
the Action Council's difficulties with scientific evidence were, potentially, as much a problem for 
morale within the campaign as for the success of its appeals to government officials or the 
broader public. 
Many protest movements and activist campaigns seek to produce evidence to some 
extent. If we accept Charles Tilly and Tarrow's (2007) definition of contentious politics as actors 
making claims bearing on the interests of others, then it is not hard to see how those who pursue 
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contentious politics would sometimes need to provide warrant for their claims. What 
distinguishes environmental organizing, however, is the importance of evidence from the 
physical sciences as backing for claims of injustice. As Tesh notes, "although citizens who 
organize against environmental pollution do use moral concepts, their claims have a scientific 
base" (2000, p. 9). Although Tesh (2000) documents several US environmental campaigns that 
were successful despite a lack of scientific evidence, she shows that environmental science was 
important to activists' understandings of environmental hazards and their motivations for 
organizing. In other words, even where environmental activists do not make strategic use of 
scientific evidence, it remains existentially crucial. Making claims in environmental politics is 
inseparable from making scientific facts. 
And yet, by the time they took the district collector down to the edge of the paddy, the 
Gandhamur Action Council had had enough of science. For many months its official position 
had been that no more studies were needed, and opposition to scientific research had become 
even more strident after the release of a recent government report by a panel of independent 
experts. Although the report had found elevated levels of some heavy metals, it had described the 
results as inconclusive and called for further study. Further study: Vijayan, the leader of the 
Action Council, often told me that this was all scientific studies had ever or would ever achieve. 
Members of the Action Council heard the collector's words as confirmation of this sentiment. 
Although many held her in high regard, they were deeply frustrated. If the collector had seen the 
pollution with her own eyes and told the TV reporters it was real, then why was yet another 
technical report necessary? The mood by the edge of the paddy turned glum.  
Struggles over claims about the reality of injustices are usually analyzed in terms of 
competing efforts to impose human notions of justice and injustice onto a value-neutral reality. 
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In social movement studies, for example, organizations are described as strategically "framing" 
real situations or events in ethically charged ways that serve their aims (see Chapter 3). In such 
accounts, the values belong to the activists, not to the world. But this approach to ethics is not 
unique to studies of contentious claim making. In anthropology, at least, human values are 
generally described as springing from social practices of evaluation in which the objects of 
evaluation have a bit role at best. The metaphor of stance, which I discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6, captures this view of the ontology of ethical values well. Ethical value is a matter of 
how people position themselves in relation to things, not a matter of the intrinsic qualities of 
things. Humans give values to reality; they do not draw them from reality. 
In recent years, the idea that ethical values are of more-than-human making has had a 
growing number of proponents in philosophy and sociology (Philip S Gorski, 2013; Sayer, 2011; 
C. Smith, 2015). Anthropologists have by and large remained suspicious of these trends (Fiske & 
Mason, 1990; Shweder & Menon, 2014). And they have good reason to be. Anthropologists have 
often been in the position of countering the claims of scholars in other disciplines that, to borrow 
Hume's (2000) terms, knowledge of what "is" makes them authorities on what "ought" to be. 
Anthropology's recent post-Kantian concern with ontology—i.e, with the "is"—has had little if 
any effect on the discipline's apprehension about moves from is to ought. Anthropologists have 
long argued that facts are value-laden, and some have begun to speak of realities as value-laden 
as well (Mol, 2002), which would seem to re-open the question of the place of realities in ethical 
life. But a simultaneous surge in research and theory about ethics has engaged little with all of 
the talk of reality and realities.60  Moral realism would seem to have a prime location at the 
                                                 
60 An important exception are Shweder and Menon (2014), who point out that most humans 
conceptualize values as objectively knowable. The authors argue that this fact should challenge 
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intersection of these two literatures but, perhaps because of its fraught history, it has remained 
relatively unexamined.  
From one angle, the predicament of the Gandhamur Action Council illustrates 
anthropologists' concerns with moral realism perfectly: their moral claims go unanswered 
because government experts, being the authorities on what is in the water, are also the arbiters of 
what should be done. And yet, the Action Council and its supporters, even if they refuted the 
need for further scientific studies, did not give up on links between the is and the ought. On the 
contrary, taking the collector to the edge of the paddy, calling TV reporters, setting flags in the 
muck and lining up chairs on the side of the road—it was all about contention over moral reality. 
For these and many other environmental organizers, the best road to ought lies through evidence.  
Activist uses of evidence should provoke us to consider moral realism more seriously, if 
from a somewhat novel angle. Activist evidence is always evidence for a cause, and in that sense 
it fits with existing metaphors of value as a "stance" or "frame"—that is, an action upon the 
world. This aspect of activist evidence poses a challenge to the propensity of some recent 
treatments of ontology to treat claims about reality as self-sufficient and non-contentious 
(Graeber, 2015). Nonetheless, activist evidence also presumes that reality is already value-laden, 
and that what is at stake is not only how humans evaluate reality but what actually exists. 
Contention over the presence of pollution in Gandhamur, then, is an ethical problem that is also a 
problem for our theories of ethics. By analyzing the evidentiary practices through which Action 
Council participants attempted to demonstrate the reality of pollution in Gandhamur, we can 
explore the varieties of relation between is and ought and reopen the question of moral realism 
                                                 
anthropologist to take moral realism more seriously, and warn of unintended political 
implications of assuming a relativist viewpoint. 
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for the anthropology of ethics. 
7.2 The smell of injustice 
When I arrived in Kerala for dissertation fieldwork in 2013, I was warned not to go to 
Gandhamur. Just when I had settled with my daughter in the nearby town of Chalakudy and was 
ready to make my first field visit, police charged a group of protesters in front of the gelatin 
factory and beat them with heavy sticks. This event stimulated new organizing efforts, making 
Gandhamur an even more attractive research site. However, in the first few days after the 
violence, friends told me that visiting there would likely get me deported and maybe worse. It 
was hard to wait. Pained by the thought of all I might be missing, I gave my research assistant, 
Sunil, a little basic training on how to take field notes, outfitted him with my audio recorder and 
camera, and sent him to find out what he could. 
But when Sunil returned that evening, it was not the photos, recordings, or field notes he 
brought back that interested me; something had changed about Sunil himself.  
"Have you become one of the campaign activists?" I asked, grinning. 
When Sunil and I had talked about the gelatin factory campaign before, he had always 
been cautious, if not skeptical. He had told me that he did not plan to take sides. But now, after 
only a few hours in the village, he was ready to admit that he was no longer neutral. He was 
certain that the protesters claims were true, and he felt he also should join the campaign. How, I 
asked, had this change happened? 
"They all told me 'there is so much pollution in the water,' and I heard them." Sunil 
explained, "But when I saw it directly, then it was really true. Because in the water there was this 
smell...A smell was there, and there was the color change of that...so it must've been when I saw 
all of that." 
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Sunil and I would reflect back on his first visit to Gandhamur, and its effect on him, for 
many months to come. Each of us would be taken to the edge of the water many more times, and 
we would watch others, like the district collector, be taken there as well to see and smell the 
pollution. Indeed, in the months following the police violence, much of the activity of the 
campaign was organized around such guided tours for outside visitors, which occurred several 
times per day. We watched them lead students, religious leaders, and government officials to the 
same spots. We heard the same arguments about acid, asthma, and cancer rates. The same story 
of a wedding reception that had been canceled due to the bad smell. Watching local activists 
show visitors the pollution again and again, I became more aware of the showing, and of what 
the activists said, and less attentive to the stuff in the water and the smell in the air. Over time, I 
began to see direct encounters as a powerful ritual capable of transforming other visitors just as it 
had transformed Sunil. 
Making the pollution obvious was never about allowing it to speak for itself. In my video 
recording from the collector's visit, for example, the local activists surround the collector as soon 
as she steps out of her car. There are always multiple voices speaking at once, and many parts of 
the audio track are difficult to transcribe. What I can make out is full of deictics: 
"This is the water that we have to drink! We should make them drink this! 
 "This is my riverbank. I am living right next to the river...The riverbank next to my 
house is like this." 
 "This soil cannot be used ever again! This soil is destroyed. This area is destroyed."  
With such words, the activists directed the collector's attention to aspects of what lay 
around her. As they pointed with their words, they also pointed with their hands. They leaned 
forward to insert themselves into her visual field. Moreover, they tied what she saw to aspects of 
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their experience that she could not see—to drinking the water, to living beside the river, to 
farming the soil. 
Like Sunil, the collector and others described seeing and smelling the pollution in this 
way as nēriṭṭ, glossed above as "directly," an adverb derived from the Malayalam for "straight." 
A popular Malayalam-English dictionary lists the glosses of nēriṭṭ as "directly, in person, without 
mediators" ("Nēriṭṭ,"  2012). Local activists often used this term to describe their own 
experiences with pollution, particularly the experiences that had led them to join the campaign 
(see Chapter 2). Given the importance of direct experience with pollution in local organizers' 
own motivations, it is not surprising that they sought to enroll others by taking them to 
experience the pollution directly as well. 
Though the rhetoric of directness focuses on a relation between an experiencing subject 
and pollution, directness should also be understood as a relation between subjects. When locals 
guide the collector's attention to the stuff in the water or a house on the far side of the paddy, 
they construct what Schutz' called a "we" relationship—a shared, intersubjective orientation to 
the world. As Schutz argues, a "we" relationship is not only a way of knowing some third object, 
but a way of knowing one another. Schutz describes this relationship using a metaphor of two 
people beside each other watching a bird in flight. They not only orient to the bird, they also 
orient to one another via the bird. Both people may not experience an object (e.g. bird) in the 
world in the same way, but they nonetheless share a togetherness in their coordinated 
experiences of objects.  
Such intersubjective coordination points to one way of theorizing the role of reality in 
ethics. Keane, building on the work of Garfinkel, has argued that ethical judgement depends 
upon the construction of intersubjective agreement about "what is going on and, given that, what 
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the appropriate way to act is" (Keane, 2016, pp. 89, 90). Under the conceptualization of reality as 
intersubjective agreement, ethical value is still imposed by humans upon the world, but "the 
world" is itself a product of human interaction. Thus, what Keane calls "shared reality" not only 
includes descriptions of what is, but also prescriptions for what ought to be done. When the 
locals in Gandhamur showed Sunil the pollution, for example, we might say he had a direct 
encounter not only with pollution, but also with injustice. The metaphor of stance works well 
with this way of talking about moral reality. If Sunil's encounter with injustice was enacted 
through an ethical alignment with Action Council participants, his encounter with pollution 
might be called an ontic alignment. 
One advantage of the notion of reality as intersubjective coordination is that it renders the 
"is/ought" problem unproblematic. To the extent that reality is already fundamentally social, it is 
also already replete with human values. In other words, everything that is has already been 
relocated into the world of human oughts, so is and ought no longer require any bridging. One 
could argue, then, that this conception of reality, which is popular in anthropology, already 
includes a kind of moral realism. But this moral realism only applies insofar as reality is 
understood to be constructed intersubjectively.61 
 As the ritual of direct encounter makes apparent, the intersubjective coordination 
required for sustaining a shared moral reality can take a lot of work (Keane, 2016, p. 91). In 
Schutz' example, coordination might seem to arise spontaneously from the mere co-presence of 
                                                 
61 Keane's discussion of shared reality, for example, is specifically concerned with the 
background assumptions required for social interaction and, by extension, evaluation in 
interaction. At the same time, his discussion of natural histories and affordances employs a 
notion of reality that is not limited to intersubjectivity. Thus, while his analysis might be called 
realist with regard to shared reality, this does not imply moral realism with regard to the 
objective world.    
  256 
 
people and birds,  but the Action Council members did not have it so easy. Pointing with both 
their hands and their words, they had to guide the collector in following the flow of the pollution 
from the factory into the paddy field and beyond, into a river that could not be seen from where 
they stood. And the work of coordination did not stop there. With their stories of stinky wells 
and late night coughing, of skin rashes and cancer, they guided her in tracking the movement of 
the pollution through their lives. 
Direct encounters, in other words, were intensely mediated. Mazzarella (2006) has 
warned that activists' claims of direct access to reality—what he calls the "politics of 
immediation"—are dangerous because they hide the work of mediation. Such erasures are 
apparent in the contrast between the rhetoric of direct encounters with pollution and the highly 
mediated direct encounter ritual. But to reject immediation claims as bad politics on these 
grounds alone would miss the point. Because what is at stake in claims to directness, at least in 
this case, is not so much that pointing, commenting, and other kinds of mediation are not 
involved. What is important is that these are not everything. When Sunil describes his direct 
encounter with the pollution, he begins by saying that the local activists had already told him 
about it. So he did not happen upon the pollution alone. The locals prepared him and guided him 
there. But what really convinced him to join their cause, he claimed, was what they guided him 
to. The smell of it. The color. Sunil said that these had an effect that was greater than, and 
therefore not reducible to, the agency of the local activists. Reality, he claimed, persuaded him. 
To what extent are the claims of Sunil and others to direct encounters with pollution (i.e. 
with injustice) compatible with the conceptualizations of "shared realities" above? The answer 
may depend upon how much emphasis is placed upon sharing and how much is placed upon 
reality. Sunil's direct encounter with pollution is undoubtedly conditioned and mediated by social 
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interaction with local activists. But it also adds something. The smell and the color become a 
condition for a new social coordination; they bring about a new alignment between Sunil and the 
activists. And Sunil claims that this effect was only possible insofar as the smell and the color 
were not themselves reducible to local activists' prior attempts at coordination. This claim seems 
to align closely with Schutz' account of the "we" relationship, in which the flying bird is a 
condition for social coordination. Attention to the bird may be mediated by a pointing finger or 
even the movement of an eye, but the relation between watchers is also mediated by the bird. For 
both Sunil and Schutz then, even if social coordination is always a precondition for shared 
realities, reality is not reducible to sharing. On the contrary, reality is also a precondition for 
social coordination. 
An important difference between Sunil's and Schutz' concerns, however, is that Sunil has 
seen and smelled a moral object whereas Schutz' birdwatchers only watched a bird. Schutz 
describes the birdwatchers as sharing space and time, but direct encounters were intended to be 
productive of a shared ethics as well. Implicit in Sunil's description of his encounter with the 
pollution, then, is a theory that values, and not only neutral objects, are not reducible to social 
coordination. To return to the metaphor of stance once again, Sunil's ethical position with respect 
to the campaign was not merely an effect of his interaction with Gandhamur activists. The reality 
that he encountered was, in some sense, already positioned for him. Here, talk of stancetaking 
comes up against a limit because it can describe subject positions and alignment of subject 
positions with respect to objects, but the objects themselves (regardless of whether they are 
human or non-human) have no agency in the matter. And yet, the possibility of direct encounters 
with pollution requires that objects can have ethical effects on subjects. To come face-to-face 
with injustice is not only to access the world as it is, but also to recognize with certainty what 
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ought (or ought not) to be. 
Although Sunil's did not describe his own direct encounter this way, our other 
observations of the direct encounter ritual suggested that empathetic engagement was crucial to 
making directness a matter of ethical, and not only ontic, alignment. Local organizers did not 
only direct the collector's attention to the polluted water, but to the "water that we have to drink." 
Likewise, when they tied objects in the shared sensory field to stories of a child's sickness or a 
smell strong enough to wake them in the night, they took shared sights and smells as an 
infrastructure for building a shared experience of injustice. But if Sunil's account of his first 
direct encounter exemplifies a move from smelling the pollution to empathizing with the 
struggle, much other talk of pollution in Gandhamur seemed to make the opposite move. Stories 
of suffering were appeals for empathy, and the recognition of the smell in the air as pollution was 
undergirded by this emotional and moral alignment. 
 In direct encounters, then, we can we see one way that activists bridge the "is" and the 
"ought." But it is a two-way bridge. Sunil arrived at commitment to the cause by way of smells 
and colors, but Gandhamur activists were not shy about getting to the smell by means of 
commitment to the cause. The latter move—from "ought" to "is"—was diffusely evident in the 
whole mood and tenor of the protest by the rice paddy on the day the collector came. Mingling 
and chatting in the road that ran between the paddy and the factory wall, protestors complained 
of headaches and difficulty breathing. They told jokes with nose between thumb and forefinger 
and shouted up at the factory workers' peering over the wall. And they went back again and again 
to point out the nastiness to visitors and to each other. There was a collective elation, it seemed, 
in the sudden obviousness of the pollution. The complaints, the jokes, and the pointing all made 
the pollution more obvious, and the obviousness was fodder for more commentary, more 
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pointing. One might say that a vicious (or virtuous) cycle was set up between sharing and reality, 
such that pollution was directly experienced and outrage shared by all. In this festive 
convergence of fact and value, injustice was felt to be undeniable. 
7.3 “That’s what you say” 
The collector's direct encounter with the pollution may not have persuaded her to do what 
Gandhamur organizers wanted, but she did take action, and quickly. Late that afternoon, a 
second little white car arrived, carrying a scientist from the Kerala Pollution Control Board and a 
trunkload of plastic jugs. She did not receive the same welcome the collector had. At least one 
man shouted at her to leave. But Salil, the unofficial slogan leader for the Action Council, led her 
down to the water's edge. While he waded into the muck with one of the jugs, other men 
gathered around. It was getting close to dinnertime now, and the women were at home. As the 
researcher began to make notes in her clipboard, Stevenson, the owner of a nearby brick and roof 
tile factory, edged his way in beside her. 
"This goes from the paddy into the canal, doesn't it?" she asked. 
"From the paddy into the perunthodu canal. This is a tributary..." 
They went back and forth, indicating directions with their hands as Stevenson described 
the path that the blackish water would take to get to the river. While she wrote in her pad, he 
leaned closer and softly asked her to understand that no one had anything against her personally. 
It was just that they had been bearing all of this for so long. For a moment, she turned and looked 
him in the eye. 
"I'm not saying that, but shouldn't people speak with some manners? Someone said 'I'll 
hit you !'" 
"Hey! There was nothing like that...someone said that?" 
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"That's what [he] said," the researcher confirmed, turning her attention back to her 
notepad, "And I know who said it too." 
But before Stevenson could say more, some of the other men standing behind her 
interjected. They spoke up all at once, raising their voices to talk over one another. 
"No! Madam! That's the disgust of the people! They're saying that because they have not 
been able to get justice for 5 ½ years. There's no point in blaming them." 
"Why test this when you can see it with your bare eyes?!" 
"It's right there...even a child would understand." 
The KPCB researcher stiffened and stared silently at the black and foamy water. 
Stevenson tried to speak over the others, leaning closer and describing how the people here lie 
awake in bed at night, unable to breathe, but now the researcher gave him no response. Finally, 
cutting him off, she asked, "This was emitted the day before yesterday, wasn't it?" 
"Yes." 
"The twenty first, right?" 
"Yes." 
She noted it down in her pad. Behind her, the others crowded closer and louder. 
Stevenson bent closer as well, leaning out over the water to get into her field of vision. She did 
not look up.  
"Let me just say one simple thing...wasn't it in Njeetorey [a village downstream] that the 
fish died?" 
 "Since when has this been floating up to the surface?" she asked, "Since morning?" 
"Night," he said. 
... 
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In some ways the process of taking samples would seem to offer an ideal opportunity for 
facilitating a direct encounter with the pollution. The researcher needed to establish 
spatiotemporal co-orientation with the Action Council members in order to take samples, and 
Stevenson astutely perceived this as an opportunity for ethical co-orientation as well. But unlike 
the collector, the researcher refused every attempt to embed aspects of the sensory surround in 
narratives about locals' experiences of suffering. When Stevenson mentioned how breathing 
problems keep local residents up at night, for example, she did not respond. Her next utterance, a 
question about when the effluent was emitted, again established a co-orientation to the stuff in 
the water, but not to breathing problems. She sought to co-orient to a shared reality, but she was 
selective about what aspects of reality she would share. 
Like Stevenson, others soon came forward to share stories about health problems, 
especially those of their children, with the KPCB researcher. And for the most part, she 
responded as she had to Stevenson: staying focused on her notepad and restricting her utterances 
to questions about the stuff she was sampling. Only as she was getting back into her car, did the 
men finally seem to break through. Stevenson had just finished describing his own child's 
breathing ailment, and Rajesh asked her where she lived. She murmured something very softly. 
"You have children, don't you?" asked Rajesh. 
She affirmed with a slight twitch of her head, her hand on the car door handle. 
"We're telling you this because we have children," he said. 
"Madame, one minute," began an older man who, until now, has been standing quietly 
behind the others, "After six chemotherapy treatments, my wife is finally sort of healthy...My 
brother's house is just opposite, just across this [he points to the paddy field]. This smell, these 
are things that we are really experiencing." 
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"Aren't you standing with all of that?" Rajesh demanded, "For this company?" 
"That's what you say, isn't it?" The researcher asked, her tone implying that the question 
needed no answer. 
"What?" 
 "That's what you say, isn't it?" she said again, laughing as she climbed into the car. 
The researcher's question, "That's what you say, isn't it?" foregrounds her denial of co-
orientation to a shared reality. By framing the position of Rajesh and others62 as "what you say," 
the researcher marks her non-alignment with that position while also not explicitly disagreeing. 
The stories the campaign participants tell are their stories, not hers. More importantly, in 
focusing on the campaign participants' words as "what you say," the researcher undermines any 
possibility of direct encounter with the injustices that the local activists claim are real. The 
campaign participants, she insists, are mediators, and further appeals to her will only be 
recognized as more mediation. What they say must remain only what they say. 
By focusing on the campaign participants as mediators, the KPCB researcher not only 
refused to treat their experiences as immediate, but also refused an immediacy of relationship 
with them. Schutz notes that, "the greater my awareness of the we-relationship, the less is my 
involvement in it, and the less am I genuinely related to my partner. The more I reflect, the more 
my partner becomes transformed into a mere object of thought" (167). By recognizing their 
appeals only as "what you say," the researcher fixed them as objects of observation, rather than 
as participants in a shared subjectivity. In this way, she foreclosed the empathetic engagement 
                                                 
62 In the video, it is not clear whether the researcher's question is addressed only to Rajesh or to 
the whole group. But insofar as Rajesh was attempting a kind of summary point – a rhetorical 
capstone demanding a response to all that he and the others had been telling her-- it makes sense 
to hear the researcher as characterizing the campaign participants' words in general. 
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that might otherwise have led her to join their cause. It was as if she looked where Stevenson 
pointed in order to take her samples, but when he described their experiences of suffering, she 
attended only to his pointing finger, as it were. Thus, on the same bit of road that was bubbling 
over with the obviousness of pollution a few hours before, the cycle between sharing and reality 
was rendered inert—cut short before it had a chance to gather any momentum. 
The Action Council members' interaction with the KPCB researcher helps to clarify why 
"direct" evidence was so important to them. If the activists' claims about injustice are only "what 
they say," then they lose their persuasive force for the researcher and, by extension, for the 
government. Directness was important to Sunil because it affected him in ways that the activists’ 
words did not. But for the KPCB official, the pollution will be recognized to exist only if it 
affects her in ways that are not reducible to what the activists say. In contrast to Mazzarella's 
warning that claims of unmediated access to reality can be dangerous, the Gandhamur activists 
faced a more urgent danger in the contention that their claims about reality were only mediations. 
One way to hear the KPCB researcher's response to activists is as an assertion that all 
claims about injustice are simply a matter of what people say. Her rejection of their experiences 
as valid, then, might be grounded in an ideology about who can authoritatively produce 
evidence. This interpretation would be consistent with my interactions with other KPCB 
officials. Late in my research, I was fortunate to make acquaintance with a friend of the chairman 
of the agency, and I arranged for an interview with him at their headquarters. However, when I 
arrived in his office, the chairman declined to answer any of my questions. He told me politely 
that the agency was responsible for studying pollution in Kerala and that they do their job well. 
Thus, he held, there was no reason for them to explain how they do it to anyone else. He said that 
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whatever information they provided for the public was already available on their website.63 In 
other words, the chairman asserted a straightforward division of labor in which the KPCB 
gathers evidence and distributes it to the government and, to some extent, the public. If the 
KPCB researcher dismissed the Gandhamur activists' evidentiary practices as "what you say," 
the chairman seemed accustomed to defining valid evidence as "what we say." 
Nonetheless, government researchers were not the only scientists who considered the 
Action Council's evidentiary practices less than adequate. Some scientists who were supporters 
of the campaign also considered empathetic co-orientation with campaign participants to be an 
illegitimate mediation of reality. For example, Asha was a prominent environmentalist scientist 
who had long supported the campaign. Nonetheless, she said that she could not lend her voice to 
the campaign's call to close down the factory completely. She could not fault campaign 
participants for demanding this, but such a demand was grounded in "emotion" (vikāram) and 
she was "a person that believes in facing all of the issues with facts and figures." She attributed 
action based on emotion to the people. Given "the people's" experience of the pollution in 
Gandhamur, she said, such intensity of emotion had arisen inevitably and spontaneously. But 
even though she shared their concerns, and validated their experiences, she declined to join them 
in acting based on emotion. She asserted that environmental activists simply do not have the kind 
of emotions (vikāram) that the people have.  
The term vikāram was frequently used to describe local activists in Gandhamur. Though I 
have glossed it above as "emotion," the term is generally used to denote only a subset of 
emotions—anger, sadness, or lust, but not happiness or love. Often, it is used to describe some 
                                                 
63 I searched the website extensively for reports on Gandhamur and could find none. I was later 
informed by my informants that they could only be obtained through a request filed under India's 
Right to Information Act. 
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combination of emotions, particularly when the effect is overwhelming. Vikāram is intense 
emotion that can drive a person to act in ways that they would not when level-headed. Local 
activists often described their vikāram with pride, calling it the source of the campaign's strength 
and tenacity. They also used the term to describe themselves at times when they seemed to 
anticipate that I might object to their actions; for example, when they became openly hostile with 
factory workers or journalists. When Rajesh sought to convince the KPCB researcher that she 
should not blame the locals for threatening her, he said it was because of their vikāram that "the 
people" say such things. 
Rajesh's use of vikāram to legitimate action implicitly invokes something like Asha's 
theory of spontaneous emotion arising from local experiences of pollution. Both Rajesh and 
Asha describe vikāram as moving "the people" (janaṅṅaḷ) to act, such that in some sense their 
actions are not their own. Here again, we have an assertion of immediacy: the injustice of the 
pollution stirs up the vikāram of the people, driving them to rise up in protest. Their actions 
cannot be evaluated in the usual ways because they are the outcome of injustice itself, rather than 
human reflection and agency. 
Analyzing similar claims about spontaneity in the American civil rights movement, 
Poletta (2006) has argued that denials of agency by social movement actors can encourage 
participation and heighten morale. The rhetoric of vikāram points to one possible reason for this 
seemingly counterintuitive finding. Under this interpretation, the actions of the protesters are 
taken to be an effect of the justice of their cause. The less reflective or strategic the actions, the 
more they point back to the reality of the pollution that drives them. The actions of the people are 
justified by the reality from which they spontaneously arise, and the existence of that reality is 
certified by the rage of the people. 
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Note, however, that Asha asserts that she cannot participate in this spontaneity because 
only the people have vikāram. Elsewhere, I have noted that the term "activists" (pravarttakar) is 
one defining contrast for such usages of "the people" (see Chapter 2). Asha notes that distinction 
and suggests that scientists, who deal in facts and figures, are excluded from the people as well. 
But even as a scientist and an activist, who cannot accept claims about reality based on emotion, 
Asha still concedes that the people have a kind of unmediated access to moral reality. She 
recognizes their demand to shut down the factory as valid for them because it is the injustice of 
their circumstances that motivates the demand. Thus, she implicitly recognizes that injustice is 
really there. But she also holds that, with regard to her own position as scientist and 
environmental activist, she cannot conclude that injustice is there.64  
One way to understand Asha's seemingly contradictory claims is through Mol's concept 
of distribution (2002). For Mol and some other proponents of the ontological turn in 
anthropology, reality is not so much a state of being as an activity; people do not discover or 
know reality, they do reality (Law, 2009; Mol, 2002, pp. 5,6). Mol argues that one consequence 
of this processual view is that realities are multiple and varied. Different ways of doing reality 
(e.g., what we have here called "evidentiary practices") bring different realities into being. In the 
view of ontology theorists, such different and potentially conflicting realities need not be 
subsumable within any encompassing ontology. Instead, they can be distributed across different 
settings, roles, or aims of evidentiary practices. Thus, Asha can do reality as scientist and activist 
even as she recognizes that Gandhamur activists do reality differently. She may even concede 
                                                 
64 This is not to say that Asha did not see any injustice in the Gandhamur situation. But the 
injustice she saw was not sufficient, she believed, to justify the claims the local activists were 
making. She argued that the situation justified that they make these claims, but did not justify the 
claims themselves. 
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that their reality is relevant to her in some ways so long as she distributes these two realities to 
separate questions or aspects of her work. We can see a similar act of distribution when the 
district collector asserts that, "in a layman's way," she is certain that pollution is there, while also 
maintaining that any government decisions would need to be based on a technical report. 
The notion of reality as an activity agrees in some ways with the conceptions of shared 
reality examined above. Both ontologies (or infra-ontologies, as ontological turn folks might 
have it) conceptualize reality as, at least in part, produced within and internal to certain social 
interactions. Schutz' conception of the "we" relationship, however, also presupposes that realities 
are external to and productive of social interactions. For Mol and other multiple ontology 
theorists, social interactions include both humans and nonhumans, but the realities that they 
enact are wholly internal to the enactment.  
This has important implications for the activist uses of evidence described here. If all 
realities are internal to enactments, then there is no way to claim that any evidentiary practice 
more directly accesses reality than any other. Every practice, one might say, has direct access to 
its own reality. Mol describes the consequences for moral claims concisely: "Bodies enacted are 
being done, which means they cannot answer the question of what to do" (2002, pp. 164-165, 
italics in original). If every encounter is a direct encounter, then realities have nothing to say 
about oughts. Gandhamur activists' encounters with injustice are only "what you say." 
For Gandhamur activists, the problem with the distribution of multiple realities is not 
simply that it vitiates their claims to directness, but that holding realities separate does not entail 
making them equal. On the contrary, for both Asha and the district collector, there is the 
implication that, when it comes to action, one reality must be more equal than the others. Asha's 
acceptance of multiple realities grounds her acceptance of local activists' intense emotions and 
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leads her to validate their conviction that the factory should be shut down. But she will not seek 
to shut down the factory herself. For that, facts and figures are needed. Likewise, by 
acknowledging the reality of the pollution "in a layman's way," the collector forestalls any 
question of government action. For both, their acceptance of some validity of what we might call 
"the people's reality" is couched in the assertion that this is not the reality that matters for their 
own actions. 
In short, theories of multiple realities offer no more for the activists in Gandhamur than 
theories of reality as sharing. For them, it matters that reality is shared not only with other 
activists, but with anyone they might seek to persuade. Only then can they claim that the 
injustice they know is the injustice others must recognize. For these activists, then, the multiple 
realities talk of the  "ontological turn" in anthropology misses the pragmatic meaning of reality 
entirely.65 
 Gandhamur activists claims about directness are contentious; they invoke moral reality 
in an attempt to counter the moral claims of the factory, its workers, the police, and others. 
Reality is powerful because it can separate out "what x says" from something more. It can 
arbitrate between different moral claims. If reality is a social process, it is not a sort of enacting, 
but a sort of arguing. If reality, opinion, and perspective all mean the same thing, then the 
Gandhamur activists have no reason to talk about reality at all. 
It is not hard to see why the Gandhamur Action Council came to oppose further scientific 
                                                 
65 Keane (2013) has recently argued that statements about the nature of reality generally are 
better analyzed with regard to their ethical implications, rather than treated as descriptions of 
alternate ways of being. While this is my own approach to analysis here, it is worth noting that it 
might also serve as a description of the KPCB researcher's response to activists. In other words, 
while the stakes in their claims are ethical, the desired pragmatic effect of their claims hinges on 
their not being read only as ethical stances, but also as legitimate accounts of a moral reality. 
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research altogether. Science is hazardous because it may render their moral claims simply "what 
they say." Even if scientific evidence is understood to enact only one of many realities, it 
undermines the force of activists' own invocations of reality to compel an ought, arrogating such 
moves to facts, figures, and technical reports. For the same reason, however, we can see why 
Gandhamur activists would have difficulty abandoning science altogether. Insofar as the reality 
of the KPCB, expert panels, and technical reports is the reality that matters for government 
action, they had much to lose by disavowing engagement with the agency's researchers entirely. 
What they required was a way to make their reality recognizable to science. 
7.4 People’s Science 
In her study of US environmental justice movements, Tesh (2000) describes 
environmentalists struggling with contradictions between people's experiences of injustice and 
the findings of scientists. She argues that these contradictions are rooted in fundamentally 
incompatible epistemologies. In Kerala, however, epistemological opposition between the people 
and science, while widely recognized, has not always been regarded as inevitable. From the early 
twentieth century, Kerala's Communist movement sought to ground its politics in absolute 
commitments to both the masses (bahujanaṅṅaḷ) and to science. In the 1960s, this Communist 
ethic produced the Kerala people's science movement (Kēraḷa Śāstra Sāhitya Pariṣatt, or KSSP), 
which sought to spread literacy, educate the masses in elementary scientific theories, and harness 
science in the service of the people (Isaac, Franke, & Parameswaran, 1997; Jaffry, Rangarajan, 
Ekbal, & Kannan, 1983). The people's science movement was by no means epistemologically 
relativist; scientific findings were taught to the people, not questioned in light of popular beliefs. 
But the notion that science should serve the people implied a certain division of labor; science 
supplied the means, but the purposes were to defend the interests of the people against 
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capitalism, corrupt governance, and other forms of injustice. Thus, KSSP popularized the notion 
that science could and should be on the people's side. By the time I arrived in Gandhamur, the 
booklets and scientific demonstrations of the KSSP were regarded as quaint remnants of a 
bygone era, but the possibility of people's science was still very much in the air. 
As should be clear by now, the Gandhamur Action Council often invoked the ethico-
epistemological authority of the people in making claims about injustice, and they did so with 
some success. But the campaign struggled to combine this authority with scientific evidence. 
Efforts to produced people's science were always underway, but the desired synthesis remained 
illusory. Part of the difficulty was lack of access to laboratories and expertise. Research produced 
in collaboration with students at a nearby social work school, for example, was dismissed for 
lack of rigor. On the other hand, there was also concern that an overly robust study might 
undermine the claims of the Action Council. At one point, a large panel of scientific experts from 
across Kerala was formed with the initial participation from both the factory owners and the 
campaign. According to its convener, this was a huge strategic opportunity for the campaign 
because he and nearly every member of the panel were strong supporters of the Action Council's 
cause. But the study never happened because the Action Council balked at the condition that it 
would have to accept whatever the panel found. Local leaders never doubted that the pollution 
was there, but they did doubt whether scientific research would confirm their views, even when 
the scientists appeared to be on their side. The problem was how to ensure that science would 
bolster, not undermine, the moral claims of the people. 
 The study that had come closest to achieving the people's science synthesis had been 
conducted by an NGO called Jananīti ("People's Justice"), which specialized in producing 
"investigative studies" on issues related to people's struggles. Campaign participants sometimes 
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argued that further research was not necessary because there was already an abundance of 
scientific evidence on their side, and the Jananīti study was the basis for this argument. The 
Jananīti study confirmed every aspect of the campaign's claims. Because it was published in the 
first years of the campaign, it is likely that its findings had influenced the framing of the claims 
as well. In particular, the study had found high levels of heavy metals in the water, and campaign 
participant's often described these metals as the reason for high levels of cancer and other 
illnesses in the village. Thus, this study had been adopted by the campaign, as it were, and its 
claims blended harmoniously into the voice of the people. 
Unfortunately, beyond confirming the views of activists themselves, the Jananīti study 
had had little impact on the trajectory of the campaign. The reasons for this failure were a topic 
of some debate, but the most common view was that the study, though full of evidence, was 
unscientific. Critics within the campaign described the study's problem as an excess of vikāram, 
the term Asha used to distinguish activism from science. The study, they argued, was too closely 
and obviously aligned with the perspectives and emotions of campaign participants; it read like 
an activist report more than a scientific report. Although the study's critics did not dispute its 
findings, nor disagree with its sympathies, they believed the study was of limited strategic use 
because it was too obviously already on the side of the people. 
James, the former Catholic priest who heads Jananīti, did not dispute that the report was 
sympathetic to the campaign. When I asked him about the impression among some that he had 
published "an activist report," he enthusiastically affirmed this view. 
"You are absolutely right. An activist report is what it is. But, facts are there. You can't 
deny it. See, that means there is a kind of emotional involvement in that." 
This emotional side of the report is apparent in the way that it presents evidence. In the 
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acknowledgements, for example, there is a dedication to "the PEOPLE OF GANDHAMUR who 
live at the other end of the pipeline to a total disaster, for their enduring resistance and persistent 
protests against a devastating industrial fiasco." The chapter presenting a "scientific analysis of 
samples" is preceded by a chapter describing the experiences of the Jananīti team who visited 
the site, which mixes descriptions of the effluent pipe, the sludge, and the smell with descriptions 
of the adverse effects on locals. This section of the report echoes the stories told in direct 
encounters, describing how infants cry through the night due to breathing difficulties, giving 
their parents insomnia and nightmares. The report not only feels for the people, but also seeks to 
elicit these feelings in the reader.  
While James acknowledged that the report was emotionally charged, in his view this was 
not an inadequacy by any means. Regardless of the tone of the report, he argued, the facts of the 
report spoke for themselves. He described how, shortly after the report was published, the 
company held a press conference dismissing it on the grounds that it was not "unbiased" 
(niṣpakṣam). When the press asked him for his response, he agreed that it was not unbiased, but 
he challenged anyone to prove that the report was false. And he suggested that no one could do 
this because of all the facts in the report. Even if it was not neutral, no one could refute the facts. 
"It is not a false report," he explained, "All the same, it is not a neutral [report]. The 
report is, I mean uh, it feels for the people." 
James' understanding of moral facts differs in important ways from the epistemological 
assumptions implicit in either the direct encounters of the Action Council or in Asha's notion of 
"facts and figures." In direct encounters, empathetic alignment with campaign participants is 
deployed in tandem with ontic alignment. Vikāram feeds into evidence and vice versa. Asha also 
recognizes the epistemic power of emotion, but sees it in a more negative light. In her view, it is 
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because of this power that a scientific approach requires distance from the intense emotion of the 
campaign. For James, however, emotional alignment with the campaign is unproblematic so long 
as the facts are also there. He presents emotional involvement as a distinct aspect of Jananīti's 
report that, though agreeing with the facts, could not be understood to taint them in anyway. The 
voice of the people might sing through, harmonizing with the facts, but the facts still spoke with 
their own voice. 
Critics of the report argued, on the contrary, that the Jananīti report's emotion rendered 
its facts unconvincing. It was not necessarily the case that they believed the facts were tainted by 
bias, as the company claimed. What they argued, rather, was that presenting the facts in an 
emotional, "unscientific" way made them appear biased to others. And pragmatically, when it 
came to persuading non-activists to support the campaign, perceptions of bias were as much a 
problem as bias itself.  
Such was the criticism of Fahad, a young professor at a nearby engineering college and a 
member of Justice Now, a Muslim youth group that had long worked in solidarity with the 
Gandhamur campaign. During much of my research, Fahad was working on a new study that 
was meant to make up for the inadequacies of earlier attempts at producing people's science for 
Gandhamur. He saw the Jananīti study as one source of scientific evidence for the Gandhamur 
campaign. Its failing, he argued, was in the feelings it evoked in its presentation of that evidence.  
"From the beginning itself, anyone reading that report will feel that it is a report meant to 
help the struggle win. But the report we are preparing, without feeling that it is the struggle's 
report - eh, not without feeling, not like that...This [is] evidence. Facts."  
Fahad wanted the Gandhamur campaign to produce its own scientific reports, but he did 
not want the reader to feel that it is "the struggles report." At the same time, Fahad was careful 
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not to say what he almost did say: that he was trying to keep the reader from feeling that this was 
the struggle's report, even though it was. Instead, he says only that the reader should encounter 
the report as "facts," that is, not with feeling nor without feeling. Not as the struggle's, nor not as 
the struggle's, but as simply science. Activist scientific work, he argued, is necessary to produce 
such facts, but these facts should nonetheless be read as disconnected from the mediations of 
activist science, as immediate. 
Producing this sort of immediacy, in Fahad's view, was a matter of following the 
"pattern" of science in the methods and presentation of research. Having never conducted a study 
of pollution before, Fahad researched the procedures for environmental impact assessments set 
out by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. He adopted many of their research methods, 
such as mapping out zones for sampling and taking samples in triplicate. Thus, he could claim 
that his study had "nothing that was not scientific." In addition, he said, he structured the report 
"in the pattern of science"—with abstract, introduction, literature review, methodology, results, 
discussion, abbreviations list, and references—all in the "standard" order. Late in my research, I 
visited him at the college, and we paged through the completed report together: two thick, 
colorful volumes of tables and charts, sandwinched between glossy white plastic with brass 
clasps at the corners. Like the campaign participants, he told me that nothing good could be 
expected from government science. But without some scientific evidence, the campaign would 
never win. And here that evidence was. 
In certain respects, Fahad's report was not immediately recognizable as people's science. 
The report was meant to persuade scientists and to be usable in court cases, he explained, and 
would be hard for non-scientists to understand. Although he anticipated that I, as a fellow 
scientist, would appreciate its findings, he acknowledged that it would not be readable by 
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common people. Its scientific form, which made it so powerful in other respects, also made it 
difficult to communicate to those it was meant to serve. For that reason, Fahad planned to 
summarize the results in a PowerPoint presentation and present them to the Action Council and 
its supporters before publication.  
But Fahad's PowerPoint did not go quite as planned. A week after our interview, he stood 
before dozens of participants in the Gandhamur campaign in a large hall in the nearby town of 
Chalakudy, defending his findings. For most of the presentation, the audience had been quite 
silent. Local campaign participants nodded and murmured as Fahad presented maps of the 
sampling sites. One man, a scientist with the fisheries department, raised some issues with some 
of his conclusions about microorganisms in the samples, but Fahad seemed to handle the matter 
well. Near the end, however, there were more questions along these lines, and a problem began 
to take shape. Fahad had found levels of certain bacteria that can be hazardous, but he had said 
little or nothing about heavy metals or cancer. He had found pollution, but not the pollution that 
the campaign had been protesting all this time. He countered objections by suggesting that his 
results opened up new possible directions for the campaign, which would be grounded in firmer 
evidence. But this did not seem to satisfy, and the presentation ended on an ambiguous note. The 
next day, I received news that the release of Fahad's study had been postponed indefinitely. 
When I departed Kerala several months later, it still had not been released. 
 Fahad, like James, believed that moral facts could persuade even when science was 
undertaken with activist motives. People's science was possible because of this obdurate power 
of facts; the impossibility of explaining them entirely in terms of empathy or ethical alignment. 
But whereas James asserted, against his critics, that the facts speak for themselves, Fahad 
attributed the power of facts to the processes by which they were produced and the forms in 
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which they were presented. Only by employing internationally recognized research techniques, 
Fahad believed, could he produce facts that would not be tainted by activist emotion or written 
off as "what you say." But if the Jananīti study failed because it felt for the people too much, 
Fahad's study failed because the "neutral" evidence it produced was out of sync with the needs of 
the campaign.  
If the efforts of the Gandhamur Action Council to produce people's science appear to 
assume a realist moral ontology, they also challenge any straightforward account of how moral 
reality can be accessed. Even if injustice is out there in the world, showing it to be there is no 
easy task. On the one hand, even if they were convinced on their own account, activists 
recognized that emotional alignment could overshadow or even eclipse a moral fact, rendering its 
persuasive force null. On the other hand, activists had no guarantee that reality, when summoned, 
would speak with one voice. Perhaps in other circumstances, the discordance between Fahad's 
study and the campaign's claims might have been distributed to separate realities. But in this 
case, the purpose of people's science was precisely to resolve tension between scientific evidence 
and the experiences of the people. Instead of resolving tension, however, Fahad's study 
threatened to heighten the problems with evidence that the campaign already faced.  
The campaign's rejection of Fahad's argument that his evidence opened up new strategic 
possibilities for the campaign helps to indicate just how committed campaign leaders were to the 
unity and coherence of moral reality. After all, given that Fahad's evidence of micro-organic 
pollution did directly contradict the campaign's claims, it might seem that the campaign would 
have been more prudent to take his advice. This adjustment have brought their claims into 
agreement with some substantial scientific evidence. Moreover, it might seem that if they were 
really committed to realism, they would have had to accept that their old views were incorrect. 
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As one activist explained to me, however, Fahad's proposal was impossible. Campaign 
participants' narratives of cancer, respiratory problems, and heavy metals were not simply 
strategic frames aimed at persuading others, they were how they understood their own opposition 
to the factory. They were the basis of vikāram. In other words, switching to the understanding of 
pollution that Fahad proposed would not have been simply a matter of the best means to an end. 
Accepting his evidence threatened the end itself. The decision to prefer their own experiences 
over Fahad's evidence might have been bad science, but it was also testimony to how important it 
was to Gandhamur activists that the injustice they fought was a coherent reality. 
7.5 Two stories about injustice 
Several months after his first direct encounter with pollution in Gandhamur, Sunil began 
to express skepticism again. Only it was different this time. Earlier he had resisted siding with 
the gelatin factory campaign because of the neutrality he believed was appropriate to his role as a 
researcher. Now, he was suspicious of foul play. Suspicion was in the air at the time: after the 
clash with police, the campaign had received a surge of media attention and popular support. The 
pipe had broken in the midst of this high point, when victory had seemed all but certain. But 
thereafter the campaign had begun to cool, many outside supporters withdrew, and media 
attention dwindled (see Chapters 2 and 3). There were grumblings about betrayal within the 
Action Council. There were rumors about Sunil and me as well. In the midst of all this, Sunil had 
begun to voice doubts about the methods and motives of campaign organizers.  
Recall, for example, the incident with which I open Chapter 3, in which Sunil and I were 
riding our tandem bicycle into Gandhamur, having received news that there had been a fishkill in 
the canal behind the factory. Stopping for a cold soda along the way, we overheard a few tidbits 
from the shopkeeper and other patrons. The shopkeeper said the fish that had died were too large 
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to have really come from that canal, that the campaign must have just thrown some dead fish in 
themselves, but others said that they had seen little fish floating on the water as well. As we 
remounted our bike, Sunil asked me, "Did the fish die, or did they kill the fish?" 
For Sunil, our direct encounter with pollution that day no longer held the same persuasive 
force as on his first day in Gandhamur. Indeed, as time passed, Sunil had begun to express that 
he was no longer sure he could smell the pollution anymore. He smelled things sometimes, he 
explained, but he was not sure he smelled what everyone else was talking about. At one point, he 
told me that he doubted whether he had ever really smelled it. 
Sunil's experiences of suspicion and doubt show a different side to our account of activist 
evidence. If the smells and colors of injustice had at one time compelled him to join the cause, 
his alienation from the campaign now seemed to make such unmediated encounters with 
injustice less possible. Our other stories of activist evidence in Gandhamur have shown how 
reality can affect the ethical positions people take. Here, as counterbalance, is a story of how 
ethical positions can influence perceptions of what is real.  
Of course, the influence of ethical positioning is important to our other accounts of 
activist evidence as well. In the direct encounter ritual, Gandhamur activists sought to embed the 
smells and colors in their own life narratives, so that sensation and solidarity were blended into 
the experience of pollution. Empathy and experience were always deployed in concert, each 
supporting the other, so that is impossible to say whether reality or intersubjectivity is more 
fundamental. But even the KPCB researcher's refusal of empathy was an ethical act which 
influenced how the stuff in the water affected her. The problem then, is how to make sense of 
both of these stories—encounters with reality affecting evaluation and evaluation affecting how 
we encounter reality—at the same time. 
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One way would be to stress the sharedness of shared moral realities. In this account, 
ethics is something that people do, in which social relations are at stake. Under the metaphor of 
ethical positioning, or stance, evaluation of any object puts one into alignment or disalignment 
with others, generating moral solidarity or antagonism (see Chapters 1, 3, and 6). When activists 
in Gandhamur make claims about pollution, then, they are not fundamentally concerned with 
what is in the water or the air, but rather with where they stand in the agonistic field defined by 
the opposition between the campaign and the factory. This view works well with traditional 
accounts of social movement framing, in which activists are primarily concerned with recruiting 
more people. A frame may take the form of a claim about reality, but its motive is given by the 
strategic aims of a social movement organization such as the Action Council, not by an 
encounter with an unjust world. 
Focusing on evidence helps to highlight the limitations of this understanding of ethics. 
Already, the metaphor of stance requires some object mediating alignment or disalignment, just 
as Schutz' account of the intersubjective "we relationship" needs a flying bird. When we examine 
the evidentiary practices people undertake to back their ethical claims, these subject-object 
relations come to the fore. It mattered to Sunil that it was colors and smells, not only activists, 
that persuaded him. It mattered to Asha that facts and figures should be the basis of her actions, 
even if she already empathized with the campaign. It mattered to James that facts could speak for 
themselves. None of these people describe their ethical positions purely in terms of 
intersubjectivity or the importance of social relations. Indeed, much appears to be at stake in 
understanding activist evidence as more than a recruitment strategy. 
These accounts of activist evidence do not force us to abandon the view that the 
moralness of moral realities has its basis in the stances people take with respect to objects of 
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evaluation. Gandhamur activist may understand themselves to have encountered injustice in the 
world, but we can certainly re-describe these encounters as impositions of values upon the world. 
Within such a framework, claims about moral realities must be understood, with 
Mazzarella (2006), as a kind of false consciousness—a denial of the social constructedness of 
what we construct. We could still acknowledge that talk of reality is particularly important to 
people when ethical matters are at stake, and that such talk can have significant pragmatic effects 
on social life (Keane 2013). Nonetheless, claims to have encountered injustice in the world 
would only be describable as a pervasive and highly consequential error—a fiction with a social 
function. 
An alternative approach would be to take something closer to Gandhamur activists' own 
view and treat justice and injustice as properties of real objects. Seen in this way, claims about 
reality are not only about ethical alignments or disalignments; they are also demonstrably more 
or less accurate. Thus, the difference between Sunil's initial moment of certainty and his later 
moment of doubt would be readable as more than a story about shifting alliances to which the 
question of injustice serves as a mere foil. Instead, the question of injustice remains a real 
question that, in part because of one's commitments, can be difficult to answer. Sunil was certain 
because he thought he had encountered a real injustice. He doubted because he believed he may 
have been misled. But both certainty and doubt presupposed that injustice could be real and 
could be known. The difference would not be an indication of the arbitrariness of Sunil's 
evaluations, but of the difficulty of evaluating correctly. 
Graeber, building on the work of Bhaskar and other critical realists, has recently argued 
that "it is one of the defining qualities of reality that it cannot be completely known" (2015, p. 
27). It is when we debate what is uncertain, he points out, that we invoke reality. The realist view 
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I propose here extends this argument to invocations of moral reality as well. The uncertainty 
surrounding these invocations is what reality is all about. From this perspective, to treat moral 
claims as purely social is to commit something like Bhaskar's epistemic fallacy: "that statements 
about being can always be transposed into statements about our knowledge of being" (2008, p. 
16). Sunil's claims to have smelled (or not smelled) injustice in Gandhamur are not merely self-
referential statements about his own position; they are statements about being. As such, they can 
be more or less correct, more or less doubtful, but they cannot be written off as fictions 
altogether. 
To what extent would such a realist understanding of activist evidence conflict with 
anthropology's traditional emphasis on the cultural specificity of ethical values? As noted above, 
even as Gandhamur activists' claims presuppose some degree of coherence and unity of moral 
reality, their predicament also illustrates how states can employ a scientist variety of moral 
realism to delegitimize opposing views. Such appropriation of the real by the powerful is at the 
root of anthropology's opposition to realism historically, and critics of recent calls for ethical 
naturalism expressed the same concerns. 
One way of addressing this problem is the notion of affordances (Keane, 2016). 
Described in terms of affordances, a value-laden world may affect one's evaluations without 
determining them. More importantly, the same world need not necessarily afford the same 
evaluations for all people. What is good for some need not necessarily be good for all. The 
concept of affordances would thus help us to understand the intensive work Gandhamur activists 
undertook to conduct the direct encounter ritual successfully. In particular, we could see why 
they sought to address the KPCB researcher as a fellow parent, rather than only as a scientist. 
The smell of pollution might afford a stronger sense of injustice for a parent or a layperson than 
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for a scientist or a government researcher. 
It is not clear, however, that affordances are powerful enough to account for the kind of 
persuasive force that both Gandhamur activists and scientists attributed to evidence of injustice. 
In Sunil's account of how he was affected by the pollution, for example, is it enough to say that 
smells and colors made his new commitment to the campaign possible? It would seem, rather, 
that he experienced the world as demanding this commitment, not merely affording it. Similarly, 
the aim of research on pollution is ostensibly to make a particular evaluation not merely possible, 
but undeniable. As James and Fahad discovered, summoning the persuasive force of ethically 
charged realities may require a lot of work, but this was at least in part because the ethical 
implications of evidence were difficult to control. Evidence was both desirable and risky insofar 
as it made certain ethical positions unavoidable. 
At least in some cases, then, we may need a concept more causally effective than 
affordance to describe human engagement with a value-laden world. But this is not to say that 
the evaluative content of reality is ever transparent or deterministic. At a minimum, a value-laden 
world must be as complex, contingent, and conjunctural as we know the world to be.66 
Moreover, any account of the persuasive force of things would still need to situate that force 
within the persuasive practices of humans. There are no direct encounters in Gandhamur without 
the direct encounter ritual. And if Gandhamur activists believed that moral realities could be 
known, they were just as certain that prejudices, intense emotion, or corruption could obscure 
these realities. Even the most obvious injustices, it would seem, are moving only for those who 
allow themselves to be moved. 
                                                 
66 For this phrasing, I am indebted to the account of non-deterministic causality developed by 
critical realists, particularly the theoretical work of George Steinmetz (1998) and Philip Gorski 
(2004). 
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Our picture of activist evidence reveals a tension in ethics as way of relating to others and 
ethics as a way of relating to the world. If the metaphor of stance foregrounds the way an 
evaluation of an object is also a position with respect to other subjects, evidentiary practices help 
to bring the evaluated objects back into view. For the activists in Gandhamur, the objects matter; 
evaluative positions must be motivated by smells, or facts and figures, or their narrative of 
injustice is only a matter of "what you say." Evaluation, for them, is not only a matter of how 
subjects position themselves in relation to objects, but also of how objects are positioned in 
relation to subjects. This does not mean that anthropology cannot continue to describe ethics a 
matter of subject-subject relations in which objects only mediate social alignments and 
oppositions. But it does highlight one weakness of this approach to ethics: we must continue to 
wonder why people so often argue about good or bad, injustice or justice as if they were out 
there in the world. Relatedly, moves from is to ought will continue to seem awkwardly 
unjustifiable. Throughout my account of activist evidence, the validity and even necessity of 
such moves is the one thing that no one involved—neither the activists, nor the scientists, nor the 
ambivalent research assistant—ever really doubted. To adequately account for this, we need 
some minimal moral realism of the kind I describe here. 
In the last three chapters, I have traced how various trajectories of force interact in 
activists' efforts to change themselves and others. I have shown how activists' creative work upon 
themselves is always also tied up with the influences of others and of the material world. 
Persuasion, which has already begun in the process of work upon the self, likewise unfolds as a 
convergence of multiple forces, including the inspiration and demands of a non-neutral material 
world. In this analysis, I have considered how the ethical dimensions of activism can shed light 
on ethical life more generally. In the next and concluding chapter, I consider the limits of this 
  284 
 
move. I employ the tools offered by my analysis thus far to ask what is specific to activist ethics, 
and how activists' ethical lives may differ from those of non-activists. In doing so, I also address 
an ethical problem at the heart of activist experience: how does one become an activist? 
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Chapter 8: Becoming an Activist 
8.1 Trapped 
"I am afraid." 
"Hmmm?" 
I searched Sunil's face to see if he was joking. We were standing on the railway platform, 
sipping cold club sodas while we waited for the train. We had been talking about his recent 
interview in Mumbai, where he had applied to the master's of social work (MSW) program at the 
Tata Institute for Social Sciences (TISS), the most prestigious social work program in India. As 
happens when two people spend nearly every day together for a year, everything in our 
conversation had been said a few times before, and my mind had wandered. But now, he had my 
attention. He was serious. 
"It's the Dialogue Journey," he explained, "Its route comes right through my nāṭ.67 They 
have a plan to come right through that town that is near my house, you know that main junction? 
Rajendran-uncle asked me if I know people at any of the local youth clubs. He wants me to 
organize a welcome party. I do know plenty of people, but...my uncle's quarry..." 
After their split with the campaign against the Gandhamur gelatin factory (see Chapter 2), 
activists associated with Kēraḷīyam had increasingly given their attention to granite quarrying in 
the Western Ghats mountains. As described in Chapter 3, meeting with the action councils of 
                                                 
67 Nāṭ is a term meaning the place to which one belongs, usually the place of one’s kin. For 
detailed discussion, see Chapter 2. 
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quarry struggles—and, ultimately, organizing a coalition among them—became a major aim of 
the Dialogue Journey, a fifty-day trek through the Western Ghats with an official mission of 
raising awareness about environmental degradation. As Sunil and I followed preparations for the 
journey, the anti-quarry focus of the event had become a source of some anxiety for him. Now, 
that anxiety had greatly increased. 
"It all depends on which way they go," he said, tracing the Journey’s possible routes in 
the air with his hands, "There is a split in the road there. One road goes off this way to [a large 
town], and the other one curves off this way and goes right past my house. As long as they do not 
go down the road to my house, it is okay." 
Sunil's fear was two-edged. On the one hand, he was afraid to say no to Rajendran, the 
main organizer of the Dialogue Journey. As discussed in Chapter 5, although people of all ages 
participated in the Dialogue Journey, one of its major aims had been to cultivate a new 
generation of activist youth—that is, unmarried people between their late teens and early 30s. 
Rajendran, an activist who had himself been a youth during the emergence of Kerala’s 
environmental movement in the 1970s, had been working full time to organize a collective called 
Youth Forum for the previous year or so, often living in the Kēraḷīyam office. The Dialogue 
Journey was to be the capstone of this work, after which participants in Youth Forum would take 
the reins themselves. At twenty, Sunil fit in with this crowd in a way that had not been true for 
our prior fieldwork. Rajendran had, from the beginning, approached Sunil as a potential 
participant in the Youth Forum, and his invitation to organize a welcome party for the Dialogue 
Journey followed this pattern. It was clear that Sunil did not want to let him and the other 
journey participants down. 
But at the same time, Sunil was afraid of what might happen if he did organize such an 
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event in his hometown. 
"Everyone there knows that my uncle is the one who gave me my whole education," he 
told me, "Then if I give him trouble in return..." 
Sunil's uncle (his ammavan, or mother's older brother) was in the quarry business. Sunil's 
mother was his father's second wife, the first having died. However, after marrying Sunil's 
mother, Sunil's father continued to live with the kin of his first wife, from whom he had two 
children.68 As Sunil's mother preferred not to move to her husband’s first wife’s home, she had 
remained with her older brother. He had built a small house for her and her two sons, of whom 
Sunil was the eldest. Throughout his youth, Sunil had watched as his uncle went from being a 
quarry laborer to purchasing his first small bulldozer, to hiring the men he used to work 
alongside, to purchasing more and larger equipment. His small but thriving quarry business had 
put Sunil through his BSW program, making him the first in his family to hold a college degree. 
His uncle had postponed completing the construction of his home so that this would be possible. 
When Sunil began receiving his salary as my research assistant, he had tried to give money back 
to his uncle, but the latter had refused. And now, if he gained admission to the MSW program in 
Mumbai, his uncle would pay for that as well. How then, could Sunil bring a bunch of anti-
quarry activists to his hometown? What would people say if he gave his uncle such “trouble in 
return”? 
Sunil was, in effect, caught between these two fears. If he told Rajendran that he did not 
                                                 
68 Matrilocality was common among Muslims from Sunil’s region, depending on financial 
means and the preferences of kin. Thus, his father had settled with his first wife’s kin after their 
marriage. In the same way, it was not unusual that Sunil’s mother should remain with her older 
brother after her marriage. Matrilineality and matrilocality were once very common in Kerala, 
particularly among the dominant landowning Hindu caste, but to varying degrees in other castes 
and religions as well (Arunima, 2003). For this reason, and to this day, a woman’s older brother 
often plays an important role in her children’s lives. 
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want to organize the welcome party, then he would be asked why. He would have to admit not 
only that his uncle was in the quarry business (or “quarry mafia,” as it was called among 
Kēraḷīyam associates), but also that he was unwilling to protest this business. He would be 
admitting to choosing his family over his activist commitments. If, on the other hand, he 
organized the welcome party, winning the favor of his new comrades, he would be spiting his 
uncle and shaming his family, and himself, before the gaze of their nāṭ. 
In the face of this impossible choice, Sunil's strategy had been to keep quiet and hope 
Rajendran would forget about the whole thing. Or even that the Journey would take another route 
altogether. That is why he had suddenly brought it up with me at the railway station that day. He 
had been silently holding it in, and it had been eating him up inside. 
"I had not mentioned to Adarsh or anyone else up to then, and I still have not mentioned 
it to anyone," he said, asking me to keep it secret as well, "If I bring it up, I might get trapped," 
8.2 Activist ethics as one possibility 
In introducing her ethnography of Indian lesbian activists, Naisargi Dave (2011) 
describes a moment when she realized that an account of the strategies and functions of various 
lesbian organizations would not sufficiently address questions at the very heart of queer activism. 
Specifically, such an analysis could not tell us "why are activists, activists?"—that is, what 
motivates certain lesbian women to act in the ways that define them as activists (Dave, 2011, p. 
4). The answer to this question, she finds, is that "collectively, they nurture ethical ideals about 
what the world could look like. They act out of conflicted, sometimes uncomfortable, beliefs in 
the possibility of justice" (Dave, 2011, pp. 4, 6). It is this, Dave argues, that makes queer 
activism about ethics. 
In the preceding chapters, I have told a similar tale, exploring how activists in Kerala's 
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people's struggles make claims about injustice in the current world and attempt to enact and 
promote their visions for justice. I have attempted to trace the origins and multiple trajectories of 
the motive forces that drive these activists to undertake this work. But I have also tried to 
understand how they exert force upon one another, and upon their non-activist social surround, 
so as to transform their own motives into drivers of broader change—to win people over to their 
cause. For example, I have shown how documentation of people's struggle feeds into 
intervention in people's struggle, and vice versa; how a small group of people with convictions 
about a polluting factory become "the people" appearing before the public; and how sensory 
encounters with pollution are translated, or not, into action by government officials. Across these 
and other accounts of ethical force, I have countered the notion that ethics is exclusively driven 
by the force of society upon individuals or the work of individuals upon themselves. Instead, I 
present cases in which a range of interacting forces—authority and reasons, peer pressure and 
self-discipline, bodies as roadblocks and bodies as display—all exert pressure on the evaluative 
domain of human life and, as such, make a difference to contention within that domain. 
In conclusion, then, I wish to bring the fruits of this analysis to bear on a question that has 
been latent throughout many of the preceding chapters: How does a person become an activist? 
This question is, of course, proximate to the question of what makes an activist an activist, which 
Dave suggests should be central to the study of activist ethics. And it is with Sunil's various 
fears, I believe, that we find the most nuanced and insightful answer. 
We have already explored activist becoming in Sunitha's story of gaining awareness and 
conviction at the seminar led by solidarity organizers, in the practices of stance alignment at the 
rain camp, or in the direct encounters that Gandhamur Action Council members facilitated 
between visitors and the sights and smells of pollution. We can see in these stories the impacts of 
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persuasion by others, of the desire for community, and of the qualities of material things. Each of 
these are motive forces that might contribute to a non-activist becoming an activist. But in each 
case the answer is unsatisfactory because activist becoming was never really under question. We 
have, in the main, examined the change narratives of those who are already activists—whether 
retrospective stories of one’s own transformation or prospective efforts to bring others to the 
cause. But in such narratives, it is hard to fully appreciate the possibility that one could take an 
entirely different path, that one could also not become an activist. 
By contrast, Sunil was, during much of our work together, uncomfortably situated 
between being an activist and not being an activist. Accompanying me on fieldwork, Sunil was 
thrust into the midst of people's struggle activism suddenly and with little foreknowledge of what 
this might entail. Although he had just completed his bachelor's in social work, he had no 
previous encounter with Kerala's alternative leftist circles. As suggested in the previous chapters, 
many of the values of Faiza and Adarsh were strange to him. Moreover, their opposition to 
organized religion was incompatible not only with his own Muslim faith, but also with his efforts 
to avoid lapsing in the routines of prayer and mosque attendance with which he had grown up. 
And yet, he also felt drawn to participate more fully in at least some aspects of the Kēraḷīyam 
community, and this desire became stronger as our research went on, particularly as he was 
introduced to other activists his own age. At the same time, he continued to desire to please his 
uncle. His fears of being rejected by Rajendran and the Youth Forum participants, or by his uncle 
and the people of his nāṭ, were the counterpart to these desires. The story of how Sunil 
negotiated these desires and fears became a story of how a person might, or might not, become 
an activist. 
I have already indicated, in the opening to Chapter 1, how living alongside Faiza and 
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Adarsh exerted pressure on Sunil, and I have suggested that he experienced this pressure as a 
kind of unfreedom, an unpleasant force from outside himself. We have also seen, in Sunil's 
"direct encounter" with pollution in Gandhamur, how other external influences bore upon his 
ethical positions without the same negative affective impact. But Sunil was also actively engaged 
in responding to the various positions and life paths that presented themselves among the 
activists we studied together. He weighed these new values and new relationships against the 
values with which he had been raised and the community of kin among whom he had, up to that 
time, most identified. As he considered what it would mean to take on the values and practices of 
the activists he met, Sunil came up against Dave's question ("why are activists, activists?") as a 
puzzle for who he should be. Thus, following him as he found his own path among divergent 
possibilities is one way of exploring what is particular to the ethical lives of activists. In the gap 
between possibly become an activist and possibly not, we can join him in exploring how activist 
ethics differ from other forms of ethical life. 
8.3 Dialogic shifts 
Shortly after Sunil confided in me about his fears regarding the Dialogue Journey's route, 
we found ourselves stepping out of a small tour bus into one of the largest granite quarries in 
Kerala. We were taking part in a weekend trip to Faiza's ancestral home in the Western Ghats, 
arranged by her father and occasioned by a ceremony he had organized in honor of her deceased 
mother. With us were Faiza, her sister, a few of their cousins, my wife, some neighbors from 
across the street, and a gaggle of kids of various lineage, including my own baby daughter. The 
first stop on our sight-seeing excursion was the quarry. 
As we walked up a steep hill, our sandals splashing in fine red sand, I wondered how our 
group had decided to stop there at all. The quarry had a brutal beauty; it sliced through the dull, 
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black rind of the rockface to reveal clean, new granite, as white as bone breaking through the 
skin. But Faiza was leading our tour, and I felt sure that this could not be where she wanted to 
take us.  
At the top of that first hill and the bottom of many more, we came to a place where there 
were dump trucks parked and men reclining in the shade of a few wide-reaching trees. There was 
a shed with a machine inside, making a sound like eating: crunch, crunch, crunch, crunch, except 
that it never stopped to swallow, it just went on like that. On one side of the shed was a conveyor 
belt made of large shovels, like the scoops of an old-fashioned waterwheel, which lifted broken 
rock from some unseen cache below and dropped it into a metal box. A second conveyor belt 
extended from the box like a long metal tongue, and from the tongue’s tip an unbroken stream of 
gray dust poured down into a waiting truck, sending up a cloud of fine mist as it fell, like steam 
rising over pouring tea. 
I could not help but feel sickened. And I wondered, as I noticed that feeling, whether I 
would have felt the same a few months before. Over the course of my research in Kerala, I had 
begun to notice differences in myself that were both sensory and evaluative at the same time. 
Some were of the sort that one would expect in any long-term visitor: my food began to feel 
incomplete without the flavor of coconut, which is an ingredient in nearly every Kerala dish. But 
there were other changes that were matters of taste in a different sense. Kerala's many rubber 
plantations, which had been cool groves when I first encountered them years before, now looked 
desolate; I could see only the forests that had been cleared to plant them. Elaborate mansions, 
with their high concrete walls, which I might have admired previously, were now only mountains 
broken up and chewed to dust. The influence of the activists I studied upon my own ethical 
views was, no doubt at the root of these changes in taste. In this sense, I understood them. But I 
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did not like them. For the most part, they made my world less beautiful. And now that quarries, 
rubber plantations, and mansions were distasteful, I could not experience them any other way. 
For me, our whole quarry tour was like that. We climbed until we could take in a wide 
vista, with endless hills and valleys stretching away below. Here and there, naked black mounds 
erupted like stone bubbles over the rolling green waves. My eye immediately fell upon the little 
white bitemarks that had begun to gnaw the mounds away. Some had been whittled down to 
pencil-point spires, as spindly and white as church steeples. But I could not see them like 
steeples; I could only think that no one would ever know the size and shape of the mounds that 
had once been there. 
The more I explored this new revulsion in myself, the more I wondered if Sunil had 
begun to feel it too. As we came to one crest, there was a twisting cylinder of stone with another 
boulder, a huge block, balanced delicately on top, like the head of a hammer. Sunil joked about 
how someone must have come and forgotten it there, a joke that had come into my mind at 
almost the same moment. It was a common occurrence in those days, near the end of our work 
together, when we had so many months behind us. But that day, trying to feel out changes in 
myself, this small moment of resonance made me wonder whether he might also have changed in 
similar ways. If he had, how would I know? 
That day, I could find little sign that Sunil saw the quarry the way that I did. He and 
Faiza’s cousins were mostly caught up in up in posing and snapping photos of one another in 
front of the boulders. Faiza, still in the role of tour guide, made her own position clear with a 
short social history of the place, describing how it had once been a tourist destination for very 
different reasons: the boulders had been dotted with small ponds, worn into the rock by millennia 
of rain, and the water had been thought to have healing powers. Now, she said, all of that had 
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been destroyed. I had pulled Sunil aside and had Faiza repeat this narrative, but it was hard to tell 
what it meant to him. As we walked back, past the dust-making machine, he had rejoined Faiza's 
cousins, who were snapping photos all the way down the hill. 
I continued to wonder about how Sunil might, or might not, be changing, but I was 
reluctant to ask him about it directly. As his employer and mentor in ethnographic fieldwork, I 
had learned to be careful about too quickly expressing my evaluations of what we encountered 
together. As noted earlier, Sunil was often quiet about his views. In our first months together, I 
had felt that he was particularly reluctant to express views that might differ from my own. Over 
time, he had begun to more frequently and directly disagree with me. But with regard to quarries 
and other environmental issues, my sense was that he was not entirely sure what he thought. As 
such, any direct question might push him to answer in a particular way. So rather than prying for 
answers, I waited and watched. 
A few weeks after our quarry visit, as the Dialogue Journey began, I saw some signs that 
Sunil had begun to adopt ethical positions that aligned with those common among the activists 
we studied. On the first day of the Journey, when he and I stopped at a snack shop, some locals 
asked us why we were there, Sunil explained the mission and activities of the Journey in the first 
person plural, as if he also was conducting it. When he was done, I felt the need to clarify—
given my status as a foreigner—that I was there as a researcher, not a participant. In the days that 
followed, Sunil visited houses with members of Youth Forum and, though he took some notes 
and audio recordings, he also participated in discussion, expressing many of the same views held 
by the activists. Later, he talked to me about this process, explaining that it had made him feel 
more a part of things. 
And yet, I wondered, how could I be sure that this increased participation reflected 
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changes in Sunil's own views? Without question, in his conversations with journey participants 
and people we met along the way, Sunil was increasingly placing himself in ethical alignment 
with the mission of the Dialogue Journey. But how much of this was motivated by changes in his 
commitments and how much by concern for what others would think of him? For example, 
Sunil's fear of organizing the welcome party seemed to be motivated primarily by concern about 
what the consequences would be, on the one hand, for his relationship with his uncle and, on the 
other hand, for his relationships with Rajendran and other activists. Sunil's response to this 
dilemma—to keep quiet and hope Rajendran forgot about the matter—seemed mainly to reflect a 
fear of being found out as kin of the “quarry mafia,” not concern about the environmental 
impacts of quarries. This made it seem possible that his expressions of alignment with activists' 
views during the Dialogue Journey were also mainly about wanting to be accepted. 
Sunil's narrative about his fear of bringing home plastic bags seems to exemplify this 
disjuncture between change motivated by social pressure and change motivated by a more 
internal process of re-evaluation, like the process I felt was transforming my own sensory 
experience. Sunil now recognized plastic bags as ethically salient—as something for which he 
could be called to account. But were plastic bags ethically important to him? In response to his 
fear, he had stashed the bag in a water reservoir, an act that would surely have met with even 
more disapproval from Faiza than bringing it home. This seems to suggest that what had changed 
for him was not the ethical import of plastic bags, but only recognition of the possibility of 
censure. 
However, even in the case of the plastic bags, I found it hard to see the changes in Sunil 
entirely in this way. First because, I also had experienced anxieties of the sort Sunil described, 
and I felt that the changes in myself were not reducible to these emotions. And second, because 
  296 
 
during fieldwork I had often sensed that there was a lot of slippage between what people took 
others to hold them accountable for and how they judged themselves. My analysis of ethical 
stickiness speaks to this (see Chapter 5). Those who continued to eat cookies were explicit in 
their rejection of Ali's evaluation of cookies, and yet that evaluation became a part of their 
conversation with one another. In that case, of course, this “internalization” of accountability was 
no necessary indication of alignment between cookie eaters’ opinions and those of Ali; indeed, 
they began to take each other to task for not eating cookies. Thus, such porosity of the boundary 
between internal and external would not be enough to account for an experience like my own, in 
which my sensorium had begun to fall into line with environmentalist values. Nonetheless, I 
could not help feeling that Sunil’s outward displays of altered opinions could not have remained 
only on the surface. Some of it, if not concern for plastic litter, must have gotten its barbs into 
him. 
Mahmood, in her study of piety movements among Muslim women in Cairo, describes a 
process of ethical formation that traverses boundaries between internal and external much more 
profoundly and completely—not only introducing accountability into a conversation, but 
fundamentally transforming opinions and desires. She describes how, in the self-understanding 
of these women, "submission to certain forms of (external) authority is a condition for the self to 
achieve its potentiality" (Mahmood, 2005, p. 149). For example, fear of divine retribution is not 
understood to be a purely external motive, but is rather a virtue that one must cultivate in order to 
develop the will to obey God (Mahmood, 2005, pp. 142,143). As one piety movement adherent 
explained, this fear is not the same as fear of the dark; it is what you feel "when you confront 
something or someone you regard with respect and veneration" (Mahmood, 2005, p. 143). Thus, 
we might understand divine retribution itself as external, but its moral force is premised on an 
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(internal) attitude of reverence for divine moral authority and directed at transformation of the 
force of the will.  
Mahmood’s argument about the entanglement of internal and external forces is very 
much in line with my own arguments in the previous chapters. But Sunil's engagement with the 
norms of the activists we studied was very different from the process of ethical formation 
Mahmood describes. For example, while Sunil often expressed admiration for Faiza and 
Adarsh's activist commitment and seemed to desire their approval, I saw no indication that he 
actively cultivated this desire for approval (nor fear of disapproval), nor that his fear of being 
"found out" by Faiza or Rajendran actually served to shape his own commitments.  
Nonetheless, there was evidence to suggest that Sunil had internalized the activists' 
ethical views in a different sense, one that was neither mere stickiness nor necessarily an 
alignment with these views. In one of my final conversations with Sunil, when I had run out of 
time to wait and watch, I asked him frankly about how his opinion on quarries compared with 
those espoused by the Dialogue Journey participants. His response was uncharacteristically 
immediate and comprehensive; it was clear that he had already given the question considerable 
thought. While he agreed that the really big quarries should be shut down, he felt strongly that 
activists were wrong to oppose all quarries. He argued that smaller quarries, of the sort his uncle 
digs, were needed if people were going to build houses for themselves. He said that the argument 
common in the Kēraḷīyam crowd, that people should build "alternative" (badal) houses out of 
mud, was simply impractical. 
This explicit description of Sunil’s views, in and of itself, could tell me little about how 
Sunil may or may not have been affected by the activists we studied. To be sure, it clarified 
where he stood, positioning him somewhere between the activists and the “quarry mafias” they 
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opposed. But it did not tell me whether he was changing. It was only a moment later, when we 
began to talk about his silence with regard to these views, that I began to see how the activists 
were affecting him. 
"Have you ever shared these opinions with anyone?" I asked. 
"Oh, no, if I said that, they would all turn against me!" he replied, "Who knows what 
would happen?" 
But although Sunil had not told any of the Dialogue Journey participants his opinions, he 
explained that he had imagined doing so.  
"At the time of those discussions, I stand up like that and say, "I am really a quarry 
person!" 
"You said that?!" 
"No, no! I thought that. I imagined. If I said that sometime, what would they do?" 
Sunil described his imagination of this scenario in two ways. He described how they 
would all turn against him. Laughing, he speculated that they would kill him. He also described 
the reasons that they would give for why he was wrong. He said that they would propose 
"alternative things" (badalāyiṭṭuḷḷa kāryaṅṅaḷ). For example, he surmised that they would point 
out that many people have built houses that are just sitting empty,69 and people should just share 
those. 
"But not everyone will be able to accept that," he said, "But then, they'll probably say, 
'Selfishness. You're not looking after the future, [you're just looking after] your own interests.' 
That's what they'll say. For each matter, they'll have some argument." 
                                                 
69 In Kerala, many of the largest and most elaborate houses were owned by people working 
overseas (see Chapter 1). These were often described, by activists and non-activists alike, as 
sitting empty. 
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 Like so, Sunil voiced the activists' objections to his views, responded to them, and 
allowed them the possibility of response in turn. He allowed that some of their points were 
difficult to refute. For example, he acknowledged that they were right to be concerned about the 
future; he agreed that current quarrying could be a problem for the next generation. He raised 
this point in the imagined voice of the activists, and he let it stand. But in response to other 
points, he gave succinct counters. Over months of imagined dialogue, Sunil had worked out 
nuanced arguments on both sides. Although he had carefully kept silent about his opinions, he 
had also been talking with the activists all along.  
Like the processes of ethical formation Mahmood describes, Sunil's imagined dialogues 
confound dichotomies between internal or external, self and other. Though the notion of "internal 
dialogue" is useful here, we should not forget how much this process is informed by Sunil's 
participation in the activities and discussions he had observed. In voicing the opinions of 
activists, Sunil mixed past tense reports of what they had said in similar situations with future 
tense predictions of what they would say, if he said such and such. Thus, the dialogue he 
presented shifted ambiguously between experienced and imagined, between overheard speech 
and inner speech. Sunil had internalized the activists not as models for his own behavior, but as 
interlocutors. 
And yet, this dialogue is also radically disconnected from these interlocutors. And in this 
way Sunil’s process stands in stark contrast to what Mahmood describes; if practitioners of piety 
blur the distinction between internal and external by opening themselves to normative pressure, 
Sunil’s dialogues continue despite a closure to such forces. The fear of censure that motivates 
Sunil to keep silent in actual discussions (or to stash a plastic bag in the reservoir) has no force 
here. If Faiza doubts whether Sunil's concern with plastic bags is motivated only by such fear, 
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his imagined dialogue shows that, with regard to the problem of quarries, such an explanation 
cannot suffice. Rather, by convincing him that sharing his views openly with the activists is 
impossible ("they would kill me"), Sunil's fear leads him to a form of dialogue where he need not 
be concerned with what anyone thinks of him. In this sense, we might say that  his refusal to talk 
opens up a space of radical freedom. 
8.4 Ethics without contention 
By the third week of the Dialogue Journey, it seemed clear that Rajendran had, indeed, 
forgotten about requesting that Sunil organize a welcome party in his hometown. Moreover, 
despite participating in many discussions about environmental degradation along the way, Sunil 
had been careful to give no indication of his own opinions about quarries, let alone his 
connections to the industry. And yet, as the Journey neared his hometown, Sunil's anxiety was 
high. 
"I'm not going to tell anyone where I'm from," he told me, "I will just say I am from 
Chalakudy. But some might recognize me. If I tell them my uncle's name, they'll ask me 'Is that 
Quarry Bashir? Which Bashir? Quarry Bashir? If you say Quarry Bashir, then they might know. 
Quarry Bashir or Bulldozer Bashir." 
By a stroke of luck, our route did not go right past Sunil's, as he had feared. Nor did we 
run into anyone who asked who he was or who his uncle was. We did run into a few friends of 
his, about his age, and he took care to explain that he was accompanying the activists in his 
capacity as a researcher, not as a participant. None of his friends raised the topic of quarries. 
Even then, Sunil remained tense. He later told me of one particularly hair-raising turn of 
events, when Rajendran had come over to talk with him at dinner. Sunil had braced himself for 
the worst, sure that some of the locals must have informed Rajendran about Sunil's uncle's 
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business. I had been part of the conversation as well, but had had no idea of the anxiety Sunil 
was experiencing. As it turned out, Rajendran had only come to congratulate him on his recent 
admittance to the TISS MSW program. 
"We have a lot of people up there at TISS," Rajendran said, and he tried to list the names 
of other young people he knew were studying there, but quickly got stuck on a name. "Anyway, 
we have a lot of people there. When you get there, you can help to get them organized."  
Sunil grinned and bobbled his head affirmatively, but said nothing. The feared moment of 
reckoning had not come to pass. The next day we left his hometown behind us. He had escaped 
the trap. 
About a week later, Sunil left for the MSW program in Mumbai. He reported to me later 
that the Mumbai chapter of Youth Forum never took off, but he continued to be interested in 
issues related to environmental justice and, upon graduation, he secured a job as a researcher 
with an environmental NGO in northern India. He has been especially interested in using his 
research to increase public recognition of the environmental knowledge of India's indigenous 
populations and promote the transfer of this knowledge to the next generation, concerns very 
much within the ambit of those valued by the activists described here. For many Malayalis, Sunil 
could well be called an environmental activist. 
And yet, Sunil's ethical life took a path very different from those of the other activists 
described here. Like Adarsh and Faiza, Sunil designed his life largely around the work of 
promoting his vision for social change. And doing so took him far from home. However, his 
distance from home was never one of ethical disalignment, as it had been for Adarsh and many 
of the other activists associated with Kēraḷīyam (see Chapter 6). Sunil continues to attend 
mosque regularly. He makes a respectable salary for someone his age. By his own report, he eats 
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more or less whatever is readily available—as he and I always did. 
On the night of Sunil's goodbye dinner—the same night when Sunil shared the harrowing 
tale of the plastic bags—Faiza and Adarsh also offered Sunil some gentle criticism and advice. 
This mode of conversation was unusual in our house. Though Adarsh and Faiza were a good ten 
years older than Sunil—enough that they might have assumed the right to tell him directly what 
he ought to do—they generally sought to encourage change more indirectly, even when it came 
to asking him to clean the bathroom and other mundane matters of sharing food and shelter. But 
in this final conversation, their advice was explicit and challenging. They felt that his 
experiences meeting and living alongside so many activists ought to have changed him a great 
deal, but they were concerned that they had not. Faiza, in particular, expressed concern that, 
despite having met people who had different ideas, beliefs, and lifestyles, Sunil was still very 
much a "normal" (English) person with a "neutral" (English) approach to life. She was worried 
that his pursuit of an MSW might only exacerbate these qualities. 
"In my experience, regarding society, these MSW graduates don't have any kind of 
awareness or sense of reality...They see this "social work" (English) as something very separate 
[from their relations to family or their societies]. But you have seen a lot of things. You have 
directly come to know the pulse of people in a place like Gandhamur...All of that should be 
reflected in your personal life." 
For Faiza and Adarsh, MSW graduates were "neutral" because they separated their 
change-oriented "social work" from their relationships with family and other aspects of "personal 
life." They believed that one's commitment to social change should touch every part of one's life. 
Their criticism of MSW graduates and advice to Sunil parallel the scalar perspective that 
solidarity organizers invoked in accusing the Action Council in Gandhamur of not having 
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"consciousness" or a "cause." To have awareness means to recognize the equivalent importance 
of working for change in all aspects of one's social life. In this view, change of self is part and 
parcel of changing one's social world; it is not enough to simply to undertake a social work 
career if one remains "normal." Borrowing from Mohandas’ seminar a year before, Faiza 
described the approach of MSW graduates’ failure to recognize the integration of changing 
oneself and changing others as “alienated” (see Chapter 6). Every part of social life, she argued, 
should be “social work.” 
As described in Chapter 6, being out of alignment with others is fundamental to Faiza and 
Adarsh’s ethic of activism, which is also a particular approach to activist ethics. In comparing 
Adarsh and Hari's approaches to disalignment, I have shown that activists face a dilemma 
between consistency and compromise, in which too much emphasis on consistently living out 
their values across all aspects of their lives can potentially lead to social isolation. At the same 
time, however, at least for activists involved in people's struggles, without some degree of social 
isolation, there is no activism. This is clearly true for rain camp participants, who find 
togetherness in their difference from the mainstream (see Chapter 3). More generally, we can see 
recognition of this principle in the centrality of the idea of the “alternative” (badal) for those 
associated with Kēraḷīyam. Without asserting some disalignment, some gap between one’s own 
position and that of others, one cannot imagine an alternative social order, nor begin to push for 
change. 
The fundamental necessity of contention to activist ethics also holds for members of the 
Gandhamur Action Council. Though they do not make a way of life of badal, these activists 
nonetheless contravene the usual preferences for alignment described by Sujit. They are the 
people who “talk openly”; the people whom Sujit says no one likes. As shown in Chapter 4, what 
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is important about talking openly is not that activists actually say what they think; what is really 
central is that they perform a willingness to stand and speak as if they do not care who hears—a 
willingness, and even desire, for disalignment. Such public displays of their opposition to others 
are crucial to their claims to be "the people."  
Thus, for those in Gandhamur as for those associated with Kēraḷīyam, part of the power 
of activism comes from a willingness to welcome disalignment with others and the social rifts 
that such disalignment entails. In neither case, of course, is disalignment the whole game. 
Indeed, the efforts for moral change described here were all ostensibly aimed at alignment; 
through persuasion, activists sought to bring others into alignment with themselves. But if 
alignment was the end, disalignment was always crucial to the means. It was where persuasion 
must begin. 
According to Faiza and Adarsh, their concern with Sunil's neutrality sprang from 
recognition of this fundamental importance to activist ethics of a willingness to be out of 
alignment with the ethical positions of others, not from any specific desire to win Sunil to their 
own ethical positions. One might call their advice to him meta-ethical; not advice to take up 
certain values or a certain way of life, but to take up a certain approach to ethics. But they also 
believed that, without influencing Sunil’s apparent aversion to disalignment, their efforts to 
change Sunil’s values were futile. As Faiza described to me later, she believed that, even if 
Sunil's thinking had changed during his time with them, any benefit would be outdone by his 
inclination to blend into the social context in which he found himself. 
"I think maybe he has changed in his thinking. Maybe from now on when he goes to take 
a plastic bag, he'll think 'Oh, if Faiza was here I would not take this bag.' And then, chances are, 
he'll take the bag," she said, laughing. "Understand? His style is like that—all dependent on his 
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context." 
My aim here is not to determine whether, or to what extent, Faiza is correct in her 
analysis of Sunil. But her criticism of what she found insufficient in Sunil's supposed approach 
to life—including to things as small as plastic bags—reveals what she took to be important to her 
own approach. For Faiza, working for change was premised on a basic willingness not to blend 
in, a willingness to take a stand and face the possible social fallout. In her view, the meta-ethics 
required for social change is fundamentally contentious. And in this we find a contrast with Sunil 
not only as she depicts him, but also as he described his own quarry quandary. Faced with the 
possibility of social censure or division on either side, Sunil believed that silence was clearly the 
best choice.  
This does not mean that Sunil did not undergo ethical transformation. His imagined 
dialogues still offered a robust means of engaging with ethical problems—one that is not so 
socially disconnected as it might at first seem. And it would appear that through such means, 
Sunil has been able to continue working for social change and, indeed, cultivate a life for himself 
that is in tune with his own values. But to the extent that these forms of ethical formation 
avoided contention, they do not contribute to an activist ethics in the terms of the other activists 
described here. 
In the preceding chapters, I have shown how changing oneself and changing others are 
inter-related in the lives of activists involved in Kerala's people's struggles. Tracing the 
trajectories of force that traverse these joint projects helps us to think beyond the dichotomy of 
freedom and unfreedom and see, instead, how selves, others, and material things can all exert 
pressure upon human ethics. We can see such forces at work in ethical lives whether they are 
activist or not. But we have found advantage in studying what I have here called “activist ethics” 
  306 
 
because it introduces division between selves and their others and engenders controversies over 
the values claimed to be present in the material world. By setting the various forces of ethical life 
against one another, activist ethics brings them into relief. For these reason, it not only helps us 
to understand the ethical lives of those who pursue contention, but also the lives of those who 
pursue other paths. 
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Appendix: Orthography
 
In transliterating Malayalam to Latin script, I have followed the system developed by 
Kunjan Pillai (1965) and shown in the table below. Symbols are listed in dictionary order (top to 
bottom, then left to right). I follow Asher and Kumari (1997) in transliteration of the central 
vowel “ə,” represented primarily by the diacritic “് ” in Malayalam script, which only occurs in 
word-final position. I have spelled words with commonly used romanizations (e.g., panchayat, 
hartal, and beedi) in the usual way. 
 
